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

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THE BEING OF GOD

MORAL GOVERNMENT

AND

THESES IN THEOLOGY.

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EDITED

BY REV. JAMES R. BOYD.

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PREFATORY NOTE BY THE EDITOR.

The principal writings of Dr. Squier are "The Problem Solved," published in 1855; "Reason and the Bible," (or the Truth of Religion,) in 1860, and his "Autobiography and Miscellaneous Writings," in 1867, one year after his lamented death. The volume now offered to the public, is the last that will appear. It was committed by the author on his death-bed to the charge of the Editor for revision and publication. It is matter of sincere regret to the latter that the revision could not have been made in the author's life-time and submitted to him for approval. The work, especially in some of its chapters, was found to stand in need of some correction, both in the way of omission, and of addition, in order to make it more perspicuous and acceptable to the general reader. Besides some verbal changes of less moment, the words or clauses supplied are generally included in brackets, and the utmost pains have been taken to express the author's ideas in the most exact and accurate manner, such as it is believed would have entirely met his approval and sanction.

Another part of the Editor's labor, has been the preparation of the Analysis, which it is conceived may be found useful, especially should the volume be employed, as the author earnestly hoped and expected that it might be, as a Text Book in the Higher Institutions of learning.

The first part of the volume, treating with great acumen and originality upon the Being of God, was given by the author himself to the press a few weeks before he died, though it was not published until the month following his

death, in the Presbyterian Quarterly and Theological Review for July, 1866. He designed it to accompany the treatise on Moral Government, of which indeed it forms a most appropriate introduction.

The author attached great importance to the doctrines he has maintained in relation to Moral Government, and conceived some of them to be in advance of the age; and, though antagonistic to many theological theories now in vogue, he anticipated the adoption and the prevalence of his own views in their stead, at no very distant period. Whatever estimate may be put upon the soundness or importance of those views, there can be no doubt as to the great value of the book, in suggesting original thoughts, and in affording to the student no inconsiderable amount of mental discipline.

It has been judged expedient to reprint the THESES IN THEOLOGY, that were published among the Miscellaneous Writings of the author a year ago, forming Part III of the present volume. They may be found very useful in the elucidation of some points in Part II that may have been too concisely treated. It is suggested also, that the previous volume of the author, entitled "Reason and Revelation," may with great advantage be read in connection with the one now offered to the public, for the sake of securing a more complete view of some of the topics herein presented.

With the fond hope, and the earnest prayer to the God of truth, the moral Ruler of the Universe, that this volume may be made greatly subservient to the progress of moral and theological science, and may thus promote the highest welfare of mankind, it is now commended to the candid examination and study of all who are interested in discussions of this nature, and especially to those who are connected with Collegiate and Theological Institutions.

Geneva, N. Y. J. R. B.

ANALYSIS.

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PART I.

THE BEING OF GOD.

THE BEING OF GOD.

The existence of God is a fundamental subject of thought. Nothing underlies it or goes before. All theology and moral science arise out of, and depend upon it. If God be not, then nothing is. All else must be resultant of him, and take on the postulate that he is. How can the finite be but by reason of the infinite, the created but by the uncreated, the dependent but by the independent, the conditioned but by the absolute and eternal?

Investigations in theology and moral truth have been much at fault here. They have shown weakness and equivocation, where of right belonged manhood and strength. The subject has not had justice at the hands of its friends. We have failed in method and in cogency of argument, in the reliability and comprehensiveness of our positions, in the resources and completeness of our logic and convictions. We have felt as if the theory of truth here was involved and intricate; as if the thread of the Sybil conducted us through dark and cavernous passages, and along by-ways which we knew not; that there water was too deep for us, and that we must here pass from the sphere of knowledge into that of simple faith.

In this direction the English mind has taken the lead. Sir William Hamilton has formally stated "that the *knowledge* of God is impossible," in his article on the "Unconditioned"—a position which has been laboriously supplemented by Dr. Mansel, of Oxford, in his *Limits of Religious Thought*. The natural effect of such counsels is to beleaguer conscience and embarrass faith, and set men free from the obligations of religion. And the seed has already borne its legitimate fruit. This is observable in the new impulses and encouragement of "*Positive Science*" on the one hand, and of philosophic atheism and infidelity on the other. What else could be expected? Men will not forswear their intelligence. They will not be religious by prescription, or believe beyond the limits of rational conviction. They will not consent to this divorce between reason and faith; and if attempted by those who should assist their faith, they will only choose their own alternative, and repudiate a creed that does not take the intellect into its conclusions, and build its economy of belief on those enduring principles and first truths which are common to all safe and satisfactory inquiry in other departments of knowledge. Indeed, the conscience should have special help here, in view of the "law in the members," warring against the "law in the mind." It is suicidal to put reason and conscience in antagonism, or reason and faith. And yet this has been the anomaly and perturbation of our theology hitherto, and its false mission to the thinking classes of men. France turned infidel by reason of the unappreciable mummeries of the Romish faith. The Tractarianism of Oxford gives ominous

signs of a like reaction. Error germinates in the twilight of conviction, and grows rank in the oscillations and tergiversations of truth.

But why found religion in mysticism, and put its chief elements beyond the limits of human thought? Was it not designed for man, and man for it? Should it not inhere in the principles of common sense, and be like the sunlight—for all, and adapted to all? It is false humility to say that we cannot know God, and that he cannot make himself *known* to us, and that the reason he has given us is not the offspring and counterpart of his own—made in his likeness, and adapted to intelligent correspondence with himself.

St. Paul was a philosopher as well as a Christian; and in a single sentence has he scattered to the winds all this timorousness and misgiving in respect to the elements of religious belief, and brought the whole subject into relation to the human mind, and incorporated it among the legitimate subjects of our knowledge and conviction, and declared our ignorance of it to be without excuse. Rom. i. 20: "For the invisible things of him (God) from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse." This passage is very emphatic. Its statements and positions are comprehensive. Its averments are characteristic and unequivocal. They go the full length demanded for the proof of the being and perfections of God, and account the belief in God to be so obvious and obligatory in its apprehension and requisition, that the heathen even are inexcusable for not

recognizing the true Jehovah, and worshipping, loving and serving him as such. The apostle waits for no special economy to reveal God to his creatures, but proclaims him manifested in his works, his being, his eternity and Godhead. All is clearly *seen*—intuitively beheld, and obviously implied and understood, in the legitimate apprehension of the mind from things that are made. "Eternal power" implies eternal existence; that is, uncreated, absolute existence. And then there is the embodiment of the whole grand idea of the "Godhead," as manifested in his works, as *clearly* beheld, as undeniably apprehended and understood. The reference in the passage is to the one true God, with his divine perfections, as thus known in reason, and clearly seen by the intelligence—the invisible things of him—the eternal potentiality and proper "Godhead" of the Deity.

On the basis here referred to, and in the light of the clear convictions of the apostle, we propose to give the proof of the being of God.

1. *Something is.* This is the testimony of reason, of consciousness, and of the senses. There is infallible truth in this position. If I think, I am; for only that which is, can think. How can we have secondary phenomena without the primary, or actions and words without being and thought?

We are conscious both of acting and of being. Some good writers have given up this last position, but without sufficient reason. There is in the soul a consciousness of existing as well as of acting, of being as well as behaving. This consciousness of self as being

and acting is infallible in its instruction, that something is—that we ourselves are, and have faculties and powers, convictions and feelings, intelligence, emotions and passions, observation and experience. In no other way could knowledge be more infallible, or be possible independent of it; and it is worse than idle to call in question the universal and necessary convictions of humanity on this point.

The senses, too, are sure sources and media of instruction; and we distinguish the "me" from the "not me." The eye, the ear, the touch, the taste, the smell, all are channels of knowledge to us from an external world, and methods of our access to it and communion with it. Only by these and like ways could we be put in communication with material objects, and become cognizant of the universe around us. And this linking of the "me" to the "not me" of external nature is a wonderful economy, yet fully authenticated.

Thus we have various means of coming to the knowledge that something is. We are; others are; suns and planets are, and all the universal cosmos of created things. This we may affirm with the certainty of clearly apprehended truth, without troubling ourselves with speculations about the presentative or representative methods of inquiry. Science and common sense agree here. This conviction comes to us with a thousand voices, from within and without, as the universal language of humanity, so that we need not prolong an argument in proof of that which every one feels and knows.

2. *Effects are.* We do not need to prove that man did not create the sun, or himself, or anything else. We know he did not. It is an undeniable position. And yet there are effects. The intelligence sees them to be so. Matter is; and it is meted, bounded and limited, and must have been meted, bounded and limited by what was outside and independent of itself. It is, because it was made to be, and was put into existence by a power before and extraneous to itself. It is, as it is, and where it is, by reason of something else. At most, it is but a "*causa causata.*" We see it to be, and to contain only the "*vis inertiæ.*" It is finite, and some being must have made it. It is a creation, and in itself an inert effect. Philosophy and common sense, reason and revelation, intelligence and the senses, agree in affirming this. We arrive at it as surely as we do at the truth, that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts; that matter exists in space, and events in time; and that he who acts, is.

Men dive deeper than the truth sometimes, and show themselves more like muck-worms than philosophers. All science takes rise in the intuitions of the intelligence. Demonstration is in aid of intuitional apprehension. The first truths of reason need no demonstration; they are intuitionally self-evident; they are infallibly seen in the mind's own light. Why undertake to prove to me that which already is a matter of my own consciousness, or which exists with the certainty of infallibly implied truth in the dictates of the intelligence? Why devote an argument to prove that matter exists in space, or that events occur in time, or that effects imply a

cause, or action an actor, or thinking a being that thinks?

Intuition is the test of truth, and the arbiter of knowledge. But for this, demonstration would be without conviction, and logic valueless and impossible. What satisfaction can we get from any efforts of logic beyond the insight of our minds, of the truth as reasoned out or stated? Thus all knowledge and conviction, on the last analysis, arise out of, and are resolved into, intuitions. And they must begin in self-evident principles of truth. We apprehend them in the insight of the intelligence, and advance from them, and but for them advance would be impossible. They are not proved, but seen in their own light, by the insight of reason.

This is not faith, though faith and trust in the things thus seen and signified is consequent and reasonable. It is not testimony to us, but apprehension by us. It is not testimony from the senses, but it is perception by them. It is apprehension and knowledge through them. It is the insight of the intelligence in the only possible way of consciousness and sense; and we believe the things thus made known, for the best of reasons, because we see them to be true. We take testimony from others and use it for what it is worth, but here we see and have the original types and methods of knowledge, and give them credence as such. And we perceive that matter is effect, and recognize it as merely inert, unconscious, impersonal effect, without sense or reason, and appropriate and use it as such. It is created, and not absolute in its being; it is, because it was made to be, and could not have been otherwise; and if we deny

the intuitions of mind in this, then is all knowledge impossible, and science a misnomer from the beginning.

So in the sphere of mind, though here we rise above nature, and take in the peculiar elements of the supernatural. Mind is cause *per se*, and yet but a limited, finite, created, dependent cause in us. It has no creative power, and must itself have been created. It is itself an effect, finite and dependent in its being and power. It could not create one particle of the dust of the earth. It had a beginning, and a creation, and puts on all the types of dependence, responsibility and allegiance. It is consciously an effect, and humble in its dependence, as the offspring of one who created and upholds and sustains all things.

3. *Something always was.* This follows infallibly from the fact that something is. How get the existent, without the ever-existent? How get the effect, without the cause? The scale of dependent causes does not help you. You must reach an original cause, which is in no sense an effect. Any and all effects show this. The philosophic Paul saw this, and leaped at once, in his convictions and his argument, from the creation to an *eternal* Power, and with the utmost legitimacy and infallibility. We care not how difficult may be the idea of the always being; it is inevitable. Either deny everything, or admit that. If effects are, there is eternal cause. If anything is, something always was. You get your whole doctrine from the least mote as completely as from the largest universe. Nothing could be, unless something always was. That which had a beginning is an effect, and had a cause above and before it.

That which began, is by reason of that which did not begin. Dependence proves independence; the derived, the underived; the created, the uncreated and absolute. You must accept absolute, uncreated, eternal being, as the only stand-point for the existence of anything else. It is our inevitable postulate—if effects are the creation is. But these are, and there is a cosmos. As you cannot deny the one, neither can you the other. The logic is inexorable, the philosophy without mistake, the insight of reason obvious and perfect. You get the derived finite, by means of the underived infinite. The *always-being*, is the necessary complement of the doctrine of every being, action and thought. You can have nothing, or think of nothing, that does not involve it. The full and adequate conception of the *always-being*, "without beginning of days or end of years," may not be expected of derived mind. We are an effect, and abide in the region and sphere of effects, and find it difficult to grasp that which is only cause, and itself uncaused. But that it is, admits of no doubt, "being clearly seen by things that are made"—and we repeat the thought.

4. *The always-being is eternal cause.* The always existing could be in no sense an effect, or find the reason and ground of its being in something else. Nothing else existed, to take on this relation to it. Its existence, like that of duration and space, is from eternity to eternity, "the same yesterday, to-day and forever," and is inherent cause. Whatever else exists is originated by this, and exists by its creative fiat. In the existence of this, you reach the necessary ultimatum of

being, as cause of all conception concerning it. Nothing is possible or conceivable beyond. The ultimate idea is eternal existence, as eternal, original cause—the originator of all else; but, itself without origination and without beginning, and like space and duration, boundless, ceaseless. It simply is, and acts. We may not, in our sphere of derived existence, and under the laws of thought that must obtain in the region of cause and effect, be able to gain the full contents of such existence; but that it is, we infallibly know. We get it as a first truth of reason, from the laws of the intelligence, and the inevitable logic of the case. More we could not have; less there could not be, if even a mote or an atom exists.

5. *The always-being, the eternal cause, is* INTELLIGENT *cause.* Matter exists only as effect: its "*vis inertiæ*" is proved by the insight of reason and the senses. Mind only is cause, and is seen to be cause, by the dictate of consciousness. It may be dependent for its being, as in the case of finite, derived mind, but has in it the elements of inherent cause, in its self-activity and prerogatives of free-will. It has free personality, and the self-felt, and self-acknowledged power of causation and choice. It is a "*causa causans.*" All intelligence is such, and it is all the proper cause of which we know. If other modes of being are possible, they are not known or knowable, and are without relevancy or significance in this discussion, and could no way affect our position.

Intelligence, then, is the characteristic of the eternal cause. It is so "*a fortiori.*" This is infinite, absolute mind, having in itself the elements of all power and

cause. Mind has everywhere homogeneous characteristics and manifestations. It must have intellect, sensibility and will. These are integral to it, and include all that belong to it, or that is conceivable as in it. We may go from derived mind to the underived, and obtain from conscious manifestations, the elements of both. From what is in, and belongs to derived, dependent mind, we recognize what belongs to independent, absolute mind. The one is a derivative from the other, and like it, and in correspondence with it. The forthgoings of the absolute will be in the direction of its own being, in giving birth to mind, and constituting it the offspring of its author. There will be mutual similarity and appreciation. They will correspond with each other, and we pass from the known to the unknown, as we step by the moon into the visible heavens. We legitimately take the chronological or the logical method, and pass from effect to cause, and from cause to effect, and we see in the eternal cause, not the reflection merely of our own intelligence, and mental constitution and energy, but the absolute and unfailing source and fullness of it. We come to the fountain head of all being, intelligence, and power. We arrive at the original, unlimited, independent cause; at the infinite mind, which was before all else, and by which all else exists. And we get this with the infallible certainty of demonstrative truth. We get the doctrine in consciousness, and by the light of our own intelligence, and we refer it legitimately, in its relations, to the original, absolute cause. There is firm footing. Intelligent cause finds its fullness and perfection in the original, eternal cause, and we behold

in it the grand primal element and authorship of all else. There is "the hiding" of power, and there the counterpart and depository of the intellectual characteristics, energies and manifestations of a created universe.

6. *The always-being is* RIGHTEOUS *cause.* Here we rise into the moral bearings of our subject more appropriately, and enter a sphere of truth that is thought to be less ascertained and obvious. We may then proceed with special caution, and be more deliberate in the conclusions to which we come, and we throw into the foreground of our position the following summary of thought comprised in it, as we ask, Is not rectitude the normal mode and state of the intelligence? Is not sin an apostasy from right? Could malevolence and wrong have an object in an independent, absolute, intelligent cause? What is the doctrine of conscience and of reason? What is the instruction of fact in the case? We may review these inquiries a little in detail, and see with what united force they bear on the position, that the intelligent, eternal cause exists in eternal rectitude and truth.

[1] *Rectitude is the normal status of intelligence everywhere.* Mind is constituted in its elements and inherently adapted to right action under the influence of truth. Its nativity and growth, and harmony of being, are in all righteousness, goodness and love. It feels outraged and wronged when committed to any other course. Its indigenous principles have their natural development, and play, and outgrowth, and consent of action in all goodness, and justice, and truth. Wrong grates harsh thunder in the chambers of the soul, and

throws it into a state of uneasiness, self-accusation and discord. Wrong is essentially abnormal to the intelligence. It puts it out of gear in itself, and with all things else. It is an interference and a disruption. There is not an intelligent being that truly fellowships wrong, and that does not feel humiliated by it, or that is not ashamed of it, and that seeks not apology and excuse for it. Its presence begets self-reproach and a sense of guilt and unworthiness. Its indulgence brings on antagonism and warfare. It is unreason, as well as unrighteousness. It is without occasion, and without excuse. It is out of harmony with truth and the nature of things, and an apple of discord everywhere. It is so in the individual, in society, and through the universe. It is intellectual and moral disruption, suicide and ruin, and it would not be the status of original, absolute cause, or of anything made in its image.

[2] *Sin can only be by apostasy from right.* There is a logical difficulty in the way of conceiving wrong to be the normal state of the intelligence. Sin is transgression. It supposes law, and right, and righteous authority, and the behests of goodness and truth. Moral government is before it. It finds a nature of things established,—an order of being, to which it is disruption and discord. It is logically abnormal, and by priority of right. It is apostasy from the original, absolute cause, and cannot be of it, or possess its moral nature. It is dereliction and antagonism, and could not be in unity and agreement with the truth and verity of things.

But there is no opportunity or possibility of change, or apostasy in absolute cause. The conception of change

would reduce it to limited, finite effect, and divest it of all elements of original, absolute cause. Besides, what should change it? and from what should it apostatize, but from itself? It has all knowledge and power always, and has in it no ground of change. This is conceivable in intelligent beings, only by change of view, by new considerations, through increase of knowledge, and the pressure of motives not before in the mind. Change has its genesis and analysis in the altered state, or circumstances of the being changed. This is a liability of derived, finite mind, which of necessity begins in ignorance, weakness and inexperience. It begins at the zero of knowledge, for knowledge is an experience, and not a creation. But, to it are confined all the attributes, incidents, and grounds of change. To the all-knowing absolute, they are impossible. "He is of one mind, and none can turn him." Changes in him would not be of the nature of intelligent action. The highest freedom would make it ever certain that he would be unalterably the same, "yesterday, to-day, and forever." Change in finite mind will occasion change of treatment from the absolute, but this is only because of its own oneness and immutability. It will have moral government, for it is itself intelligent cause, and will administer it in perfect righteousness from its own inherent perfections. Such a government, so administered, is a perfectness on the part of absolute cause. Nothing else could be better, or be in its stead. This only is conceivable or possible in the absolute, and perfect freedom of absolute, intelligent cause. This is of its image, and in its likeness, and will be its method and forthgoing.

[3] *Malevolence would be without an object in original, absolute cause.* It would not be intelligent action there, and could have no place. Malevolence implies resistance, controversy, and ill-will. It is a normal state nowhere, and would have nothing to feed on in the absolute cause. Simple goodness is not in itself an object of hate to any intelligence. Righteous authority must come in our way, and set up its claims on us, when we have got off the track of obedience, or have resolved to serve ourselves, and have our own way, to be resisted and impugned by us. Sin is shy and apologetic. No one accepts it for its own sake. It has the verdict of no intelligent being in the universe. All are ashamed of it, and tender excuse for it, and seek to justify themselves in some way for its indulgence. "The wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are bold as a lion."

But what occasion has absolute cause for all this, and to turn to the deceits and craft of ungodliness? Wrong would have no object or apology there, and must be forever without ground or possibility. It is independent. It intuitionally knows all things, and is from eternity to eternity the same. It must recognize truth, and right, and blessing, as the only reason, and the opposite as only unreason and folly. Sin is always so, and an absolute cause would see it, and thus regard it, and be at a perfect remove from it. It is conceivable only in the finite, and there only in misguided, mistaken, and perverse will.

[4] We advert to the *doctrine of conscience and the nature of mind.* The thought here is intimately blended

with what has been already said. Mind is made for truth, and truth adapted to it. The conscience, with fair opportunity, corresponds to all righteousness, and eschews all wrong. It has a scorpion's sting for him who practices iniquity. It repudiates all wrong, and makes the way of the transgressor hard. Thus writes our great English dramatist:

> "Thrice is he armed who hath his quarrel just."
> —"'Tis conscience that makes cowards of us all."
> —"The thief doth esteem each bush an officer."

So again, on the other hand,

> "I feel within me
> A peace above all earthly dignities,
> A still and quiet conscience."

Sin seeks twilight and evasion. It is inconsistent and out of harmony with all mind, and is every way abnormal to the innate principles of the intelligence. The greatest of modern scholars (Neander) has called it simply "unreason," and with this agrees all fact in the case. We know nothing of wrong but through apostasy. We have only to cease from it, in penitence and reformation, to recover our normal state, and put the powers of the soul into consent and harmony. All history agrees in this. The conflicts of the ages demonstrate this, and the sentiments, aspirations, and progress of the race. What is the advancing civilization of the world but a recovery, a resurrection, a plea, in behalf of associated humanity, as well as individual man, for that "righteousness which exalteth a nation, and against the sin which is a reproach unto any people?"

But we do need more to evince the innate, moral rectitude of the absolute cause. It is the doctrine of all science and truth, of all logic and reason, and inevitable from the nature and history of mind.

7. *The always-being is infinite cause.* What shall limit it, and put it into the finite, and give it metes and bounds? Nothing is before it, or superior to it, or correlative with it. It must be unlimited and boundless, as are space and duration. To put it into the finite reduces it to a mere effect, subject to the accidents of time. The thing would only be absurd, and involve the denial of absolute cause altogether.

It may be difficult, and perhaps impossible, for us fully to grasp the contents embraced in infinite cause. The nature of thought and speech would seem to forbid it. We are derived beings and exist in the finite. Language is earthly and finite in its composition and history. It is essentially analogical. Our conceptions rise from the known to the unknown. We compare the infinite with the finite, and strive after the apprehension of it through that medium. They are not correlates. The infinite is a conception of the *pure reason.* It is apprehended through a negation of the qualities of the finite, as effect, and as existing by necessity, from the fact that the finite exists. It is the logical antecedent of it, and must be, if the infinite is, and must be apprehended to be by the intelligence, as the alone condition of the finite;—"being clearly *seen* by the things that are made, even its eternal power and godhead."

The infinite is, so to speak, the normal type of being. The finite is limited, partial and fragmentary it may be,

changing and evanescent, and exists by no necessary law. It has the characteristic or accident of more or less. It is the product of free-will, and might not have been at all. It is the exception and not the rule of being. Infinite existence was without it. It is in quality and amount only what it was made to be, by the creative fiat of eternal cause :—a few billions of worlds, perhaps, with people and products, their habitudes and mutations, their accidents and results. The grand law of being is in the ever-existing, unchanging, infinite.

It is difficult for us to conceive of either mode of being, and of the one no less than of the other. The finite is effect, and could exist only by reason of the infinite, and as its product. The doctrine of cause generates, necessitates the existence of the underived infinite. The finite is by reason of the infinite, and can only thus be, to give it being and the qualities of finite existence. Finite it will be of course, it being created, and proclaims its logical antecedent and creator, in that which is not created or finite. It springs out of that as the offspring and manifestation of it, and its constant work.

Of the infinitude of original cause, it is enough for our position that we conceive of it, as we do of space and duration, as every way limitless and without bounds, or dependence or change, as in no way effect, but existing eternally as the same ubiquitous cause.

8. *The always-being, is self-existing, perfect being.* It depends on nothing else. It exists in self-sufficiency and perfection; independent and without imperfection in any respect. Imperfection is characteristic of the finite and dependent. Decay and change are its liabili-

ties. It is subject to outside influences. It has been put into being and may be put out. It is not raised above a state of dependence: it could not be. Not so the great first cause. These elements would reduce it to an effect, and put it in the finite. It must have been perfect in all respects, indestructible and exhaustless, or it would have come to nought, or never have been. It can have no element of decadence, exhaustion or change. Every attribute of it, must of necessity be perfect in its kind, and eternally the same, without variableness or shadow of turning; and these attributes are those of wisdom, goodness, and power,—all perfection, both natural and moral, infinitely and forever. Nothing other or different from this does the finite and created demand. If but a mote exist, all this is and must be true and always was. With perfect certainty and assurance we spring from the existence of a thought or an atom, to the existence of the uncreated, infinite, and eternal cause, with all the perfections of intellect and heart belonging to intelligent being.

9. *The always-being is God, the personal Jehovah, with all the attributes and prerogatives of the Godhead.* This is St. Paul's conclusion, and we arrive at it with the security and perfectness of pure truth. It has the infallibleness of a first truth of reason; clearly seen in the light of the intelligence itself.

Personality resides in the will. This is the executive faculty of intelligent being. It is cause and the only cause. Reason may be receptive only, and impersonal it may be in some of its aspects; the sensibility may be passive; but not so the will. That is the centraliza-

tion of the personality, and the living and conscious agency of the mind. It is the life and energy of the acting, responsible agent. Here is where we abandon the abstract form of speech, and take the concrete. Here we give impersonation to our subject, and speak of cause as the investiture of the deity and the synonym of God, with all divine perfections infinitely, of both intellect and will. This is the "I AM" of Moses, and the Pentateuch, where it is referred to with philosophical exactness and comprehension. Accidental metaphysics cannot coin a more descriptive appellation. It is the always existing—the eternal present, embracing in a complete personality all the attributes and prerogatives of the one living and true God. It is revealed in the intelligence. Reason would cease her office not to observe it. Nothing is, or all this is. If any thing is, then God is, with all perfection of wisdom, power and goodness.

We need no special revelation to evince this, except as sin has obscured our vision. Indeed, Moses must have accepted it as the dictate of reason, and known in the intelligence, and appealed to, as an indubitable first truth, for the verification of the message sent therewith. It must be the dictate of reason, or it would be no test or verification of the message, or of him by whom it is sent. It must be an undoubted first truth, or it could not thus be appealed to, or discharge its office in the connection. The process was wholly philosophical, passing from the known to the unknown. Thus the existence of God is nowhere made the subject of a communicated and verbal revelation: this it could not be.

The conception of the being of God antedates, by necessity of relation, that of a revelation from him. One must have a friend, in order to hear from him, and recognize his being in accepting his communication. Thus a divine revelation will begin with stating the acts of God, and not with a disquisition to prove that he is. It will recognize everywhere his being, and make it the basis of its communications and declarations to the ignorant and misguided, as what they ought to know, and would, only as "through lust, they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, and changed the true God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed forevermore."

Ignorance of God is an apostasy from the true and primeval knowledge of him. It is born of the lusts and vile affections of men, and is less allied to the head than the heart. God has not left himself without a witness in the intellect and conscience of man, and it is to that, that revelation appeals with its economy of instruction and grace. It is a restoration and recovery. It is needed only by reason of the fall, and has its design to gain us back into the harmony of our being, and into harmony with God.

Thus in review of our whole epitome of thought, the legitimacy of faith in the being of God is every way vindicated and obvious. It is the offspring of the intuitions of reason, and of inexorable logic. I believe in the existence of God as I do in that of any thing else that I know to be. My faith, confidence or trust in God, is the result of an intellectual apprehension of him, as of any other being, and not a baseless and un-

sustained sighing, or wish for that which we cannot "know." Faith is the result of evidence. It is the child of light in the understanding. The "Godhead" is clearly seen, through any manifestation in the finite. "God is light, and in him is no darkness at all." We have such proof of his being and perfections, as we have of no one else. Our bodily organs do not apprehend the real being of any one: the recognition is wholly mental. And we have more relations to God than to any one else, and over and above all, the relation of dependence, by which we see that his existence is the necessary prerequisite of any person or thing else.

We hold then, and by the most rigid logic, and the most assured and unquestionable methods of the intelligence, that faith in God is of all things most reasonable, and is commended to us by every possible avenue of knowledge. Spirit, of course, is not matter, and yet if we accept the revelation given, it is quite capable of taking on the forms of matter, as is true of ourselves. Bodily organs do not apprehend spiritual being, but the mind for which they act, does, and sees it with the certainty and perfectness of direct consciousness and conception. The commerce of mind with mind is, of course, intellectual, but nevertheless is real and appreciable. God recognizes us, and we recognize him. He holds intercourse with us in the communion, and fellowship, and love, and all the reciprocities of the infinite with the finite, and we give back the like responses and their counterpart. Finite mind is an emanation from the infinite, and in its image, and like it in its properties. God can communicate with it intelligently, and it

can understand him and reciprocate the intercourse. This is the behoof and privilege of all finite mind. For this was it made, and in this is its highest prerogative, excellence and glory.

And here lies the sphere of intelligent being ;—God with us and we with him and with each other, in the three categories of all possible knowledge and relationship;—the infinite—the finite, and the relation between them.

On this basis faith becomes truly the dictate of reason and the form of it. It is intelligently the gift of God and the handmaid of virtue. It receives meekly and with docility all divine communications, as not from an unknown source, but as from a known God and Father, who "has not left himself without witness," or left us in our orphanage without light, seeing that "he is not far from every one of us, for in him we live, and move, and have our being."

Nor in this do we unduly magnify the gift of reason, or the province of our intellectual being. What else would be true, or to be expected? If God be an infinitely perfect being, shall not that appear in his work, and especially in that crowning work of spiritual being in the finite? Shall it not be a respondent of the infinite reason and be capable of knowing as well as of loving and serving God? Must its devotion be to one unknown, and its worship be that of ignorance and mere dictation? How then could we be intelligent and responsible worshipers, or distinguish between truth and error in this department of knowledge? This power to know God is indispensable to both intelligence and mo-

rality. If we cannot know God, then by equal force of reasoning we cannot know other spiritual beings, and all sense of obligation and duty will fade from the mind.

Sir William Hamilton and his followers mistake the relations of faith, and inaugurate a nomenclature on this subject which only confuses and bewilders. It is not true that because we believe the senses, therefore they are not methods of knowledge. It is because they are methods of knowledge and loopholes of the mind, by which it looks out upon truth and sees what is, that we believe them. What are they but the mind thus surveying the domain of truth, and gaining the materials of knowledge? and when, with these hints from consciousness, or the senses, we pass into the region of pure truth, what is more conceivable than the necessary being, perfections and relations of God, and the love and service we owe him? The faith that is not founded in knowledge, and that does not take the intellect into its conclusion, must indeed be supposititious, and arbitrary, and by consequence shadowy, and unsatisfying, and well would it have been if distinguished writers on this subject had analyzed it with greater patience and accuracy.

But enough of the brief recital of truth designated in this article; and we close as we began, with a reference to the philosophical, as well as inspired, St. Paul, who, in the first chapter of his Letter to the Romans, as elsewhere, seems to have measured in few words the hight, and depth, and length, and breadth of this whole subject, and left, "without excuse," all wavering and doubt concerning it.

PART II.

MORAL GOVERNMENT.

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INTRODUCTION.

Moral Science is among the ultimate studies of the human mind. Though related to the sphere of duty, its scientific investigation and arrangement have been retarded by the objects of sense and the earthly employments and thoughts of men. Aversion of heart to the claims of religion may have contributed to this, but the subject has encountered hindrances in the engrossing attractions of less intellectual pursuits, as also in the want of that general culture of mind which is needful to its full development and comprehension. Much has been gained for it of late, from the scholars of Europe and of this country, and it is destined undoubtedly to assert its prerogative as Queen of sciences in the researches of the future. Advancement here is most needed in the sphere of theology. The creeds of the church have indicated its immaturity and suffered by reason of this. Advancement in truth and thought among men demands it in this study also. The problems in theology cannot be resolved without it. Many are getting discouraged in respect to them. Vitally important questions are ignored and blindness evinced on many subjects which lie at the base of all competent and satisfactory conceptions of what belongs to a system of divine truth. The being of God—the doctrine

of accountability—of divine decrees—of the origin of evil and God's relation to it, are but examples of this, and indeed the whole Calvinistic and Arminian controversy, may be cited as the arena of this. Some assured first principles in moral science, well-understood, well-defined, would bring this contention to an end. More maturity here is also essential to progress than in any other department of thought, and as a humble contribution in this direction, the following treatise is respectfully presented to the candid examination of the scholar and the Christian.

CHAPTER I.

MORAL GOVERNMENT—PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

[*a*] There are *two spheres of existence within our knowledge. These are the physical and the intellectual*—matter and mind—nature and spirit—that which is merely effect and irresponsible thing, and that which is inherently cause, has self-activity and the attribute of conscious, responsible personality. The difference between them is that between person and thing—between a self-knowing and self-moved being, and inert and unconscious matter, moving only as it is moved, and possessing in itself no element of self-activity or knowledge or change. A more complete and graphic apprehension of these subjects may be gained by looking at them in the concrete, and thence catching the more exact features of each, and recognizing the difference between them. Observe that buoyant, laughing, exultant boy, whirling his top or flying his kite—that mariner at the helm turning the ship "whithersoever he listeth;" or the machinist constructing or directing the most intricate combinations in the mechanic arts. The top,—the kite,—the ship,—the machine, are moved from without, and on the simple principle of the mutual repellency of forces. The authors of the movement in question, are

self-moved, from a principle of inherent and elective cause in themselves.

[*b*] *The physical sphere* directly and except as related to the spiritual, *is ruled out of our present inquiry.* The two are blended together, but the first is for the sake of the second and would be destitute of significance and of object without it. It may be essential to the needed experience of mind in the finite, but is the casket containing the jewel, rather than the jewel itself.

[*c*] *Of Spirit there are two spheres—the infinite and the finite*—God and created intelligences—his offspring created by Him and in His image, and being the finite expression of Himself. If either is, both are. The finite could not be without the infinite, the created without the uncreated;—the dependent without the independent and absolute. We may know that *that* is, which we can not comprehend. Thus we may know that God is, though not able to comprehend the subject matter of absolute existence. There is difficulty in comprehending any existence—finite or infinite—derived or underived—and in reality no more in the one, than in the other.

[*d*] But—*The finite is.* This is matter of consciousness,—of testimony by the senses—a proof by all the methods of intuition and knowledge. If the finite be not, then is there no relevancy or object in our science.

[*e*] *The finite suggests the infinite.* The created declares the uncreated—the creature the creator—the derived and limited, the underived, independent, and absolute. How could there be the created, without one to create? how the derived without one whence it comes?—how

the dependent without one who is not dependent in his being or attributes? Thus the existence of the absolute Jehovah is an infallible intuition of the reason from any and all derived and created existence. It is as positively seen in a mote, as in a universe.

[*f*] *The infinite is cause.* It is so because there are effects. The universe is an effect and shows "His eternal power and Godhead." The finite could not be if God were not a cause. It is the nature of mind to be a cause,—finite mind is cause in its sphere. "He who made all things is God." How get the finite without the infinite, to form, bound and limit it? Thus while the finite suggests to us the infinite and absolute, it can be only by reason of it, [the latter.]

[*g*] *Only intelligence is cause;* matter is mere effect. It is where it is put, and only as it is put; it is "causa causata"—exists only as the resultant of force applied, and is dependent on it. Only mind is "causa causans" —has inhering force, self-consciousness, self-activity.

[*h*] *God is intelligent cause.* He has made intelligent beings. The intelligent creation shows Him to be an intelligent cause. The material creation shows it. The adaptation of means to ends, the subject of final causes indicates it. The universe is full of his wisdom and goodness. That which is made could not in this exceed the maker, or be more than evidence of His wisdom, goodness, and power.

[*i*] *God is a perfect being and a perfect intelligent cause.* Perfection is the normal state of all intelligence—it could [not] but be that the infinite, absolute one is perfect in intellect and character, and that all perfection

dwells in Him in an infinite degree. The being of God logically antedates the possibility of wrong. Wrong is an apostasy from right and pre-supposes it, and pre-supposes just and rightful authority. Thus God is [exits] before sin and wrong are possible. Again—sin can be only through the aberrations of finite cause—it occurs through the mistaken and wrong use of constitutional powers in themselves right. God can have, and can see, no reason to be otherwise than a good being. Divine intelligence could have no argument for wrong, so that a perfect righteousness must be the method of the Deity. Malevolence would be a solecism as an original form of intelligence, and philosophy agrees with fact, that sin could only be by apostasy.

[*j*] *The infinite and the finite of moral being are related to each other, and out of their relations spring rights and duties*—imperatives and responses—the doctrine of right and wrong, of good and evil—the awards subjectively and objectively attendant on conduct and character. Homage and worship are the legitimate claim of God, and the inherent duty of intelligent creatures, and thus spring all the claims of the decalogue and the reciprocal rights and duties of moral law. This is the sphere of the greatest truth and behest of being.

[*k*] *The dignity and value of the subject*—it presents the three categories of truth—the infinite—the finite—and the relation between them.

CHAPTER II.

MORAL GOVERNMENT—WHAT IT IS.

[*a*] As there are two spheres of being, so are there *two kinds of government, physical and moral.*

[*b*] *The nature, the adaptations, and limits of the first*—that which is exerted over simple material existence.

1st. It is in the way of force applied—simple, directive force—the exercise of power under the movement of mind. It has no reference to rights or claims in the subject of it. Matter is merely a means under control of mind, and is for the sake of something else other than itself.

2nd. Government in physics is adapted to that which is mere effect or thing, and is limited to that.

[*c*] *Moral Government correlates with intelligence.* It is adapted to the nature and relations of mind—it expresses the reciprocal relations of intelligent beings, both in the infinite and finite—both as to God and creatures.

[*d*] *Why called moral?* 1st. Its relations to law,—2nd, to duty,—3rd, to character and desert,—4th, to destiny. It is a government in [the domain of] freedom—has free-will for its subject. It takes up the question of rights, obligations, personality and the reciprocities between absolute and derived intelligence.

[*e*] *Its characteristics.* 1st. It is a morality—its element, its aim is a righteousness—its home is in the sphere of morals—it comprehends that sphere. It connects personality with obligation and is administered in the interest of all righteousness. 2nd. It demands a moral perfection—it results in the highest good—the highest happiness results from its moral perfection and righteousness, [that which it demands.]

[*f*] *Moral Government in its probationary stages and methods is an economy of moral influences adapted to intelligence and apprehensible and appreciable by it.* These influences are two-fold—*subjective and objective.* 1st. Intelligence in contact with the "not me" suggests much that is of the nature of implied truth,—the first truths of reason—cause, space, time, God—ideas inherent in [or growing out of] the constitution of the mind—conscience—all moral relations and convictions. 2nd. Objective truth—truth of all kinds, varieties, combinations, and strength—all law and religion imposed, both natural and revealed—all appeals to the susceptibilities, sensibilities, and conscience—the field of intellect and feeling, of logic and eloquence, fact and fancy, judgment and imagination, interests and the passions.

[*g*] *Moral government in its probationary stages and methods is resistible*—it is so from the nature of mind. This is the region of free-will. The logic of the doctrine of accountability proves this. Moral Government is inconceivable without this—a misnomer; so is conscience and common sense. This is no limitation of Divine power. That correlates with physical effects. The resistible is not always resisted; *the is*, is not al-

ways synonymous with *the could*, nor can it be. There is yielding often where there could be resistance. Men repent often, when they can hold out in impenitence; they freely submit, though the contrary is possible. This is essential to the doctrine of finite cause and the elements of a moral system. It is a matter of consciousness.

[*h*] In respect to the incipient and probationary stages of Moral Government, *the supremacy of God as administrative agent is resultant and eventual in a sphere of free-will, and not complete without taking on the type of physical power, in eventual retribution.* Finite cause has its province of freedom. Free-will often resists the Holy Ghost effectually. "Ye do always resist the Holy Ghost." Moral government is left to an issue in retribution which has in it physical power.

[*i*] The will of God may not always transpire, and that may be which God in no sense wills. Moral Government implies this in its exact idea; fact shows it; all graces have their possible opposites—all character its alternative. What would be a virtue which is inevitable? a grace that could not be helped, [could not but be exercised?] The first prohibition of wrong is instructive here—God wills our sanctification. He wills all to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth.

[*j*] *Moral Government may be abused*—from the nature of mind—of law—of authority. Instructive facts—sin in heaven—on earth—now.

[*k*] *A divine moral system is a perfection*—it is of the nature of God—it is a divine expression—it only could

be, or can be, as an emanation from God in moral sphere. Anything else would be an imperfection, and [would be] unworthy, as coming from Him. Hence the present is not a choice of systems, but the only and perfect one, and as a divine moral government is a perfection in righteousness.

[*l*] Moral Government has truth—mind—probation—retribution, rewards and punishments as correlates and concomitants thereof.

CHAPTER III.

MORAL GOVERNMENT—WHERE IT IS.

[*a*] *The being of God.* This is essential to all authority and the source of moral government.

[*b*] God, a Person, with the rights and prerogatives of personality in the infinite and absolute. Thus he is rightfully the source of authority, law and jurisdiction.

[*c*] God, *a Power, and competent to moral government, and its requisites and concomitants.* All mind is cause, inherently possessing the elements of power. God, the infinite, absolute mind, has all moral and physical power.

[*d*] Created intelligence, a derivative of divine intelligence—made in the image of God, in correlation and correspondence with Him,—[fitted] to understand, appreciate, and obey him.

[*e*] The *existence of God and of created intelligent beings being given, a moral government of course is.* It can [not] but be; it is inherent in the relations of the Infinite and finite to each other. In God vest the rights and prerogatives of the Godhead,—in created intelligences, the duties and behests of his offspring. It is not an artificial or conventional economy, but inherent in the relations of the Absolute and of those made in his image. Moral government is the meet and inevitable expression of it.

[*f*] *The Divine moral system, not a choice of systems, but a Divine perfection.* It only, could be; it is inherently resultant of the being of God, and of creatures made in his image. It is simply of Him and like him. It could be substituted or supplemented by nothing else. It is in the perfect freedom and self-sufficiency of God a Divine necessity, acting from the dictates and impulses of his own perfect nature and being. God thus acts, and does as he does, in infinite freedom. It is thus a solecism to call the present, as a moral system, a choice of systems, as it only is conceivable or possible in the premises.

[*g*] *The same subjectively argued, and necessary.* The human conscience is not satisfied except on the principle of a perfect rectitude. We are so made that the intelligence repudiates wrong. There is logic too in the position—right, to be right must be exactly right; thus any deviation from perfect rectitude introduces imperfection, and constitutes a wrong. The economy must be a perfection, and compass it in its aim.

[*h*] A failure in results at any point could not lead to an abandonment of the system—its nature is elective, and it is inherently liable to abuse. Free-will may fail of its intended results but it cannot be changed—its prosecution is inevitable. Any one or more worlds may apostatize, but its principles must be maintained; it is of the nature of God and of all mind.

[*i*] *Moral government has mutual adaptation.* It is adapted to all perfections and claims of the Infinite,—to all growth and expansion in finite mind. It gives opportunity for the display of all intelligence, it rises into

the supernatural, and gives manifestations to all that belongs to mind and heart. Without it the universe is mere effect, material and without object, and might as well not have been.

[*j*] *Moral government an inherent excellency*—its relation truth-ward—man-ward—God-ward. A moral system concentrates in itself the glories of the universe.

[*k*] *Its ultimate triumph and glory*—the sufficiency of God, pledged for this—demanded by the laws of the intelligence. God, truth, and conscience, conspire for it. The first truths of reason must in the end predominate. Lord Brougham said, "the Gospel must prevail for it is *true*, and must eventually be universal among men." Truth is the aliment of mind, and has in it a principle of success. We have the familiar adage, "Truth is mighty and must prevail." The Gospel has in it the elements of all moral truth. All science confirms it. Its ultimate prevalence is no less a dictate of reason, than the instruction of prophecy.

CHAPTER IV.

MORAL GOVERNMENT—HOW ADMINISTERED.

[*a*] *Moral Government is in the sphere of the supernatural.* It is above nature and physical laws—[the laws] of simple cause and effect—of the "brutum fulmen" of mere matter. It is a commerce of mind with mind,—of the Infinite intelligence with the finite intelligence—of God with those made in his image.

[*b*] *It is in the commerce of mind and truth.* It is where truth is submitted to mind and *as* it is. It is the correlation of the "me" and the "not me"—the subjective and the objective,—man with the relations of his being. Its elements are in the intellectual and the spiritual, as related reciprocally to all else.

[*c*] *It is a sphere of duties and rights*—it administers law,—imposes obligation, implies duties. It is where the Infinite and finite of moral being meet in their reciprocal relations and correspondence,—God with his rights, prerogatives, and infinite heart of righteousness and love, and man with his recognition of God, with love and obedience. It extends over the whole sphere of responsibility, of right and wrong, of moral good and and evil, and their retributive results.

[*d*] *It is a doctrine of deserts*, of praise and blame—of rewards and penalties. It administers them righteously —it has its incipient stages, and its resultant issues.

[*e*] *It is the sphere of free-will*, of voluntary action—of compliance with right or resistance to it, and thus it has the peculiarities and adaptations of that sphere. It cannot be compulsory—but is mandatory, though persuasive and resistible, except as eventual and retributive.

[*f*] *It provides legitimately for character and destiny and comprehends them.* This is of its nature as an appeal to the voluntariness of being, in view of its responsibility and power of right action. It is the intelligence confronted with law and rectitude, and the consequences of obedience or disobedience.

[*g*] *Thus it has probation and retribution*—the first as its incipient stage, the last as its resultant [or consequence.] They are its formative and final state—together they are its complement, [they make it complete.]

[*h*] *Its method* then is—1st, by the administration of law. What is law? It is variously expressed and manifested according to the subject of reference. In morals it is right reason in the way of innate intelligence, or [of] expressed statute from rightful authority [declared] by conscience, or the Divine word. Again, it is manifested by motive influences in the formative state of character,—truth addressed—the Holy Ghost—the susceptibilities of the intelligence—and moreover, by rewards and punishments.

[*i*] *An economy of grace* may intervene and combine in the movement.

[*j*] The exigencies of the case may make this last a wisdom and a glory.

[*k*] The demands of morality must not thereby be supervened, but will be sustained and subserved.

[*l*] The administration of moral government will be a morality, its demand and aim will be right action, to secure its legitimate results in a holy and happy universe.

[*m*] *It will also be a finality.* It can be secured by nothing else. To form character and gain a destiny and have it administered, is a complete whole. It is the necessary complement [or completion] of moral being. Nothing can be after, or be more ultimate [ulterior.] It is of the being of God and his perfections, and eternally like him in its principle and elements.

CHAPTER V.

MORAL GOVERNMENT— THE RELATIONS OF THE INFINITE TO IT.

[*a*] *The authorship of the created.* The derived, created, dependent, must have had an author. The actual universe finds it in God. Philosophy and Revelation agree in this,—and that it was in the beginning, for what could count time before events? The first fact or movement, as a Creator, and for the created, will of necessity be in the beginning, for how apply time to the endless duration of the Infinite? Time is a method in the finite only, and in reference to the finite, and there only in its formative and probationary state, and because this is terminable and limited.

Reason sees no other method of creation than that revealed. No means outside of God could be used, for there were none, and it must have been by a Divine word and force from within, and in counteraction; and Dr. Hickok may yet be found to be philosophical and valid in his definition of matter.

[*b*] *Sustentation of it.* Derived existence is dependent in its nature and being, and for the continuance of it. Providence is as sovereign and divine a dispensation as creation. The physical creation is mere effect—"causa

causata"—it is *as*, and *where* it is put. But intelligence is in the image and after the likeness of its author. It is dependent in its being, but it is made a cause in itself,—a "causa causans." Its activity is of its nature —it is self-activity—its created nature is that of cause. It is created intellectually, emotionally and spiritually like God,—to be a cause in its sphere, as really and properly as he is in his,—originating its methods, and plans, and purposes, and choice, or voluntary states, and with a self-control of its voluntariness and in its voluntary sphere, that makes responsibility legitimate and appreciable.

Matter and mind are sustained by God in accordance with the nature of each, with mere effect as the attribute of the one, and of real cause as that of the other,—making the first merely irresponsible effect, and giving a truly responsible destiny to the last,—constituting the first merely a means, and putting Himself into society, communion, and fellowship with the last.

[*c*] *The Divine right to it—the creation.* 1st, as author of it. 2nd, as possessing all divine perfections in his relation to it. His is the right of creation, and preservation, with all the claims of infinite goodness, justice and truth, as correlated with our dependence and wants.

God's right of ownership is absolute in the direction of his own perfections,—his possessory right is perfect. The universe is originated by Him, is sustained by him, and thus is his by every claim, rendered authentic and desirable by every divine perfection.

[*d*] *He has complete authority in respect to it.* Adaptations of divine rule. 1st, Physical sphere: 2nd, Moral

sphere. 1. Simple directive force, and absolute and universal and unlimited control. 2. Limited—1st, by his perfection, and 2nd, by the prerogatives of all intelligence. Duties and rights are correlates. One may not be commanded to [do] that which is wrong, or which is out of his power. God would not, and could not rightfully, falsify the moral relations of the universe. His authority is complete in all righteousness and truth, —may command whatever is right and according to the relations of being.

[*e*] *Supremacy over it.* This is righteous, as he made it, and he is good. (See above.)

Supremacy—how maintained over it. 1st,—in its economy and construction—in the laws and adaptations of the physical universe, which are absolute. 2nd,—in the essential rectitude of divine supremacy as seen by all. 3d,—in the administration and force of righteous and rightful law, in providences and probation. 4th,—by the office and work of the Holy Spirit. This last is a superadded gracious economy—not inherent in moral government—not necessary to moral responsibility—but its bestowment enhances obligation, as it is a help, and in aid of all morality—of all right voluntary action,—is not given to increase the powers of the soul, or confer new powers, but to induce right voluntary action within the range of its legitimate faculties. This is a mighty agency in behalf of the truth, and for God and his righteous rule and law. It is a progressively cumulative influence and power. It will greatly increase in the future, by the increase of light and the elements of

conviction, both subjectively and objectively. 5th,—supremacy maintained by and in retribution.

[*f*] Judgment—general—particular.

[*g*] Sovereign, final allotment in righteousness, to the righteous and to the wicked.

CHAPTER VI.

MORAL GOVERNMENT—RELATIONS OF THE FINITE TO IT.

[*a*] Moral relations have significance, in respect to intelligent beings only. Mere physical existence is respected only as related to them, and in their hands and use.

[*b*] Derived intelligences owe allegiance to Divine moral government. God's relations to them involve and claim it. This is inherent in the relation between God and creatures in his image. His being God and their God, claims it, and makes it their highest duty, end, and dignity. This is the dictate of our conscious being, and of all reason and logic in the premises.

[*c*] Derived intelligence owes rectitude in heart and life. [It owes allegiance] 1st,—*to absolute right as right.* A principle has significance, as applied to moral agents, —[it is] a mere abstraction, except as belonging to a living and responsible agent, and is as nothing. We owe to ourselves inherent rectitude—our conscious being claims it, and we feel wronged without it, and demeaned in our own sight. No intelligent being is without this innate sense and feeling.

2nd,—*to God as God*—to him as the infinitely perfect one, and our God. This is the meet response and expression in creatures, to his relations to us as God.

[*d*] *Specific forms of duty involved in this allegiance and rectitude.*

First Table of the law—adoration—worship—supreme love—implicit, perfect obedience—entire confidence—willing, hearty submission, co-operation—in spirit—work—aim and end.

Second Table of the law—duties and rights under it,—equal, impartial love,—reciprocal obligations and claims, and all the duties and behests of morality. (See Exod. 20.) Mutual respect—regard, justice, benevolence, compassion.

The *family relations*—husbands and wives—parents and children—brothers and sisters—neighbors, friends, —all men.

Society,—the individual to it, and it to the individual —allegiance and protection—the magistrate as ordained of God,—end of magistracy, the highest public good,—civil authority, divinely warranted, and obedience to it a religious duty.

The Church,—man's relation to God's economy of recovery and salvation—duty of repentance—faith and acceptance of the terms of the Gospel—church membership—co-operation for the spread of the Gospel and the salvation of men.

[*e*] *Unity of both tables of the law*—direct objects variant, but one in spirit and end,—duty to God covers all relations,—faithfulness to all relations harmonious with faithfulness to each. Love to God inspires love to man, and vice versa.

Relations to God, how modified by the apostasy. No Divine right abrogated,—no doctrine of law and justice

[rendered] obsolete,—acceptance and salvation now impossible on grounds of law and personal righteousness. If relief be given, it must be by mediation and grace,—by acknowledgment of sin, and personal ill-desert—and sanctification by the cross and the methods of grace.

The song of the ransomed is—"to Him who hath washed us from our sins, and redeemed us to God by his blood," and to Him be the glory.

To the apostatized salvation is by recovery through grace and by atonement for sin. It is to the undeserving. It implies personal recovery and fitness of spirit, but not legal righteousness—it is a ransom,—a salvation—a rescue, a deliverance,—a redemption, and eternal life and glory by the interposition, sacrifice and merits of another. Hence the songs of heaven.

CHAPTER VII.

THE RULE OF MORAL GOVERNMENT.

Investigation is the law of access to revelation as to other truth. The Bible presents its subjects of thought mostly in the concrete form. They stand there in living relations with men and things. They are imbedded in history, in biography, in providence, as well as in the direct utterance of doctrine and precept. They admit of scientific arrangement and exposition. All human study, however, is attended with imperfections. The testimony of the senses may be reliable, and the first truths of reason unequivocal and valid: yet in the connecting links of our mental processes, we may err. The judgment may be defective in its range and appreciation of facts; the imagination may play the truant. Extraneous influences bear upon us with or without our consent. A shipwreck or a death-scene is described by no two witnesses precisely alike. Hence the imperfection of theology and of religious creeds. They bear the impress of the age that formed them. They receive modification from the general habits of thinking in their author. They reflect the hue of the philosophy of their time. They are influenced by the concurrent science, literature, general intelligence, and prevalent culture of mind at the time. They are, as creeds, human produc-

tions, and fallible, like every work of man. They will be the legitimate off-shoot of the religious thought and maturity of their time. History evinces this, as well as reason, and hence we err not in saying that religious creeds are in the legitimate field of criticism, and subject to modification and improvement, with the progress of truth and the growth of mind. There is analogy in truth. The sciences illustrate each other. They will continue to do so. Their advanced study will aid the comprehensive appreciation of all truth. A religious creed aims to give the philosophy of Divine truth. It goes behind the facts and statements of Revelation, and would utter the law and economy of them, and it is in this transfer of the thoughts of God into the abstract formulas of these human symbols, that the liability of mistake mainly is found. The Bible is a mine of truth, but not fully explored. The facts are on record, but the philosophy of them not adequately appreciated or rightly understood; it may be. Philosophy itself is not yet a perfected science. M. Cousin styles it the ultimate developement of the human mind. Moral science in its methodized statement has scarcely arrived at maturity. Its principles, as a system of truth, are not fully established, or the ultimate rule in morals by common consent accepted. Though the highest, this is unquestionably the latest study of man, and its goal is yet future.

Moral science is inclusive of theology, for it takes in the whole subject of duty and all moral relations. It is of the nature of a universal science in that higher sphere of being where intelligence is correlated with the subject of right and wrong. In this sphere religion is embraced

and will in its theoretic statement have only the maturity which characterizes the general study of which it is a part. It may be expected to advance with the progress of all science and truth. It is yet a study. It has problems yet to solve, and a completeness yet to secure, which is now unattained. In this progress, the direction of inquiry most prominent and successful will be in the three following topics—*the ultimate moral rule—the characteristics of a moral system*—and *the* [*ultimate*] *end in a moral administration.* These are intimate in their relation to each other. They are like subjects, predicate, and copula—like the major and minor terms and the connection between them. They are the central points of moral science and of moral relations. They comprise *the rule* with its *subject* and *object*—the principle with application and reason; as seen in a scheme of things—the ultimate ground in which lies the conduct of the Divine Being, and the required conduct of all beings made in his image. The thought then is comprehensive. It grasps the main features of the whole subject and relations of moral law, and in its needed and maturer study cannot fail to relieve the embarrassments under which theology yet labors, and to reduce to greater harmony the theoretic statements and the moral consciousness of the church. As a small contribution to an object so desirable, we offer the following suggestions on (1) THE ULTIMATE MORAL RULE.

This is perhaps the most fundamental subject of inquiry belonging to moral science. Without a measuring line nothing can be measured—no height ascertained, no soundings taken, no length or breadth or thickness

determined. And the line must be in hand in order to the function required of it; we must have the rule in order to use it. Hence all systems of moral science begin at this point. They start with the inquiry respecting the ultimate rule. With more or less accuracy and success they labor at its doctrine and would show its application. This is observable in respect to both the *objective* and the *subjective* theories. These theories have been various, and not unfrequently quite conflicting, if not destructive of each other. They have borne the impress of the age, and of the spirit of inquiry which gave them birth. They have often shown a great want of the philosophical element. They have fallen back on no reliable first principles of truth, or when they have approached one, they have not recognized and grasped it, and made it the basis of the structure they would erect. The rule they would furnish has been more of the nature of an aggregate than of a simple—of a conglomerate or residuary deposit than of a pure and elemental first truth—more a resultant, than an initiatory process of mind. Hence the inadequacy or unattainableness or unsatisfactory nature of the rule, as given by many writers, and its unsettled state hitherto. There is progress in relation to it, reliable and satisfactory, but not completeness. With this progress is seen the prevalence of the subjective theories, and the elevation of the moral elements of our constituent being. This is movement in the right direction. It honors the intelligence which God has given us, and acknowledges a criterion in our own essential being, which, as a principle, sin has not demolished, and which sits in judgment

on the utmost waywardness of the passions. It reasserts the work of God in us, and as abiding there, notwithstanding the havoc and ruin of men's transgression.

But further inquiries and elucidation seem needful. Mistake on the rule is fundamental. Equivocation, and embarrassment, will then attend every application of it, and breed mistake through every process of induction and thought, consequent upon it. To this day, Old School Theology of the Princeton type admits that "God is above morality"—that "no rule reaches himself"—that "his relations to wrong are unappreciable," and that "a blind, sightless faith at this point is our only safety from scepticism."* In this the mind and conscience of New England, and of theologians of the Puritan stamp generally, will not acquiesce. And here divergent and discrepant theories obtain respecting the whole subject of moral relations, but particularly as applied to theology. The difficulty is primarily in the doctrine of the rule. The discrepancy starts from this point—the confusion is in this idea. And the trouble and disquietude thence arising must increase so long as the moral element in our being aspires to ascendency, while a sufficient and satisfactory basis of thought in the ultimate rule is not fully and adequately reached. We shall be at sea amidst storms and currents, over which we have no control, and in the midst of which our methods of calculating course and distance, are most inadequate and deceptive.

In stating then *the characteristics of the ultimate moral*

*See Review of Beecher, Conflict of Ages.

rule, and approximating a definition of it, we remark, 1st, *It cannot be an acquisition properly.* It is of the nature of an inherent principle, rather than a result in experience—a manifestation of the reason, rather than an inference from fact. We must have it, to find it, tautological or enigmatical as this may seem to be. We must start with the rule, in order to seek and recognize it. We could not know it if we already had it not. How know that any specific thing is right, without a rule to judge it by? How know that God ought to be worshipped or that his declaration on the subject is binding, or that the greatest good is itself obligatory, without already having a rule in morals? You can ascertain nothing without a rule. Why present to me all the various theories of the ultimate rule which have ever obtained, and seek to convince me that this or that one is right? To what in me do you appeal, and what do you concede that I already have, if it be not a rule of right with which to compare, and according to which to judge your theory? All experience lies in the *application* of the rule. To apply it and find out what meets its demands, is all that is possible in experience, from the nature of the case. And this only follows the generic law of all knowledge and truth. A thing entirely new can never be known or appreciated. It must forever remain an unresolved and insolvable quantity. What is the thing done, when one is lost in the forest, or on the prairies, or on the deep? What is the exact element of his condition, which constitutes his being lost, but the severance of the known and the unknown? the being where he can recognize nothing that he knew

knew before, or compare the present with the past—in one word, he is without a rule. And he must forever remain ignorant of his course and position, till some previously known object break upon his pathway. It is in the doctrine of analogy that we find the law of all acquisition. But for the intuitions of reason, we should be forever without knowledge, and the method of increase in knowledge is by assimilation. It is by development—by bridging over from the known to the unknown—by applying the principles of knowledge that are in us and of us. But a moral rule is a thing "sui generis." Nothing else is like it. It is not knowledge simply, it is not fact or experience. And if it is not in us as a principle it must forever be beyond us and our apprehensions. If not of us, it must be unattainable. If we must gain it through the facts of knowledge and experience, our efforts for it must forever be unavailing, and it must continue to be an unknown and insoluble quantity.

But the thought here is closely allied to our whole inquiry and should be a little further extended. We have five senses. Can we be cognizant of any thing in objective truth which they do not reveal? Can we get or give the apprehension or knowledge of sweetness, without the application of the sense of taste? Can we be reasoned into the knowledge of sweetness? Is not the sense referred to, the only possible test and testimonial and gaugè and rule and method of the idea of sweetness, and indubitably so, notwithstanding the liability that some tongues may be palsied, and some tastes defective or perverted? Why does the deaf man

lose the gift of speech, and fail in producing the harmony of sweet sounds, and subside in his utterances, eventually, into that hoarse, guttural, unearthly apology for a voice which we uniformly notice in him? He is without the use of the rule, or the means of applying it. Give him the requisite sense, and he will recover himself. Why not instruct the brute beast in the fine arts? The world-wide answer is, "He is without discourse of reason." He is not capacitated for it. He has no æsthetic rule. There is in him no scale of advancement, or estimate of the lines of beauty and grace. The same is true of the brute in respect to the subject of morals. He was not designed for that sphere, and he is without a moral rule. How is it that man has in him the doctrine or idea of a moral righteousness, which the brute has not? The outward facts and experiences may be supposed to be alike to both. Each in wrath may gore his fellow, and one shall feel compunction and remorse for the deed, and the other not. What is our power of moral distinctions? Why do we decide morally on the facts of our experience and observation, and why do we classify them as we do on the side of vice and virtue? and what is the inevitable principle of that classification? The question is not as to the mistakes we make, or the helps we have in the application of the rule, but why is it that we hold virtue to be obligatory and vice a crime? Why is it that we cannot but regard goodness as lovely, and God as worthy of adoration and worship? Why do I feel obligated to love God and goodness, and how have I the scale that makes this so? The question is after the principle of our moral distinctions, and the

rule of decision inherent there, and not its application in the necessary defectiveness of an outward experience. And the answer can only be as in the Bible: "And God said let us make man in our image, after our likeness, and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea," &c., &c. So "God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him"—and hence.—

2nd. *The rule is substantive in its nature.* It is in us and of us. It is an element in our being as creatures made in the image of God. In this respect it has the property of an instinct, put in our being by the Author of it as a moral percipient for use and obedience in our voluntary history and in our relations to all else. It has the same substantive character in it that reason has in its relation to the will. It is the foreground of the responsible personality, and is indispensable to it. It is an intuitive element, and its operation is an intuition. It is an inherence, and not an accretion. It is like the eye, or the ear, or any sense, only that it is in the moral of our being distinctively from the physical—is correlated with the will, and is, perhaps, more liable to abuse from the passions than the properly physical, outward senses. Its office-work is with all fact, and knowledge, and experiences, and relations. You bring them to it, and you pass a moral judgment on them according to its dictates, and conform your life thereto on the responsibility of a moral agent. In its normal state it is a God-send for all the purposes of our moral being, as the eye is on the field of optics—and there is no other law of responsible action than that of obedience

to its dictates. To act intelligently one must act conscientiously. We are never placed where we must not obey the sense of right in us. As we have no other rule, so we can use no other. We must inevitably bring all our informations to it, and by the inherent law of right judge and act in view of them.

A moral sense is a unique attribute of being, like reason, or the will, or the outward physical senses. As such it is a work of God, and a perfect work. It is perfect in its kind. It is a moral function in our constituent being, made after the moral image of God. It is a *fac simile* in the finite, and resembles perfectly its prototype in the Infinite, so far as nature and quality are concerned. Reason in man is like reason in God. It is communicated for mutual correspondence between the Infinite and the finite. It is of us, that we may know God, and know ourselves. It is inherently a perfection of its kind, and is homogeneous in God, angel, and man. And it is an ultimate appeal. We bring all information and means of knowledge to its arbitrament, and submit implicitly to its dictates. In the field of the intellect its fiat is supreme and final. Just this is true and legitimate in the moral element of our being. It is after the moral consciousness of Him who made it, and is the image and counterpart of that moral consciousness, as transferred to the finite. And the differences which are sometimes attributed to it, are from the same direction, and from the same causes, as they are in respect to our physical senses. But the eye is formed on the most approved principles of optics, though it may need the telescope to read the heavens. Yet even then

it brings the informations of the instrument to its own economy of vision, and from its own inward law judges of the facts revealed. So in morals we comprehend the rule in our own being, as inherently a perfect rule, and bring to its estimate and decision, the facts and relations of the moral sphere.

Such a rule, so located, and so ministered unto, both by reason and revelation, is a necessity in our spiritual being. It is simple—it is unique—it is universal. Every man has a conscience, and its elements are the same in every man. The principle of its decisions is ever the same, and its overt manifestations become defective and insufficient only through processes foreign to it, as an element of mind, and as seen in a fair opportunity for its legitimate work. It is in this respect like reason, or the will or any inherent function of our being. It may be misinformed, and may act from defective or insufficient premises in any given instance or application, but it cannot be displaced, or supplanted by any other rule. All that is due or possible in the matter, is to supply it with truth in the understanding and reason that the application of the rule may not be a mistake. Hence the province of instruction. We hold ourselves and all men bound to feel right and to act right, in the presence of truth. The conditions being supplied, and the means furnished for legitimate action, we concede the perfection of the rule, and of the obligation. Our appeal is as direct and uncompromising to the moral being of man as to his reason. Both are in the same category as the subject of reference. We have no other resort. Conscience may be misguided, or seared, or dormant

through inapplication or misuse. But the only method with it, is to inform and quicken it, through divine and human agency, and by the varied appliances of the truth to secure the legitimate action of the rule, divinely implanted in our spiritual being, and which being there by the hand of God, and in his image, is a perfect work and rule. The chief difficulty, too, in the practical ministrations of the rule, is from the superpositions of ignorance, and error, and sinful passions. "A deceived heart hath turned him aside." Wrong moral judgments are from a stifled conscience—from a misguided imagination—from a hardened heart, and habituated perversity of will. Childhood is proverbially conscientious. The judgment of woman is held to be pre-eminently quick and reliable on moral subjects. The aim of the gospel is to restore the rightful supremacy of conscience among men.

There are some expressions in the Bible which rather, in the way of undesigned coincidence, throw light upon our present inquiry, and thus give a divine sanction to the rule here indicated. To those who brought to Christ the woman taken in adultery, that they might entrap him in his words, He said, "Let him that is without sin cast the first stone." And they which heard it, being convicted by their own consciences, "went out one by one." The appeal is to their convictions; the arbiter is their conscience. Paul said before the Jewish council, as he looked earnestly upon them: "Men and brethren, I have lived in all good conscience before God unto this day." And also before Felix: "Herein do I exercise myself to have always a conscience void of offence,

toward God and toward man." The same apostle, in presenting the principles of the Divine government to the Church at Rome, asserts that there is no respect of persons with God in dealing with men, with or without a positive revelation and precept. "For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law, and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law. For when the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law are a law to themselves, which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." A very comprehensive passage also occurs II. Cor., iv, 1, 2, showing the ultimate appeal of the gospel, and the doctrine of the Apostle in respect to a moral rule: "Therefore seeing we have this ministry, as we have received mercy we faint not; but have renounced the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness nor handling the word of God deceitfully, but by manifestation of the truth, commending ourselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God."

Passing then from the substantive character of the rule, we remark,—

3rd. *The ultimate rule is moral in its nature.* As its dictate is a morality, so is its nature. The object of the rule is character, and in right character it finds its claim and satisfaction. It is a moral rule. It has respect to moral relations. It is a discriminating power in the interest and behoof of our moral being. Its office-work is to indicate conduct, and mark the applications of law,

and settle the questions of right and wrong in our intelligent and responsible being and history. It need not settle questions of expediency, for it is not correlated with our merely sentient being. It is not a measure in æsthetics, or the philosophy of intellect. Its sphere is distinct and "sui generis." It is in the higher, the moral nature and relations. It demands a rectitude there, and as a rule is regardless of consequences in the other and lower departments of our being. Its aim is an excellency of spirit, or a result in character—a conformity to right, "a partaking of the Divine nature." Thus its post is where intelligence meets the subject of law, and obligation, and duty. It is a discerner in the spiritual of our being. It stands between the reason and the will, to discriminate the moral relations of the product of the one and the voluntary movements of the other: to say what all truth demands of us, and whether we observe its behests: to mark our delinquencies, and claims of us that we be perfect, even as our Father who is in Heaven is perfect.

If then the statements already made accord with the fact in respect to a moral rule or sense, it is easy to see the wisdom and beneficence of God in its bestowment. All morality implies the power of discrimination between right and wrong. Without a rule moral government is impossible. A standard of right is indispensable in a moral system, and it must be appreciable by the subjects of moral government, and within the reach of all under its sway. We should not be left to go in search of it, if that would bring it, or say who shall ascend into heaven for it, or who shall descend into the deep; but

it should be nigh, in our mouth and in our heart, like the word of faith in the gospel which is its counterpart and correlative.

That which is not a perfect standard of right, is no standard of it. Any deviation from right is wrong. A right line can be only what it is, and no use of it can be made without the knowledge of it. Thus a perfect standard of right is indispensable to any moral judgment, and without the knowledge of it, no moral judgment is possible. For the same reason that a standard is needful at all, it is needful at every point in the whole sphere of its operations, and to all morality. Then every moral being must have it, and use it, and it must be commensurate with the bearings and requisitions of law. But this is comprehensive of all those made in the image of God, and they must be possessed of this standard, as we think they are. And if so, it must be a gift in their moral being, inherent like any other attribute, divinely constituted in us. As then all men must have a standard of right in order to any morality, so all men do have it, and find its imperatives in their moral nature, through whatever impediments of ignorance, thoughtlessness and vice its rightful sway may be obstructed, their consciences in the mean while "accusing or else excusing them" for their conduct.

CHAPTER VIII.

APPLICATION OF THE MORAL RULE.

Moral government lies in the sphere of responsibility. It has respect to beings under law, or to those charged with the administration of law. It is rightfully correlated with those beings who have reason, and conscience, and free will. To beings not rising to the dignity of these attributes, it makes no appeal and has no significance. It is the application of a moral rule within the appropriate sphere of that rule. Of moral government, then, the following things may be stated:

1st. *It respects intelligent beings.* It is designed for, and appropriate to them. We can obey its behests, and must defer to its claims. It is a meet respondent to our mental and moral constitution. It recognizes that constitution, and rightfully builds its claim and economy upon it.

2d. *It has respect to the question of responsibility in those to whom it relates.* Its sphere is the application of a moral rule. Its aim is character and conduct—its awards are those attaching to character and conduct. Its sphere is in the matter of right and wrong—of praise and blame, and in the rightful consequences and destiny of character in its subjects—and hence,—

3rd. *Its function is at the point of voluntary action and*

its issues. It goes to the will; it asserts its prerogative in the voluntary and executive faculty of our being. It asks a personal boon. It seeks that which we can give or refuse, and metes out to us a personal destiny, accordingly as obedience has been yielded or withheld. The question is the conformity of will to the rule of right—the supremacy of conscience—the sway of reason and truth, and all righteousness in the voluntary obedience of the soul. And hence,—

4th. *Moral government claims a perfect righteousness.* Any deviation from right is wrong. A rule must be exact. All knowledge—all science—all truth—and all morality are so. A right line is without angles or curves. So a moral government must be administered on the principle of a perfect standard of right. All coming short of that would be an imperfection and infirmity. Moral government must have right character in its subject, or inflict a righteous penalty. It must support its standard. It is the correlate of a right rule, and must not deviate from it. It must claim all righteousness, and condemn all sin and wrong.

5th. *Moral government is in itself and its principles a righteousness.* It not only demands perfection of those under it, but it is administered on the principle of an inherent perfection and righteousness. It is in its administration and methods an expression and an example of that which it claims. In this respect it is homogeneous in its origin and claims. God is in this behalf what he requires and is in himself—the illustration and the argument of his demand of others, "Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect." This is indispens-

able to the legitimacy of the whole movement. It is of its nature, and vital to all its functions. It is the base to the superstructure. If God is not right, and if his government is not the exhibition of a perfect rule, then obligation is forfeited, and a moral system, in its objective relations, impossible. It would break down, because fealty to unrighteousness is a misnomer, and an absurdity. Besides, on a principle of mind already stated, if God has not the rule, he could not know it, or administer upon it. It must be in him to have an objective reality and expression beyond him. He could give birth in a moral sphere only to that which is morally like himself, and a legitimate concomitant of it. The rule, with him, could be no acquisition. It must be of his being or he could never get it. His works will express his perfections and be their legitimate counterpart. And if they embody a moral system, and demand the recognition of a moral rule, it is because he has it himself, as the inherent law of his own being, and perfections, and work. He could not go beyond himself for a law, or recognize a righteousness which he had not himself. He could not administer on a principle not in, and of him. The application of a rule is all that experience admits of, and a rule must be, in order to be used. The work of God is a development, and if righteous it is characteristic of his righteous being; and the issue can only be, as above declared, that he is what he requires, and contains in his own being. There is a homogeneity of intelligence in the created and the uncreated. Intelligence is indispensable to right moral action. In the finite it should obey, love, and worship. In the Infinite

it should govern righteously. Moral government is an expression of the relation between finite mind and God. It is not so much an institution under and in view of that relation, as a necessary concomitant of it. "Where God is, and creatures in his image, there it of course is," and is in and of the relation between them and God. A moral system is not a choice of systems. It is the only one possible in the premises. It is the only one conceivable as legitimately of, or belonging to, them. Nothing else would express the relations inherently there. It is a co-ordinate of these relations and of the being of God and our own. No other economy could be in its place or be a substitute for it. It is, in the Deity, an intuition and not a calculation of expedients:—a morality rather than a means—an inevitable first truth rather than a problematic or doubtful conclusion. Creatures made in the image of God are a perfect work, and moral government is a perfect exponent of the relations between them and God, and both it and they, in their constitution, are the perfect work and way of God. To suppose that other methods could have been substituted for a moral government, is to suppose that God could be otherwise than he is, or that to be formed in his image is a matter without distinctiveness or signification, and hence,—

6th. *A divine moral government in its method and administration, will not only be a righteousness but an appreciable righteousness.* A defect is a failure. A wrong method compromits the character and sufficiency of God. Should his government fail it its morality, or discover any disregard of virtue in its author, we could not respect it or

Him. Should it exhibit any complicity with wrong as a divine expedient,—should it be tempted to employ sin as a means, or give any sanction to the doctrine that the end justifies the means, this would be inexplicable, and we should and must distrust it. God has given us the same rule that he observes himself. It is in his being, and in our own, and it implies the first principles of morals, as reason does the first truths of intelligence, and they cannot be shown to be false. Let it but be understood that God may treat alike the innocent and the guilty, that truth is not the habitation of his throne, that virtue is not the very being of his soul, the intelligent creation would at once feel its orphanage, and the universe give signs of wo that all is lost. Morality, in its principle, belongs to the intelligence, and will yield to no arbitrary, external economy. It may be choked by extraneous means, but give it opportunity, and it will utter its indubitable testimony for the right. This is the lesson of all history. It is the great struggle of humanity now, and will be, under God, till the supremacy of conscience is secured, and the "*is*" coalesces in the "*ought*." Here lies the great difficulty with God's earthly unfinished providence and the necessity we feel of linking it with a future retributive state of being. Probation by itself is an incompleted moral economy, and the mind irresistibly carries over its unsolved problems to an after reckoning and destiny, and derives a valid argument for the rectitude of God from the revelation which he gives of another and after life, consequential upon this. Humanity never surrenders a first truth of reason and conscience. Through lack of reflec-

tion and culture, we may fail to recognize and apply the necessary ideas of the intelligence; but when developed and incorporated with the thoughts and experience and language of men, they are never lost. In this more than in anything else lies the philosophy of history, and its office-work as the teacher of the present and the future. We grasp the principles of truth developed in the past. We get its ideas. We learn the application and use of the intellectual and moral rule, in respect to the materials of knowledge already acquired, and pass on with it to the future. Mysteries there are yet, and will be, but they lie not in the first principles of morals. They must not belie reason or shelter an immorality. We must, from the inevitable and uncompromising intuitions of reason and the moral sense, see, or be made to believe and take for granted, that "it is impossible for God to lie," or to be deficient in any morality, before we will go any further or feel any obligations of obedience. Every precept must defer to a principle of truth and right which we have. Hence a divine moral government will not contravene first principles. It will accord with the intuitions of the reason and the moral sense. It will keep within the sphere of all morality, according to the inspired inquiry, "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"

7th. *Moral government has probation and retribution.* It involves character and destiny. But character must have rule, and be tested by it. Character is learned by the application of the rule to an experience in our voluntary moral being. This experience involves a sight of law, and of obligation to it, and a reason for it, and

a voluntary and executive movement of soul in view of it. It involves the question of right as submitted to the voluntary discretion of a moral being, and is thus a probation. It may be legal, or gracious,—an original probation under law merely, or one of recovery under its condemnation, through grace. It must be one of these and is limited to them, in as much as a method of recovery for the fallen, through substitution and grace, is in this aspect and relation of it, the boundary of a moral system. All that can be done for conduct and character can be done under these, and nothing else or further would be relevant or in place. So also is retribution inherently in moral government. Law is not law without its penalty or reward. Government is no government without its sanctions. In the penalty or the reward lies the estimate or expression of the value of the law To be without sanctions is to be without reasons in the mind of the law-giver, and they are as much a natural result as a positive infliction or effect.

Probation and retribution are inherent in moral government. Each has its own laws, and order of process Probation is incipient, and retribution resultant. The first has its counterpart and anticipated completion in the last, and the last could not be without the legitimate operation of the first, and both together constitute the integrity of the moral system. Some things however are appropriate to one that are not to the other. Probation is the sphere of moral and resistable means and influences; retribution takes on the element of physical power. When character is sufficiently tested, its subject may, and from the principles of a moral economy should,

and will, pass to a confirmed state of being, in the direction of it. The confirmed angels and the saints in glory have a character and experience that render a probation no longer appropriate, and naturally change it into its results. On them probation has answered its purpose, and they pass to a confirmed issue and reward. The election of grace is sure, in that the Lord knoweth them that are his; but the promise to the Christian on earth is, not that he shall never fall here, but that he shall not fail of life hereafter.

8th. *Under moral government, that may occur which is every way discordant with its designs and ends, and which is really no part of its economy.* The doctrine of an alternative is necessarily in the idea of such a government. It may witness what it does not desire. There may come an issue against which all its provisions are framed. The nature of right shows the possibility of wrong. Virtue is discretionary. Character is elective. If there is no alternative possible there is no question pending, no character tested, and no responsible issue made. The process in that case is not distinguishable from that of the power-loom or the rail-car.

The excellency of a right action in the feature of its responsibility is inseparable from the idea that it is, when something else could be in its place. An elective jurisdiction over the issue, that it shall or shall not be, is indispensable to any accredited virtue in it. You do not find a real personality without this, or get the doctrine of personal cause.

Moral government acknowledges the possibility of that which would not have to take place. This is found

in the rule it gives us, in the law it propounds to us,—its precepts and exhortations, its penalties and rewards. Means are distinguishable from cause, which lies ever in the personality itself. Pride is possible in an angel of light, where utmost humility, adoration and love should be; temptation, too, in man, though "made upright," and he may apostatize from God.

Character cannot be compulsory. Physical power and appliances will not secure it. These are out of place in such an issue. Moral government appeals to the principle of cause in us and assumes and admits it. It has no relevancy unless compliance with its dictates is a discretion and may, on our responsibility, be yielded or denied. This is the familiar doctrine of all humanity in every day life. Why complain of a blow, if it could not be helped, or might not be avoided? Why limit responsibility to the sphere of the will? If it be a necessitated faculty, like reason and conscience, there would be no significance in the limitation and reference. We never act wrong, without the conviction that it is needless and unnecessary. We never are in a position where we cannot do right, or do wrong. The design and object of a rule is conformity to it. For this it is given. This is its aim and scope, and it marks transgression and disobedience as that which is to be avoided, and which it does not want or desire. The infraction of it is not a thing designed by it. It was not given to be trampled on. Its whole intent is a righteousness, such as it legitimately requires. It marks transgression as an abuse and a wrong against it, and an indignity to it, and follows it with its maledictions and reproaches.

It was not made to be broken. This could not be. The conception of this turns the rule itself to a falsity and a farce.

Moral government is the administration of the rule, and aims to secure its observance. It is itself a righteousness, and seeks it. The infraction of the rule is no part of its object. This would make it immoral. Its end and aim are gained in the sphere of a perfect righteousness. For this it is administered—in this it is satisfied, and on this its appropriate influences are concentrated. It repudiates wrong and makes no allowance for it. It regards sin as an abuse, a disparagement, a crime, and reads it out of the legitimate working of the economy, and as no part of its intention and aim. It treats it as an anomaly, and an intruder, and thus an offence, a mischief, and a condemnation, against which its voice is raised, and on which its curse rests. Sin is no more in it, and of it, or of its design and purpose, than rebellion is that of a State, or insubordination that of a family. Hence, in a divine, moral government, sin and wrong are no part, and express no feature of it. They are here without the "imprimatur" of heaven, without a divine leave and consent. They are not of the economy of God, and are not to be resolved in a "theistic argument" as thus related. Sin is related to God and his methods and economy, only as rebellion is to those of the State. It is inherently possible, but inherently not of him, from the very terms of the statement, as well as from the laws of all morality.

But then, this feature of a moral government, which renders sin possible, is not only of its vitality, and na-

ture, but is its excellency and glory. What would it be, without conduct, character and destiny—without the idea of praise and blame, and the essential predicates of a righteous and appreciable personality? What would that virtue be which was inevitable, or that character which could not have been avoided, or that obedience which was not voluntary and elective? What is a moral government, or a personality even, without choice, or an intelligence without free will? What correlation with law, or duty, or righteousness, or with any perfection, or claim of God or truth? All that elevates a person above a thing, or makes the appeal to reason superior to that of brute force—all that makes God appreciable by us, or known to us, or that makes us capable of love, worship and service centers here. All that constitutes the perfection, and the praise of God, and the spirituality and blessedness of heaven—all that constitutes the intelligent relationship of man to God or of God to man. We have it in experience, in the conscious convictions of the soul, and in the oft recurring aphorisms of life. Every choice implies it, and every excellency is based upon it, and nothing is more obvious than that moral government is liable to abuse, and may be attended with issues which are utterly aside from its intent and purpose.

9th. *In the operation of moral government, the supremacy of God is of the nature of a resultant issue.* In respect to conduct and character, and appropriate probationary history, this supremacy is rather a finality than an incipiency. There may be that which is in no sense according to the will of God—which in no sense asks

his leave to be, or has his leave to be—that which is simply rebellion against him, and not according to his mind in any respect, and which he takes all appropriate and wise methods to prevent. Indeed, supremacy implies comparison and conflict. "Control is of the nature of a resultant action over that of which it forms no part." It is counteraction, and no part of the impelling movement. In respect to character and all voluntary issues, it is a governmental reserve. It sits in the background. It recognizes free will, and its prerogatives in the personality. It is an executive attribute rather than a legislative or judiciary one. Its official part is not so much at the point of the formation of character, as at the summing up in regard to it. It is after conviction of crime that the power of the government is seen, or in its awards of virtue.

The prerogative of voluntary, elective action, is a prerogative of the intelligence without which it would not be an intelligence, and the question of a divine supremacy in and over those voluntary issues as to what they shall be, is simply irrelevant and out of place. The freedom of the finite in its sphere is like the freedom of the Infinite in His. God is supreme, but not to the annihilation of finite intelligence, or the crippling of it in the proper prerogatives of finite mind. These are as defined and intelligible in the finite as in the Infinite, and in the one are a type of what they are in the other. There is in both true cause and jurisdiction over the voluntary states of the intelligence in respect to what they shall be. This is a property of the intelligence. Its acts are its own, and it has the power and the pro-

vince of determining them. This is a matter submitted to the arbitrament of no other being. It is of the individuality which is responsible for it, and it is for the glory of God, and the perfection of moral government that is so. But then, with the prerogative is the responsibility, and if moral government must yield the one, it will press the other, and at this point, and in the results of character and conduct is the action of a divine supremacy, as related to our present subject. The sphere of finite cause is limited. Some things are within its reach and others are not. God knows what is in man, and all finite intelligence. He is aware of their purposes and plans and devices, and himself has purposes in view of them. Purposes have a personal reference. They are but the mental condition of one's own acts. They primarily relate to their author, and are the forecast of what he will do. Every agent has a plan of his own, and there are, in strictness of speech, as many economies of actions as there are agents to act, and each agency is distinct, and "sui generis," and in respect to its kind, and its actuality dependent on, and related alone to, the agent whose it is. God's purposes are independently his own, and they relate primarily to what He will do. He may influence others to fulfil his will, but he will not influence them in a wrong direction. He may secure his ends by means of them, but it is not by purposing their purposes and identifying himself with their plans. All finite intelligences are open to influences from without in the foreground of their purposes and conduct. God acts always from the "counsel of his own will." There may be then this sugges-

tion and economy of influence in the foreground of voluntary action, which may be obeyed or not, and the will of God in the premises complied with or resisted. The case from its nature admits of only the presence of moral means, and they are inherently not irresistible. They may fail. All is a morality. There is a real probation and electivity, and demand for an ultimate retribution, to secure in another way and through the ministry of physical, coercive power those ends in respect to which probation has failed. The incipient economy is one which lies within the sphere of moral and resistible means, the resultant and retributive one takes on the element of almightiness and coercion. Yet even there does it not subdue the will, but acts on the condition [of the agent] "for he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet." The absolute, *governmental* supremacy of God over finite will is necessarily indirect, and by action on the condition of the agent whose will it is. The doctrine of a retribution at all can be sustained on no other ground; and in that retribution it is not the will that is subdued and brought into co-relation with God or his will, but the person of the agent who is confined to his own place. God may never see all finite will subject to him, or consonant in its temper to his own mind and heart. Though he may put "out of his kingdom all that offend and all that do iniquity," rebellion will yet exist in the world of the lost. God never will reign in all hearts, though supreme over all worlds, and sovereign over all conditions.

Our reliance for the conversion of the world, and the eventual prevalence of religion among men, is not cor-

related primarily with the doctrine of a physical or governmental divine supremacy, but with the presence and action of moral means. It is God in the word and with it, as a Spirit, "convincing of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment." The event anticipated is through the supremacy of conscience, and reason, and right, and truth, under God, and the prevalence of means, and influences in their nature resistible. It is in the moral sphere, and within the precincts of the will, as a voluntary and executive faculty. Much is resistible that will not be resisted—much avoidable that will not be avoided. Men will freely choose life, under moral influences, where they might choose death. They will freely repent when it was possible for them to remain impenitent, and thus they will be converted and saved, when another and sad alternative was within their reach. Thus responsibility is legitimate, and the rewards of grace and personal holiness appreciable and appropriate. A most astute philosopher of our times has predicted for the gospel a universal prevalence on earth from the fact that it is *true*. Under a christian idea and aspect of the thought, there is force it, and it is certain that what will not and cannot be done through an economy of moral means to influence the will and bring man voluntarily to righteousness will never be done, as this is the only method possible in the premises.

10th. *Moral government has discretion over the amount of means it will employ, or the extent it will go to recover men from sin.* An endless probation is a solecism. Beyond a certain limit probation is valueless, and would even throw the weight into the wrong scale. Hence

when law fails there can be only an economy of grace in the end of piety [for attaining piety as the and]. This is the boundary of a moral system in this direction, and what cannot be done under its appropriate working must be left undone. Probation is inceptive. It must stop at the point where sufficient light and means and opportunity have been given, and forbearance manifested, or it will betray weakness, and invite contempt. It looks on to an alternative, and incorporates it in its appeal. So we act in all forms of authority known on earth. We point to a reckoning day. We go not beyond certain limits, in the trial of character. We determine the issue, and pass over the case to its retribution. This is inherently in the woof of all moral government. Nor must it do too much while in process of administration. It must not take unwarrantable methods. It must act within the sphere of all righteousness. It must not love the sinner more than the law he violates. Even a heathen Emperor must yield his son who has transgressed, or present himself for the infliction of the penalty. Mercy must not be weakness, nor fail in its fealty to right and law. God must respect himself and the basis of his throne in all righteousness, and he should not compromit that element out of any regard to any other. He is not obliged to do for the recovery of sinners all that might be supposed from the simple element of almightiness. This might not be best, and he has a full margin of discretion on the subject. There are laws of influence and relationship passing over this whole subject, which connect every act in some way with all the rest, and the divine omniscience

and wisdom regard this, and administer with reference to it.

Still more palpable is this from the fact that sin is not the method of the Deity, and in no sense from him or according to his will—as it is simply rebellion against his authority—an outbreak in finite cause against his rightful sway and against every principle of right action in the intelligence. God may consult other interests than those of the sinner in what he will do in the matter. Grace has a discretion that is peculiar. Mercy is not obligatory in moral government. Grace might have been foreborne. And now, it is every way discretionary in its administration, within the limits of all righteousness. Patience is a virtue, and God will show all long suffering and forbearance, and yet no exception could justly be taken if it were withheld. Thus then probation has its appropriate sphere, and the mercy of God in the gospel its opportunity and its trophies, and yet he may in his own wisdom, and at his discretion, act his sovereign pleasure in the premises. It may not be claimed that he shall in every instance do all he can to prevent sin or to recover men from it.

A divine discretion presides, guided and sustained alike by "the goodness and the severity of God."

CHAPTER IX.

THE END IN MORAL GOVERNMENT.

Moral government has its end, and the discussion of our subject would be incomplete without ascertaining it. The rule and its application must have a purpose for the sake of which they are administered. Great value attaches to this point. Failure to settle the true end in moral government breaks up all unity of thought on the whole subject, and sets us afloat on a sea of probabilities and fragmentary issues which have no real relation to each other, and cannot be harmonized. The integrity of a moral system lies in the three elements of rule, application and end. In respect to *the ultimate end in a moral system* writers have differed much, and from their different views on this point they have branched off into very discordant theories relative to the whole subject of divine government. Some have regarded *happiness* as [the ultimate] end in a moral system, and thus have been the exponents of the various plans of what is familiarly termed the utilitarian view in morals. Others have fixed upon the resultant *glory of God* as seen in the light of the final issue of all things, as being "the great end in creation;" while still others have referred to "*the greatest good*" as being the highest end,

without specifying the nature of the good, or its relations.

These various positions have involved a wide scope of inference and deduction, and the attempt has often been shrewd and consecutive, to reconcile, under the necessary postulates of these theories, the facts of the universe and the conceded demands of morality. They have grown out of the fact of sin, and the attempt to resolve it in a "theistic argument." A careful analysis of the theories advanced would show that they crystalize about this point, and expose their defects here. They are a conglomerate issue from the assumed facts and necessities of the case, rather than the intuition of reason as to what an end should be in a moral system. They are of the nature of an inferential result from what existing facts are thought imperatively to demand, rather than a dictate of pure truth on any appreciable scale of morals. And hence they are shifting and unsatisfactory. They have not the simplicity and reliableness of a first truth of the intelligence. They fall back on no such first truth.

But we must look at them a little more in detail.

1st. *Is happiness* [*the ultimate*] *end in moral government?* Happiness is the ultimate end in physical and sentient existence. The brute lives on this principle, but in his entire being is wholly below the sphere of moral relations. Such an end has no necessary connection with conscience or a moral rule. It resolves all virtue into expediency, and destroys the distinction between a moral system and the systems of being below. It takes up an element from a lower sphere of being and consti-

tutes it the governing purpose and object of that which is moral. It looks to sense as the anterior of spirit and the ground of right, rather than to the intuitions and dictates of the reason itself, which lie in the moral sphere.

If happiness is end, any thing is right which will secure the most of it. But this can be ascertained without a moral rule, and does in fact abjure the use of it. It is an end in common with beings capable of enjoyment, and is to be secured through a calculation of expedients. It lies not in the domain of morals. A moral government would break down in the authorization and pursuit of that end, and become a nullity. It would be lost in the one common range and idea of all sentient existence. If happiness is end, morality is but a means, and we must go out of it to find its rule. Its value is to be estimated by its effect on something else, which is not of it, and the measuring line of the spirit will be in the flesh, and all intellectual and spiritual values be rated by their effects on something which bears inherently no relation to them. It would be like comparing weight with color, or the taste of sweetness with the feeling of hardness in touch. The two things have no correlation, and are incapable of comparison. And this too would require us to regard God as good for some other reason back of that goodness, and that all persons are good for the sake of some purpose or end lying out of and beyond their goodness, and this by the common verdict of all would destroy that goodness and render it impossible. If happiness is end in moral government, then have we no *moral* rule. The rule lies in something else which is not of a moral quality, as has

been already intimated. Again. If happiness is end, then the end justifies the means. The rule lies in the end, and you may take any means that lead to it. If you may live in the end of happiness [in reference to happiness as an ultimate end] that may be your rule, and you can have no other, and should have no scruples of conscience in prosecuting that. You may be mistaken as to what will promote happiness, but on the principle here stated you need have no questions of right and wrong while pursuing that end, and can have none. The whole matter inevitably settles down into the mere epicurean doctrine of the "summum bonum."

But the subject will bear a direct reference to our conscious convictions. For what will one or might one justifiably barter away his character, and give himself license to sin and crime? May he never do it, simply because it would be a bad bargain for him, in the end of happiness? Shall we love and worship God simply for the reason that our happiness will be promoted by it, or the happiness of any or all men, or the happiness of the universe advanced by it? Shall the child love and honor his parent on the same economical principle, and in obedience to the same end, and shall we respect our fellow men, and not invade their rights, only because it is better in the direction of happiness to do thus than the contrary? But what rights has a neighbor on this principle, and who knows but that it might be best for me to appropriate to myself what belongs to him?

The result is simply this, that such an end does not accord with a moral rule, and has no direct correlation

with it; while at the same time, not being a sentiment in us, could be of no universal application by us, and could not be made an end, in our moral being and experience. This whole matter is graphically sketched by an Apostle in Phil. 4:8, "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue and if there be any praise, think on these things."*

2d. *Is then the glory of God the ultimate end in moral government?* This is the sense of President Edwards and the Westminster Confession, and it certainly approximates to a satisfactory issue of the case, in that it brings the end within the moral sphere. And yet this view is defective in the form of its statement, and may be so rendered and understood as to be utterly inadequate and unsatisfactory. The reasoning by which it has usually been sustained is deficient in moral quality, and has but partially defended from the imputation of selfishness the character of the Divine Being.* To act merely for one's self is inherently exclusive and unlovely. As a principle, it is not relieved by a consideration of the greatness of the being who adopts it. It is even

*See the subject more fully discussed in "Problem Solved,"—p. 75–6.

* "To act merely," &c. These statements, if applied to human beings in their relation to each other, are just, but have no proper application to the Creator, in relation to his creatures, for several reasons. (1) Before creatures were called into existence, God could act only for himself. (2) God is infinitely and unchangeably perfect in his character, and cannot act otherwise than in the most perfect manner. Besides, he is of more consequence inherently than

more excusable in the ignorant, and less considerable of beings than in those better informed, and by intellect and position commanding a wider sphere. It is objectionable very much in the ratio of the greatness of the being who acts upon it. We can excuse or palliate it in a child, when we could not in a person of mature age. It is a principle which correlates with happiness, and that as an end lies outside of the moral sphere and among the lower orders of being. The difficulty consists integrally in it as a principle of action, by whomsoever exercised. It is intrinsically unsocial, unbenevolent, and not the way of pure intelligence any-

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the universe which he originated, and could aim at no higher or more legitimate object than his own glory, to be exhibited by acting out or exercising his various perfections in the creation and government of it. "All nations before Him are as nothing, and less than nothing, and vanity." (3) It is best, therefore, for the universe that he should act with a view to his own glory, as the highest end; for a large part of his glory (or manifested character) consists in promoting the happiness of his creatures, especially the happiness of mankind, in their moral character, relations, and capacities. (4) It a grand peculiarity of Bible teaching that God is to be, and of right ought to be regarded, both by Himself, and all other beings, as "all in all." It teaches that "He made all things for Himself"; that "of Him, and *to Him*, and through Him are all things"; that "all things were created by Him, and *for Him*"; "I will bring my sons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth; every one that is called by my name, for *I have created him for my glory*;" "Ye are not your own, therefore *glorify God* in your body and in your spirit, which are his"; "Whatsoever ye do, *do all to the glory of God*" "Now *unto God* and our Father *be glory for ever*"; "*Glory to God* in the highest"; "This people have *I formed for myself*, they shall show forth *my praise*."

Who can read such passages, scattered all through the Bible, and regard our author's argument as reconcileable with them?—Ed.

where. Again. If this be the principle of the Divine conduct, then all beside God himself is merely a means, and is formed for an object wholly out of itself, and this is about equivalent to the extraction of all personality out of it, and to the reduction of it to the condition and province of a mere thing. It takes all consideration and regard for finite intelligence *as such*, and *in itself*, out of the Divine mind, and cuts off all the intercourse of reciprocal personality between God and those he has made in his own image.* It is impossible for us to respect a being who has no regard for us—who uses us simply as a means, and does what he will with us on the ground merely of an object wholly ulterior and beyond us. Self-respect is as much an element of moral being as is respect for others, and supreme respect and reverence for God. All are correlates to each and their harmony must not be disturbed by [a false] exegesis of the great end in creation, or in the administration of moral government.

Again. If God's end is himself, then is it impossible

*"It is impossible," &c. It is to be regretted that our author should have employed such language in relation to the great Father of our race—the All-wise—the All-good. If applied to a man, in relation to other men, it might pass without comment, but it seems utterly irrelevant in application to God. While the Bible unequivocally teaches us that the glory of God is the paramount object of regard to Himself, to good angels, and to good men; and while it also teaches that man was created and is employed as "means" for promoting the glory of God, it teaches as clearly that he is regarded and treated by God as possessing "personality" and free agency, and by no means as "a mere thing." So far also from tolerating the insinuation that God, by pursuing his own glory as an ultimate end, must be devoid of "consideration and regard for finite intelligence *as such, and*

that he should be really benevolent.* The antagonism lies in the two principles, that of acting for one's self only, and that of acting for others. The two are not identical. They are exclusive of each other. If God's end lies in a resultant glory to himself, which he keeps ever in view as the reason of all his conduct, and the ground of his actions, then is there no benevolence in them. Benevolence must terminate in its object, and be a pure regard for it. That object must itself be not a means merely, but an end. The mind must terminate, and find the reason of its act in the object of regard. It must be an unselfish regard, and be thus in its purpose, and not for the sake of something else foreign to

in itself," and that thus "all the intercourse of reciprocal personality between God and those he has made in his own image" is "cut off," the Bible declares the very opposite. The glory which God aimed at, seeks the *reconciliation* of man to his God, restores him from apostacy to intimate *communion* with Himself, and exalts him to a position of high *intelligence* and *honor*.—Ed.

* "If God's, &c." The argument that follows is exceedingly plausible, and, as applied to men in their intercourse with one another, may be unanswerable, but so vast is the disparity between God and men, in greatness and in perfection, that the same rule of judgment cannot in all cases safely or correctly be applied to God, which we may properly apply to our fellow men. The fact is, that God, in making Himself his supreme end, does not ignore, or necessarily leave out of view, much less interfere with and set aside the happiness of men, but includes it, as an expression of a very prominent part of his character which he must exercise in displaying, and acting for his own glory. For example, God glorifies himself in the highest degree in securing the salvation of men, and this at the same time constitutes the grandest and most adorable expression of his *pure benevolence*. "God commendeth *his love* toward us, in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us." God so *loved* the

it. Thus we instinctively reason in all the other relations of these two principles. We despise the man who feigns regard for us, while his object is somewhere else.

Benevolence is an ultimate principle, as well as selfishness, and necessarily exclusive of it. It is not in our being to approve the latter as the ground of action by whomsoever exercised. It is less capable of our approval in the Infinite than in the finite and no reasoning has ever availed to reconcile our moral convictions to it. No comparative estimate of the greatness of God and of creatures has succeeded in this. We instinctively feel that for an intelligent being of any grade to act only for himself, and to make himself his end in what he does, is inconsistent and unworthy. All intel-

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world that, &c" He *saves* men for his own glory. It is a part of his glory to show his benevolence to them. As towards them, his feelings and conduct are benevolent in the highest form of manifestation, and yet it seems plain that a proper regard to Himself is a higher end, than such benevolent regard to their happiness, because He is greater than all other beings together. Nor can it be proved that a supreme regard to Himself in all that he does, nullifies or renders impossible the exercise of benevolence towards men. He does not, however, "act for Himself *only*" while he acts for others. He acts for Himself *chiefly*, while he acts sincerely for their good. His benevolence to the creature *is* "a pure regard to it," but does not imply a *supreme* regard to it. God's "resultant glory" exhibits in this case the reality and intensity of benevolence—a true regard to the happiness of the object, as the antecedent of divine action. The argument of our ingenious author seems harshly to insinuate that if God makes his own glory his end, he is guilty of an unworthiness, and even of selfishness. He was led, perhaps, into this unwarrantable course of remark, by overlooking the palpable fact, as it stands out in the Bible, and even to the eye of reason, that, in the present case, while God acts for Himself as end, he as really and clearly acts for the sake of others, *benevolently*—he seeks their everlasting happiness—as a subordinate but most valuable end.

ligence is homogeneous in its principles, and acts legitimately on the same basis of character and purpose. God is benevolent in the same sense as he requires us to be, and it is by a real outgo and concentration of the affections and views and object of his infinite mind on that which is external to himself. This is no want of self-respect, but of the nature of pure intelligence, and characteristic of it. It is no sacrifice of the Divine glory, but the method of it, as a result, not made directly the end, but coming incidentally out of the nature and end of the action. *The glory of God is an incident to his conduct and character, and not the direct design and end of them.*

It infallibly must be resultant of the perfections and work of such a being as he is, and must be so recognized and regarded by all pure intelligence, and all the more that it is an incident and not the end; and that his own work is a goodness and a benevolence truly, and not the likeness and show of these qualities, for the sake of any mere resultant, issued object. *This is the relation of glory to responsible action in all intelligent beings. It is incidental to their conduct, and not its direct object and end.* We reckon it a counterfeit and an unworthiness when it assumes to be the end. Virtue is innately disinterested and self-sacrificing or self-forgetful. Kindness, to be genuine, must seek another's good, and have no ulterior selfish regard. Make happiness or glory your [ultimate] end, and all will count it an unworthiness. Do right, because it is right, and virtue, and duty, and your happiness and honor will be established in the view of all right minded beings. *Glory is rather*

a quality attributed to one, than an end acted on by him. The principle here stated applies to the Infinite as well as the finite, and no scriptural form of expression need be so interpreted as to contravene it. If "God made all things for himself," it was that they might love and honor him, according to the dictates of this principle. If he "made the wicked for the day of evil," it does but express, in the way of carrying out the parallelism of the passage, the connection between crime and its punishment under a divine moral government. The principle is one, which, from the very nature of virtue and laws of the intelligence, is of universal application to mind and its responsible issues.*

3d. *Is then the greatest good the ultimate end in moral action?* This phrase is equivocal, and therefore objectionable.

*Reference on the above subject may profitably be made to the elaborate discussion of President Edwards, (Works, Vol. III); to a review of that discussion by President Day in the American Biblical Repository, for January, 1843, in the article entitled "Benevolence and Selfishness"; to the Second Series of the Essays from the Princeton Review, 1847, Essay II; and to President Dwight's System of Theology, Vol. I., Sermon I., from which the following extract, as embodying the true Bible doctrine, is taken. Having, in the body of the sermon, demonstrated the existence of God, and remarked (1) "How great, awful, and glorious a Being is God"; (2) "How plainly are all beings absolutely dependent on God for their existence, their attributes, and their operations"; (3) "Of this universe God must, of necessity, be the sole and absolute proprietor"; (4) "Of the universe he is, of course, the only Ruler," the author adds :—"The nature of this vast work, and the wisdom and power displayed in it, prove, beyond debate, that it was made for *some end suited to the greatness and number of the means which are employed.* This end, originally so valuable as to induce him to commence and to continue this mighty work, must ever be equally valuable in his view. But it can never be

It may lie in the moral sphere, and may lie out of and below it. It may mean physical good, or moral good. It may be the greatest happiness or the greatest virtue. Each is a good "per se" and "sui generis." The one relates to sentient relations and the other to those which

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accomplished, except by His own government of all things: and (5) *it is equally evident that this end must be Himself.* Before God made the universe there was nothing beside him. Whatever motive prompted him to this great work, must, of course, have been found in himself; because, beside him there was nothing. It must, also, have been found in himself, because, when other beings existed, all were nothing in comparison with him; and, therefore, in the same comparison, undeserving of his regard. But this end could not respect any change in himself; any increase, diminution, or alteration, of his greatness, power, and glory. It was, therefore, *the manifestation of himself alone which could be the end of this mighty work.* Himself is the sum of excellence; of all that is great, or wise, or good. The manifestation of himself is, therefore, only the manifestation of boundless excellence to the creatures which he has made. The manifestation of all attributes, though capable of being made in *declarations*, is principally discerned in *actions.* Excellence, therefore, is discovered, chiefly, by doing what is great, and wise, and good. All this is so evident that it needs no illustration."

"God, when he intended to disclose his perfections to the universe, intended, therefore, to exhibit them chiefly, by an endless course of action, in which wisdom, greatness, and goodness, should be supremely, and most clearly discovered. The highest blessedness, he has told us, and, therefore, the greatest glory, is found in communicating good, and not in gaining it; in *giving*, and not in *receiving.* To this decision Reason necessarily subjoins her own Amen. The great design of God in all things is, therefore, to do good boundlessly, and forever; and in this conduct to disclose himself, as the boundless and eternal good * * * * In this wonderful work how divinely great and good does God appear! How deserving of all admiration, love, homage, obedience and praise! How amazing the wonders which he has done! How much more amazing the transcendent purpose for which they were done!"—Ed.

are moral. If the former is intended by the phrase, it is liable to the objections already considered. If the latter is meant, it is undoubtedly genuine, and only brings us to the positive side of our subject.

4th. WHAT IS THE ULTIMATE END IN MORAL GOVERNMENT? 1. *It is of the nature of morality.* It is in kind like the rule it administers and uses for its accomplishment. It correlates with conscience rather than sense. It is an end in morals rather than physics, or æsthetics, or the intellect. It is an end in the spirit, and in relation to law, and right, and duty, and desert, and is therefore generically in the sphere of all morality, whose interest it has in charge. A spiritual rule is administered for a spiritual reason,—the end of the administration will be a spiritual end. It will be for the sake of character and rectitude, and in the interests and behalf of an end in the spirit. It will be for a spiritual excellency. It will be a righteous administration for righteousness' sake—and hence and chiefly, the end in moral government is—2. *A spiritual rectitude.* Nothing is better than righteousness, and nothing more ultimate [ulterior] in the moral sphere. It is a good in itself and the highest good, and to administer a moral government on the principle of it, and in its interests and for its sake is the highest conceivable end of its administration. Moral government cannot find a reason beyond a perfect righteousness, or an end higher or more ultimate than the conscience of God. He administers a moral government on the basis of all righteousness, because it is of his nature to do so. *The perfect spiritual excellency of God leads him into all rectitude in his moral administration.*

He ever acts conscientiously in what he does, and because it is right. An inherent righteousness is the method of the Deity—and if it is asked why? the answer is—because in this there is perfect excellence of spirit, and the highest end of moral being. In this the "summum bonum" is reached, and there is nothing and need be nothing beyond it, which shall be a reason for it. It is an ultimate purpose, and an ultimate idea. It may expand into all the economies of justice and mercy, in truth and love; and every grace of spirit may be fostered under it, and every subordinate good be promoted by it, as they doubtless are, but what more ultimate [rather, what ulterior] principle can be given as its reason and ground? What more ultimate reason for a moral act than that it is right, and according to the Divine conscience, and to its representative in those made after the likeness of God? Shall it be this, that it makes us happy? But it makes us happy because it is right. If it were not right, it would afford no legitimate ground of happiness. Shall it then be that it tends to glorify God? This it does for the same reason, because it is right. If not right, it would not glorify him. *The glory of God lies in this very thing, that he prosecutes all righteousness for righteousness' sake.* For him to prosecute a thing in form right, but for some other reason, and to some other end, would be no glory to him. And were it possible that he should act on other principles, the universe could esteem it not otherwise than an aberration and unworthiness.

Shall we then assign "the general good" as the reason for a right action? But if not right, and not con-

scientiously done for its rightness, what good would it do? A principle so base and hypocritical would need the intervention of a purer virtue and a better faith to give it the attributes of goodness and extract its wrongs. Conscience will accept no other end than that here stated, nor does the word of God. Neither does logic or reason demand a further answer. This describes a perfect moral government, administered for a perfect moral reason. It is a basis of righteousness, and a superstructure of righteousness, in accordance with a righteous rule. This is the highest good, because a perfect good, and to ask for a reason behind or beyond it, either in the sense or the spirit, is like inquiring why God is good, or why the intuitions of the senses or of the reason are as they are. We are already at an ultimate idea, and may as well inquire why God is, as inquire further for the principle and ground of his operation.

Thus then we have the rule, with its application and its principle of application in the moral sphere. This rule is a divinely communicated property of the intelligence which God has given, claiming of that intelligence, as a personal agency, a perfect spiritual rectitude, on its own account, and for its rightness' sake. It is the demand of our moral being that "we be partakers of the Divine nature," and be "perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect."

From the main drift of these discussions, which we here arrest, some very obvious CONCLUSIONS may be stated:

1st. *The unity and simplicity of the principles of the moral sphere and of their legitimate action.* It is the Divine

conscience and its correlate in created intelligence, fulfilling their dictates in right action, for its own sake. It is but the claim and fulfillment of a perfect spiritual excellency in its own right, and because it is such. The rule, the application of it, and the ground of it, are properly subjective and in our own souls. They comprise right, responsible action, for the inherent excellency and perfectness of it, in a moral being, and as essentially his highest good and aim;—a conformity to the spiritual being of God and that likeness to him in which all finite intelligence is originally created. If the moral rule were a calculation of expedients, or a search for economical results, we might despair of finding it. Indeed it would, on these terms, be an "ignis fatuus," and must forever elude our grasp, and an intelligible moral government would be an impossibilty.

2d. *A divine moral government is appreciable by the finite.* The element of conscience is the same in the created and the uncreated. In the one it is a God-send from the other, and recognizes and comprehends the principles of morals in each. It would as soon detect a falsity in the one as in the other, and as indubitably know that it is a falsity. To this element in the finite, God commends himself in the oft repeated passages of his word, of which the following are examples: "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" "Are not my ways equal, saith the Lrod?" But why make the appeal if there is no power of discrimination in the direction of the reference? Why not go to the beasts of the field with it? The same element of being is conceded in all divine, moral manifestations to us, and in all praise of

God, and worship, love and service. "He that cometh to God must believe that he is," and know that "no unrighteousness is in him." Have but a doubt here, and you embarrass the relations of a moral economy. The character of God must be a transparency. We must be able to look up into the face of God, and into his heart, and see nothing wanting there. This only makes religion possible or worship a virtue. Fix but one stain on the Infinite, and a moral universe is blasted. Shall God be false to truth, and disregardful of virtue? Ah! who shall trust him any more, or rest their hopes upon him? The worship of God is intelligent just so far as he is appreciated, and in respect to the fundamental principles of morals nothing must be compromitted in the character and relations of God. The Divine relations to wrong must be appreciable. Make God the proponent of it, [as a part of the Divine plan or chosen method], and you mar his character. You may give all the reasons for such a dogma which the most fertile ingenuity can devise, and you fail to satisfy the mind. It contravenes the first elements in morals, and it always will, and no advance of mind will surmount the difficulty. The Infinite and the eternal can never explain the problem. It is inherently inexplicable. The attempt would be nothing but an effort to make a wrong a right, and reduce a sin to a virtue. Some things may be as perfectly known now as ever. We may be as fully confident now as ever, that "no lie is of the truth," and that "it is impossible for God to lie," and that it is equally impossible for him to be "tempted with evil," or to ordain and inaugurate that

which he forbids and hates. Let the position be, that God wills the existence of sin, and has ordained it in order for it to exist, then he wills that his law should be broken, for "sin is the transgression of the law," and as God wills nothing without good reason and only what is for the best, then the breaking of his law is something better than the keeping of it, and, as before, wrong is better than right—and there it follows that right is not best, and that sin is better than holiness, and as such God chooses it, in some instances at least, and "for his own glory" weaves it into the scheme of the universe. But admit the position that God for some reason wills the being of sin and wrong, and then it follows that it is right to oppose the will of God, for certainly it is right to oppose the being of sin; it is right for all men always to keep the law of God, and therefore it is right to do what is not best, and best to do what is not right. But again, as the will of God is always right, then it is right to do wrong, for God wills it; and wrong to do right, for that opposes his will—and thus every kind of medley and confusion of moral ideas comes in under the shadow of a position so fatal and false as the one suggested. We do not need the light of eternity to show its fallacy. The opposite truth is perfectly obvious now.

3d. *The good which succeeds on* [or follows] *wrong, is through opposition to it.* It is not a consequence, but a counteraction. It is not resultant of it, but an intervention against it. It is good, rebuking wrong and in despite of it. Who would say that a bad fracture is the means of getting a bone well set, or a frightened

horse the means of the skill that drives him in safety, or that the waywardness of a child is the means of making him more obedient? Such a phraseology would demoralize a language, and reduce to chaos all forms of thought and speech. Sin does no good and tends to none. It is only an evil, a vice, and a crime, and a mischief. All good in relation to it is in remedy of it, and in prevention of its mischief, and in staying its bad effects. Why not then locate the idea of good as related to it within the precincts of that remedy and prevention? Why take it back to that which by its wrong and mischief forms the necessity for the remedy in repair of its evils, and the securing of good which it tended to undermine and destroy? The help in the premises is in a recuperative providence. The relief is not because sin *is*, but because God *is* to circumvent it. It is because he lives to bring order out of confusion and light out of darkness; and who would say that this gives a good reason for confusion and darkness, and is a valid ground for instituting them? Sin is a catastrophe, and shall we say that recovery from it is a reason for it? that the parrying of the blow is the reason for giving it, and that salvation by the cross is the strategic ground of an economy of wrong? The method of this reasoning is utterly vicious. It would annihilate a moral government, and sap the foundation of its principles in the attempt to resolve sin in a theistic argument, and give a reason for it in the economy of God. We ought in all fairness to locate the good in the premises at the point where it belongs, and not announce it for the relief of that of which it forms no

part, but of which it is the correction and counteraction It is of the sufficiency of God to elicit good out of evil, and to instruct the universe to stand in awe of sin by his dealings with it, and to bring honor to virtue by the ruin attendant on wrong. But even this he could not do were sin itself a Divine method for finite being, or were it in any way in accordance with the will of God. This of itself would vitiate his relations to it, and render him powerless for any good respecting it. It would be devising an evil for the sake of correcting it, and proposing a wrong for the sake of right, and all minds would see the pageantry of it, and hold it an unworthiness. God could not respect himself in it, and we could not respect him in view of it. The term glory, as related to sin, can only be that sin is in no sense of him, or his economy, and that all his relations to it are antagonistic and repudiative. And hence

4th. *There is no good reason for the existence of sin.* To seek a good and justifiable strategic reason for an economy of wrong, is the parent vice of our old theories on this whole subject. But from the nature of the case no such reason can be given. On what principle would we assign a good reason for wrong?—such a reason as should satisfy God, and reconcile him to the occurrence of sin? The idea is a solecism. Shall God be reconciled to the infraction of his law, to the resistance of his will, and to rebellion against his authority and government? Can he look complacently on the existence of a moral wrong? If there is a good reason for it he may do this; and as beings made in his image we may too. And if there is a good reason for transgression, and God

sees it, and is reconciled to it, and we may be, then he is not opposed to it, and will not punish it, and then too there is no good reason against it, and wrong is better than right, and has a better claim to be, so far as it does exist, and it is no calamity. God would not oppose his own strategic conceptions, or be averse to that which there is a good reason for, and which in its place is as he would have it, and of course the best thing possible, where and as it exists. There is a "reductio ad absurdum" integrally in such a position, and the better way is to cut loose from it altogether, and follow the lead of our moral convictions, in our theoretic views on this subject. The intuitions of reason cannot mislead us here, and they indubitably assert that sin is an unrighteousness, and a wrong against conscience and right and reason and truth, and that God must see it to be such, and could not see a good reason for it to be; that it is essentially unreason and unrighteousness, and God must know that it is such—and we must know that the attempt to give a good reason for it, and a reason why God should ordain it in a scheme of things and make it an element in a Divine economy, does, so far as it may be successful, have no other effect than to convict the Most High of folly and wickedness. It puts him in wrong relations to both reason and virtue, and assumes that God may have a good reason for the being of that, the being of which is without reason and without right. But this we know cannot be. The better, because the true way of resolving the matter, is to come over wholly to the position that sin is altogether unreasonable and wrong in all its relations, and that God, as a being of

infinite wisdom and purity, plans no wrong or unreason, and enters into propositional relations with the existence of no unrighteousness. This at least adjusts a pure morality to the premises and all the other difficulties, if any, may be met in their course. Indeed, what have we to do with difficulties when we thus grasp a necessary truth of the intelligence? We must adopt it and act on it; and we do, and so do all men in the practical convictions and daily conclusion of life. No man acts on the principle that there is a good reason for wrong, or that it is right to plan or arrange or devise it, or that any pure-minded being will do this. The contriver of a wrong is universally held to be a wrong-minded being. It is impossible to conceive of the pious contrivance and arrangement of a wrong. It is like conceiving a thing to be and not to be, at the same time. The dictates of common sense may be here appealed to, which uniformly treats the thought of wickedness as sin, and accounts sin a mislead, a folly and a vice, equally unreasonable and wrong.

5th. *God has a discretionary sovereignty, within the limits of all righteousness, in his treatment of sin, and in his dealing towards it.* As it is not a divine strategy, God is not responsible for it, or its mischiefs. He will deal with it in infinite wisdom, and take the best methods of antagonism towards it, for the reduction of it and for instruction in view of it. As the fact and the folly and the mischief of sin, are not of God, he may seek a remedy and relief for it,—as a mislead, he may show it pity—as a folly, all long-suffering and forbearance—as a crime and a wickedness, his righteous indignation. He may

make his wrath and power, or his compassion and grace known in reference to it. As God's providence towards it is a discretionary administration of a righteous being toward a wrong, and within the sphere of depravity in finite cause, his wisdom in the premises is best seen by us in the line of his acts toward it. What God has done, and is doing, and has revealed that he will do, forms our best chapter of instructions in the premises. It will be the legitimate administration of moral government. It will be in the end of virtue, [with a view to promote virtue], and will compromise no morality. As he has prohibited sin, and uttered his veto against it, in our being, in his providence, and in his word, he may see it best that "the wicked fall into the pit which they have digged." This is a question of moral rule, and does not correlate with the idea of a simple, physical omnipotence in its incipient treatment. Character must be a discretion, and a moral system must have a moral method and gain its ends in that way. The resources of physical power are indeed associated with it, but in its incipient probationary form those resources are not its leading type. A probation is of it, while the arm of power is seen more [clearly] in its retributive and resultant dispensations.

Goodness may rebut wrong, though it could not originate it. It may have a wide margin of discretion in its methods of rebuke, and discomfiture and overthrow. It may take its own time and its own way,—may make that wrong a self-reprover. Goodness may lay pitfalls and snares in the way of sin, and "show the way of transgressors to be hard." A good being may interlock

with sin in many ways in rebutting and securing his own good ends. A catastrophe wrought out by sin may be the most effectual rebuke, and through a divine sufficiency may become the occasion of the life of the world. God may even yield his Son to wicked hands, when a sacrifice of atonement is needed, saying to the bands of ungodly men, "this is your hour and the power of darkness." God is not obliged always to do all he can to prevent sin, nor is he restricted, except within conscientious limits in his methods of remedying it. Moral methods may have the advantage, and Christ says to his disciples—"Hereafter I will not talk much with you, for the prince of this world cometh and hath nothing in me," and thus it is that a product of sin becomes a means of good. It is by being translated out of the economy and kingdom of its cause into that of the overruling providence of God. And hence, too, sin is always its own rebuke, and wrong becomes an argument for right. It cannot but be so, for it is essential unreason, as well as essential unrighteousness: and intelligence cannot but see and know that it is such—and hence the despair and remorse, and self-degradation and reproval consequent on sin. But this is no argument in favor of wrong, either to the finite or the Infinite; to say that it is so is to step at once out of a moral sphere—to lose sight of its very elements, and to destroy the foundation on which it rests. And hence

6th. *The terms of a Divine glory* [*to be realized*] *out of sin.* They are, that it is in no sense of God, and that the sphere of the Infinite must be that of an inherent and appreciable righteousness. Glory is something

which is attributed by one intelligent being to another for his real or supposed excellency. But for created intellect, God would derive no glory from his works. There must be an eye to see beauty, and a conscience to approve, and to honor rectitude. The glory of God, as connected with our subject, is not merely for a physical, æsthetic or intellectual excellency, but for his relations in the moral sphere. It is chiefly and superlatively for the Divine conscience, and for the essential righteousness of God, and the appreciated rectitude of all that he does in moral government. This must be *right*, and be seen to be right by the intelligence which he has created. Beyond its apprehension of the perfection of his character, it will not glorify and worship him. These acts are not a vague and meaningless bestowment without reason, and without apprehension of a sufficient ground for them in the recognized being, character and works of God. We must know him and his relations to right and wrong, and he must meet the approval of conscience, or we cannot ascribe glory to his name. This is ever a postulate in the outset. We must see, or take for granted, the righteousness of God. But we know that a propositional relation to wrong [the relation of a proposer or projector of it as part of his method of government] is not right; and that no good being will stand in that relation to it. Conscience will not approve it. It confounds moral distinctions. We cannot but say that to propose wrong is wrong. And here has been the difficulty hitherto. It has been a conflict between conscience and the supposed necessities of the fact that sin does exist. And with the progress of the

discussion and of the ages, conscience does not yield her point, and she never can. It is not the antagonism in a divine moral government between right and wrong, where both are in and of it, and where both move on according to a Divine purpose and will in the pageantry of a combined movement, having been introduced as a Divine expedient by the same overruling intelligence, that we approve; but [we approve the doctrine] that one is of God, and the other not—that the one is the way of the Infinite, and the other against it—that the whole strategy and economy of God is an inherent virtue, and that sin is wholly, both as an economy and a fact, from another source. Thus only can we appreciate the character and excellency of God, and glorify him for his methods with sin. We suggest,

Finally. *The harmony of moral truth as seen in its theoretic statement and in its extant history and development.* The ultimate rule in moral government, its method and its end, are one. It is a virtue for virtue's sake, and conscience approves and claims it. But this is not more a principle of pure truth than it is an obvious feature of the divine administration. All the precepts of the word of God—all the law from Sinai, and all the grace of the gospel [are founded upon it as a basis]. The appeal is *here*, in every duty—every obligation—every precept—every command—every principle of character and destiny, as seen in the probationary methods of God or in a resultant retribution—and we have the exponent of it, in a well conditioned conscience and in the identity of our moral being with the moral being [of Him] in whose image man was made—and hence, too, the ap-

propriate aim and great duty of man is the supremacy of conscience and the obedience of the will and of the passions to its dictates. Give an enlightened conscience universal sway—bring the "*is*" to the "*ought*," and by the grace of God you have accomplished the conversion of the world to Christ, and attained in human history the end of the Divine administration.

CHAPTER X.

MORAL GOVERNMENT—ITS CONSUMMATION.

[*a*] There are two kingdoms in the moral sphere—that of right and that of wrong—of holiness and sin—of God and the devil. Both are possible and both are actual; the first is normal and legitimate—the other abnormal and illegitimate, and yet inherently a liability under moral government—not of Divine institution, but necessarily *possible* in the moral sphere from the prerogatives of free will, and the whole doctrine of accountable action and the nature of virtue, and the essential glory of a moral system,—and which has become *actual*, without reason, without God, and contrary to his will, and only in the aberrations of free will in finite cause.

[*b*] These two kingdoms are every way different from, and antagonistic to, each other,—in origin—in spirit—in aim and tendency and end. The first is of God and like him, and in all harmony with the highest good,—the other is born of the wrong working of finite cause, tending only to all evil. I. John, 3:8. "For this purpose the son of man was manifested that he might destroy the works of the devil."

[*c*] This antagonism will appear with various results in the probationary stage of the economy. These ap-

pliances for right are resistible—character is formed and tested, and destiny incurred. Moral, probationary methods, are in their nature suasory and resistible—they will strengthen and be more prevalent with the progress of humanity and the ages. The ages to come will be signalized for the triumphs of virtue and right.

[*d*] Hence the [final] success of the right. 1st. Because it is right and self-consistent, and inherently excellent and self-approved. 2d. From the mutual adaptation and correlations of mind and truth and right. They were made for each other by the same author. There is a consent between them that seeks prevalence over all the obliquities of that law in the members. 3d. From the direction and intent of providence. This is in conflict with wrong and in unison with the right and good. It is the God of the Bible, combating sin, and bringing out good and glorious results from all that is. 4th. From the Spirit of God, as a co-ordinate agent for the truth and right. This is the Comforter promised "to convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and judgment." 5th. From the peculiar methods of the gospel in grace, recovery and sanctification. Rom. 7th and 8th chapters. It conquers by love—it subdues by condescension and kindness—by substitution, mercy, and compassion—forgiveness, restoration and acceptance in the condescension of God. It appeals to the constituent elements of our being, against our malignant passions and sins. It is the voice of reason and love, against unreason and unrighteousness.

[*e*] Divine power in retribution. This is in its nature a compulsory administration; it is resultant of a proba-

tionary one, and consequent upon it. It is suasory and resistible in its methods,—it is the legitimate sphere of divine, physical power, in which God takes into his own hands the results of the elective probation, and assigns rewards and punishments in righteousness and grace.

[*f*] Divine communications on the subject, Matt. xxv —doctrine of the judgment day—inherently a feature and part of a moral system. Conduct, character, award, destiny are in it, and the exercise of divine power, in its administration.

[*g*] Final state of the unrecovered,—physical and moral. (1) Consignment to a place of suffering—to a state of suffering; this involves a union of body and soul,—these both may be made indestructible. Inflictions are adapted to such a state. (2) Moral—rebellious, unsubdued state of the will,—impenitent, unholy remorse of conscience—despair—all mental suffering as naturally incident to that state. There is a law of mind in this—after sufficient probation, truth hardens the soul.

[*h*] Final state of the righteous—Heaven as a place —as a state—angels—men—elements of its blessedness —rightness—harmony with God—sense of recovery—of forgiveness—grace—communion and fellowship with God — Christ — angels — redeemed saints — renewed friendships of earth—heavenly employments—adoration —worship—praise—perfect love—Divine manifestations in all fullness and perfection.

[*i*] Perpetuity of the state of the lost and the saved as above. Revealed communications. This state in its nature final;—to form a character and reap its destiny

is the all of a moral system,—there is nothing more resultant—there can be nothing after.

[*j*] The number of the lost. 1. It is not revealed, nor ascertainable, definitely. 2. The resources and influences of moral government increase with the progress of the ages; moral means strengthen, and become more effectual. Sin is a mistake as well as a mislead. Races that do not break away from God in the outstart, or early, we may hope never will. Sin is without good reason—is essential unreason, and right minded intelligence will soon get beyond the actual liability of it, and confirmation in holiness will be seen to be as much a law of mind as the appointment of God. So in case of the elect angels. "The ages to come" will show progress and triumph to the cause of the redeemed, till the latter day fully comes—that millenium of truth and grace, which shall gather in the great majority of mankind, and leave comparatively but a remnant among the lost.

[*k*] The final relations of Christ to the universe. They will be those of one who has accomplished his special mission, and who returns to his original "status" as God the Son, and God as God will be all in all. This would be "habitat," of the resultant and final condition of the universe as a moral system. The God-head, so to speak, would resume primeval relations, and the universe be fixed in its eternal state. Yet will Christ and his work of mediation, as a work accomplished, abide in honor and praise in its results, and in the hearts of all holy intelligences, throughout eternity.

[*l*] The influences of the "divine-human" on other

orders of creation throughout the universe. This is but dimly revealed—but the universe is one—there is one God, and wherever he has made intelligent beings *there* is a moral system analogous to this. It will have correlates, and may be influenced by what transpires here and by results here brought out. God is no wiser elsewhere than here, and will show the same perfections and moral government every where.

What relations spirits have to space, we know not; but intelligence is the crowning work of creation, and, it is fair to conclude, will not be wanting elsewhere more than here. A moral system *is* of course where God is, and it is homogeneous and will have mutual relations and reciprocities, and they may be more [clearly shown] in the progress and results of things than yet appears.

CHAPTER XI.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO THE GLORY OF GOD.

[*a*] Glory is a tribute rendered, rather than an end sought. It is a reflection from right action and upon it, rather than the object in it. A right action, done because it is right, is glorious, and can [not] but be esteemed so, and all right-minded beings will account it a glory and honor to its author.

[*b*] Glory, as an ascription rendered, would be impossible without created intelligences to bestow it, and a universe in which the perfections of God are manifested. God would intuitionally and from eternity know his own perfections and excellency, but this he would as well know without their manifestation as with. It would be the knowledge of himself. A right-minded being will see and appreciate his own qualities and excellency, though he may not make the exhibition of them for the sake of self-praise the ground of action. He may be thrown into circumstances in which self-vindication is proper and needful.

[*c*] Self-respect is a legitimate principle and elementary in moral science and in a moral system. A due regard to our reputation and honor, is consistent with the

statements above. The rights of moral beings in their reciprocal relations are of account and to be maintained, and they may be so brought into question as to authorize the appeal as in the Bible, "For mine own sake," "glory," &c., "will I do this," "nor give my glory to graven images." In conflict with error and wrong, God will not fail to assert the rights and prerogatives of the God-head, and it is glorious, as it is to vindicate the right any where.

[*d*] The glory of God lies essentially in his righteousness. If he were not righteous, he would not be glorious. He is a being infinitely perfect in justice, rectitude, goodness and truth, and this is characteristic of all his works and ways, and therefore is he glorious.

[*e*] Hence, the basis of the Divine glory in creation —the perfections of God every where at work, and manifested in the proper work and ways of God, in creation, providence and redemption. The glory of a righteous character—of the infinite perfections of God, [is seen in] conceiving and bringing forth such a universe. Consider the nature, variety, extent and magnificent harmony of the works of God, in physical nature—consciousness—the bodily senses—the telescope —the microscope, — geology — mineralogy — optics— chemistry—physiology—astronomy—mechanisms of nature,—the wisdom and goodness of its provisions and grand design,—the movements of providence in it.

[*f*] The glory of *a* moral system. It has intelligence —likeness to God—free will, duty,—conduct—character —destiny—the appreciation of God—sense of rectitude —love, communion and fellowship in righteousness with

God and all good and lovely beings—spiritual companionship—joy and bliss in moral rectitude,—the interventions of grace—all that lies above the plane of a merely physical and sentient creation.

[*g*] The glory of *the* moral universe—original design—a holy and happy universe in the love and likeness of God,—the divine administration to angels—to men,—administration in law—in grace—peculiar glory of grace in the perfection it manifests—in the character it forms,—Rom. 7th and 8th chapters,—the power of grace to sanctify—the motives of the gospel—the death of Christ for sin—the gift of the Holy Spirit—the requirements of the gospel—the character it forms—the hope it inspires—the redemption it brings, and the good it secures—the moral excellency, bliss and glory of heaven. The glory of God as ascribed [to Him] in the communion and fellowship of heaven and by holy beings throughout eternity,—also as resultant of the moral sympathies and harmonies of creation, and of right-minded intelligence throughout the universe.

CHAPTER XII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO THE HIGHEST GOOD.

[*a*] Two ends may be contemplated in a moral system,—a happiness and a righteousness. 1. The first is sentient good, held in common for all sentient beings according to their kind;—it is an expediency—an enjoyment—a passivity—a self-appropriation—a receptive, personal good—an end in ourselves—it is unbenevolent —makes self the center and all else the means. 2. Righteousness has its end in a principle of action—it is itself an activity—an energy—a benevolence—an unselfish excellency—it is a moral worthiness, and abides in an atmosphere of moral sympathies and excellency—it is a dispenser, and dispenses according to truth and right and for their sake.

[*b*] The two may not always be antagonistic: in intelligent beings they should never be. They should coalesce and flow together in the same channels.

[*c*] Happiness as an end is legitimate only when consistent with all righteousness and resultant of it. Physical enjoyment may be irrespective of righteousness, but spiritual happiness can be derived only from it. The conscience is a correlate to all righteousness and will

demand that we be right, in order to be happy. Hence atheism tends to barbarism—impiety to demoralization and degradation—hence the adage, "Honesty is the best policy," and hence

[*d*] Happiness is the subordinate end. It should be and can properly be only in the element and founded on the principle of all righteousness. It is therefore rather the resultant of an end in action, than the end itself. Happiness is rather a reward than an end,—it is consequent on right action done for its own sake; and because it is right.

[*e*] This is obviously the order as consistent with conscious activities of mind. One cannot be happy against his conscience or without its approbation, which lies in the elements of all righteousness. God could not be happy, but that he is good and righteous. He is perfectly happy, because perfectly righteous.

[*f*] Happiness in moral beings is properly an incidental end. It is consequent on right action,—it is dependent on right action and a right state, and is secured in such a state and in a course prosecuted in its own interest and for its own sake.

[*g*]Happiness is then inherently in and of the good that lies in right action and in moral rectitude of state, and is thus the concomitant and result of an end rather than an end sought in action itself. Hence,

[*h*] *The highest good is moral goodness or righteousness.* This combines both means and end, and is the ultimate end, and is thus the "summum bonum" beyond which we cannot and need not go. This end is not to be sought for the sake of any other, and is a perfection in

itself, and would be vitiated by being prosecuted for the sake of any thing else supposed to be more ultimate. This is the end of all ends, and describes the object [or aim] of an action and the reason for it. Do right because it is right. This is morality—this is divine—this is of the nature of a moral system—it is of the nature of God.

[*i*] Writers have sought to combine both ends in one. This in a large and general sense may be done, as God has constituted the connections in a moral system. Goodness and moral rectitude will always be the greatest good in respect to happiness, and make it a blessing to be right.

CHAPTER XIII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.

[*a*] Two forms of being—the physical and the intellectual.

[*b*] The intellectual essentially homogeneous—it has in common the cognitive, the sensitive, and the voluntary element, or more comprehensively still, the receptive and the active powers. These elements of reason, sensibility and will are essential to mind, are appropriate to it, and all that are needful or possible to constitute it in personal agency and responsibility. To apprehend truth,—to feel and act in view of it, complete the necessary ideas in the premises, and make intellect obviously a subject matter perfect in its kind.

[*c*] Likeness of the divine and of the human [intellect]. There must be a likeness in order to mutual communication, understanding, appreciation and fellowship. All the relations of the infinite and finite imply this, and all the correspondent emotions and reciprocities of authority and duty, love, prayer and praise — of

father and child, &c. &c., and hence the Divine testimony at the creation of man — "Let us make man in our image — after our likeness. So God created man &c." This homogeneity and likeness is also manifest from the fact that there is only one economy of moral government for men, and for angels too — one law — one doctrine of responsibility — one moral destiny of good or evil — one Bible — one Lord Jesus Christ, and the universal issues of one great scheme of moral rule.

This is so, both subjectively and objectively — in the conscience and out.

[*d*] The adaptation of man (the intellectual powers) to the methods of moral government. (1) The intellect, proper—the acquisition and retention of knowledge and ideas—the understanding in its province—the reason in the comprehension of truth—the imagination—association of ideas—comparison, contrast—all the powers for the acquisition, increase, and use of knowledge. (2) The conscience—susceptibility to moral impressions, discrimination of right and wrong—force of law—applicability of the doctrine of right. (3) The will—its voluntariness—motive influence—power of contrary choice—sense of accountability—ground for character and destiny—adapted to the doctrine of rewards and punishments, to probation and retribution.

[*e*] Moral government adapted to growth of mind—to the cultivation and expansion of its powers, and a real, and symmetrical and continued advancement in true manhood, up "into all the fullness of God." Truth is the element of mind, and truth is exhaustless and expanding. To finite mind there always will be

more to know,—new associations and new experiences.

[*f*] All virtue is possible to mind,—all excellence and glory. All the elements of moral government lead it out to this—the study and appreciation of God, his perfections, works and ways,—all the possible combinations of truth, in all the progress of a moral system,—the intercourse of mind through the universe with all minds and things,—the studies of eternity,—the communings and bliss of heaven.

Derived, created mind begins at zero, but will never cease expansion and approximation up to all the fullness of God, though it will never reach it. This will show the "asymptotes" of the moral sphere.

CHAPTER XIV.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO HUMAN ABILITY.

[*a*] Two spheres of being, nature and the supernatural.

[*b*] The first is simple effect, and "causa causata;" the second, inherent cause—"causa causans." Its nature is that of self-activity and free will. It has a real, self-conscious personality, originating its own acts and voluntary states, with personal jurisdiction over them as to what they shall be, and when and how related.

[*c*] *Finite intelligence is dependent for its being, but its constituted nature is that of cause—intelligent, conscious cause, like its author, with the element of self control and self-causation of its acts.* 1. This is the conviction of consciousness. 2. This is essential to personality, like God's, or to the being a person in any proper sense. 3. This is essential to moral government, or a possible moral system. 4. This is taught in all God's treatment of us, in law and grace,—in all our treatment of each other, and in all our judgments on ourselves for our conduct

5. But for this, responsibility would be a mistake and a falsity, incongruous, and incompatible.

[*d*] Human ability is properly descriptive of the reach and scope of our mental powers,—it is single in its reference. The subdivision into natural and moral ability is unphilosophical and tending to lead astray. A moral inability is merely an unwillingness,—a disinclination—a *will not*, and might better be called by its right name. A disposition is no measure of an ability and no description of it. We are able and competent and obligated to act often contrary to our inclinations, dispositions, or desires. But for this, there could be no intelligent change of disposition, or of propensity or habit of mind or of heart.

[*e*] To this sovereignty of personal will, moral government is adapted. Its motives and methods in the formative stage of character, in probation, are resistible —they are an appeal to our voluntary being, and involve an intelligent and conscious responsibility.

Moral government is one of authority, reason, law, justice, rectitude and love, with reward and penalty. With this the doctrine of ability harmonizes—responsible issues naturally grow out of it, and they are met responsively by the characteristics of our moral agency.

THE POWER OF CONTRARY CHOICE.

[What follows on this subject was published in the New-Englander for May, 1860.]

The question whether the soul has the "power of contrary choice" is one of the utmost importance in its bearings upon theology, and all moral science. It is high time that the subject was thoroughly understood.

The orthodox faith has lost much by its dullness of apprehension and its incompleteness here, and entirely failed of that "vantage ground" which it would have held but for its unwillingness to concede what is intuitionally true at this point, and the common sense of men concedes in all the relations of life. Happy the day, for the cause of truth generally, and for the power and spread of the gospel, when our metaphysics on this and other subjects, shall agree with the acknowledged principles of common sense, and be but the philosophic and comprehensive statement of them! Ask any man of a thousand you may meet, whether he thinks he could have done right yesterday when he did wrong, and he will say "Yes." It is the sentiment of common life, and of humanity, for all time, everywhere. Not whether he acted freely and with consent of will in doing wrong. That of course. But whether situated as he then was, he could have refrained from the wrong and done the right, and he will still say "Yes," if his conscience is tender, and bad theology does not come in his way. And he will sustain his position by asking further, "If I could not, how then was I responsible for my sin? If it was 'inevitable,' situated as I was, how am I answerable for it? If the temptations to it took away my power to the contrary, I feel absolved for what I could not help;" and the conscience of mankind will go with him in this, philosophize about it as we may.

It is not to be expected that a great mind of any given age should see all sides of all subjects, for all time. The error of the colossal "Treatise on the Will,"

is just at the point under review. No man has proved that choice is always as is the greatest apparent good, and it is not an intuitional idea. Edwards found it in the dialectics of previous periods, and accepted it without special investigation, we may hope. It was, too, a link in a chain and scheme of doctrine. It was not investigated on its intrinsic merits as a psychological question. It stood in the light of a consequence, and was for its sake. It was deemed needful to Divine government, though without good reason. The argument was, that God could not be supreme, or secure results, unless he had sovereignty of all volitions and made them but modification of the infinite cause. But there never can be more than the "*petitio principii*" here. You can only beg the question. Who knows that I always do what I think is best? It seems to me far otherwise. The sense of the inquiry is not altered if I add the phrase, what I think *at the time* is best. All volition is in the present tense. The statement, however expressed, must be tantamount to this, that all men always act from the conviction of what is the greatest good. And can this be said of all the foolishness, and lust, and wickedness of earth and hell? The expression is a misnomer. It does not characterize the act. It has credence for the sake of an end to be gained by it, and yet that end, when thus reached, falsifies a moral government and ignores the distinction between nature and the supernatural.

If motives govern choice, with no power to the contrary, then "*the is*" is the exponent of "*the can be.*" Then the past could be only as it has been; the present

cannot be otherwise than as it is, or the future than as it will be. The forces are all "*ab extra*." We have no power to alter them, or their effects. The stream is from the beginning downward and onward, and we have no power to change its course. All is a Divine programme, and must be fulfilled in this way or the reins are taken out of the hands of God, and he has no way left to be supreme. It is an outside pressure on us, or one "*ab extra*" to ourselves, which is only to be yielded to, and which can only be yielded to freely, you may say. But even that you get not from the doctrine or the scheme it serves,but in spite of, and in exception to, them. These would be complete with this element left out. The whole subject is viewed theologically, and for a theological result. It is a mere matter of cause and effect to enable God to govern mind and secure results in the moral, as he does in the physical world. That the mind is free in the process, at the point of contact with it, is intuitionally learned indeed, but it does not belong to the scheme or the object of it, and does not make one hair white or black, in the matter of results. All is from God, and resistless as the lightning, and all a Divine method to gain a Divine end. And in gaining that end, the mind is no real factor. It has no discretion, no power of resistance, no sovereignty over the issue. At any given point of wrong it could not hold up, for it has no power to the contrary. It goes as it is led, and because it is led. You say freely "Yes," as the wheel on its axle, or the joint in its socket, or the door on its hinges, and by subsidizing this foreign element to your doctrine you

relieve thus empirically the unutterable repulsions of it. But in all this you do not describe the conscious intuitions of the mind in its free acts. The view is not authentic. More is wanting to it. It lacks vitality. It does not give object or character to the freedom it admits. There is in it no discretion, no power of discrimination, no election as to what the act shall be in the given circumstances. You have not got up into the region of personal cause. There is no self-origination of conduct, or character, or destiny. You have not risen into the region of the "supernatural." You have not stepped from the tread-mill policy of mere physics into the appropriate sphere of the will. The man as yet is but a mere tool in the hands of another—a thing acting as it is acted on—a means, worked by another for the sake of something beyond itself. And the picture is unmeaning. The view is lame and inadequate. It fails integrally to complete the intimations of consciousness in our free acts, and tantalizes us with the name of freedom, while it takes its gist and import, aye, its real life away, and makes it at once without significance or value.

We never did wrong without the conviction that, at the time and under the circumstances, the act was needless and avoidable. Could we, one of the sharpest pangs of remorse would be extracted, if not all remorse effectually quieted and removed. No man was ever placed where he could not do right. A virtue that is "inevitable," is no virtue. The plea, "I could not help it," is always in bar of imputed wrong, and equally excluding merit, in action formally right. Of course

we would guard against the predisposing tendencies to existent wrong, which are found in habits and propensities formed and resultant of the earlier history of the individual or the race, and our friends, in the controversy, will, we judge, agree with us in this. But if I have no power against an existing temptation and array of motives, how have I against a previous habit? Such a habit is nothing to me now, in the matter of a current responsibility, except as a present influence. And if I have no capabilities concerning it, but only to freely do its bidding—if I may not at any stage, and under any circumstances, arrest and throttle it and deliver myself from it, and proclaim the freedom of eternal victory over it, from the force of the very elements of the intelligence that is in me, and of me as a creature of God, and more especially now as aided and encouraged by the assurances of the gospel, then indeed am I "led as an ox to the slaughter, and like a fool to the correction of the stocks."

But it has been objected "*cui bono*,"—"What is the use of claiming the power of contrary choice—it never is exercised?" But are you sure of that? We believe that the power of contrary choice is, and is exercised in thousands and thousands of instances every day. Indeed, not a sinner turns to God without it. Let a revival of religion sweep through the city and over the land, and you have it everywhere. We see not how any one gets to Christ without it. He must wake it up, and stake his salvation, under God, upon it. He must summon it to the work of resistance and counter-action. He must contravene the prevalent propensities, and

temptations, and habits of a whole life of impenitence and alienation from God. He must encounter the cherished lusts of a life-time, and go right abreast of all he has ever been, to resist all, and against the pleadings, and pretensions, and tyranny of all, and turn unto God and live. And in this he needs the power of contrary choice, and uses it. So that for all the purposes of this discussion this power to the contrary is, under God, the life of the world, and is seen wherever a sinner is converted from the error of his way, or a soul saved from death. How can you break away from a dominant propensity, or change a course of action, without calling up an element of being like that for which we here contend?

The objector will not surely take shelter under the poor subterfuge that we cannot have two opposite choices, or go two ways at once; for what does this amount to, reduced to the last analysis? It is just equivalent to the insignificant, identical proposition, that *we do as we do*—that personality is a unit, and not a duad. A given volition or exercise may be no measure of the powers of its author. Powers may lie dormant, or await the occasion for their use. We should be sorry to conclude that one who is only doing wrong is exercising all the power he has, or that we ever lose the power of right action, whatever, in fact, our conduct may be.

The poor deceit practiced on the mind of such an objector, and which he would doubtless, hold as a conceded and legitimate postulate, and which has been the occasion of more discussions and logomachies since its

invention than almost anything else, is that of two sorts of necessity — physical and moral — the last always retiring, on the analysis of its friends, into a mere certainty, only. But how is the merely certain a correlate of the possible? Only by begging the question again, in view of the *theological necessities* of the scheme. A certainty may be no more allied to a necessity than an uncertainty, unless, as before, you restrict the thought to the mere inanity, that what will be, will be. But much will be that need not be, and that ought not to be, and that is under no necessity of being whatever. Shall we use a nomenclature, in dealing with abstract truth, which obliges us to say that *that* is necessary which God has forbidden, and which he is opposed to, and all good agencies in the universe, and the constituent elements of our own being? Temptation is one thing, but the necessity of compliance quite another. I may be greatly tempted, but the greater is the resistance, and the use of my power to the contrary, which I can and should make; and if I foolishly comply, the fact would be the exponent of no necessity thereto. Of course we object not to the forms of conventional speech, found in or out of the Bible, and for popular use, where great temptation or a perpetuated depravity is correlated with, or expressed by the words "can," and "cannot;" as, the brethren of Joseph hated him so badly that they "*could* not speak peaceably to him;" when every one knows they could and should.

The error lies not in accepting this metaphoric language of the Orient and of common life, as implying hardened iniquity, or in reference to hereditary propen-

sity, or great, overt wickedness, as when it is said that such an one is so great a liar that he "cannot" speak the truth, and the like phrases that are well enough understood among men — not this, but in running this phraseology into a universal dogma of Occidental metaphysics, and constituting it a battery in the discussions of exact truth and science behind which to screen the exigencies of a theological system. But the doctrine is vital to the theory which it subserves. The aim is to secure a Divine government in the moral sphere. And to secure this, it is deemed needful to give to God the sovereignty of all volitions, that they may thereby be as on the whole he would have them to be, and as will best promote his great end in creation. And as this can be done only in the way of influence "*ab extra*" to the mind, (proper,) there is established from the very demands of the system this doctrine of necessity, and the coalescence of the "is" and the "can be." The error lies in bringing in this idea of necessity at all within the sphere of the will, and in taking this way of secureing a Divine moral government. It is inherently vicious as a method, and can but subvert the superstructure it would raise. What, in the convictions, of any man, would be the value of, or what would be that moral government or universe which absorbs into the Deity all the sovereignty of volitions, and finds in him alone all the discretionary movements of mind? A *thing*, it might be; more than that it could not be.

The doctrine of cause is as legitimate and appreciable in derived as in underived being. God made man in his own image, and after his own likeness. Intelligence

is cause "*per se*," dependent for its being, but with a full and unrestricted personality as to its voluntary and responsible acts. Where would be the personality of God without the sovereignty in himself of his voluntary states and acts, and if we might suppose them to be in another, and to be caused by any other than himself, we could no longer see in him the element of personal cause; nothing would remain but irresponsible effect. He must have the control of his forthgoing volitions, or he is no person; he has no discretion in respect to what he is, or will be; he is without individuality or accountableness, to himself or to another. Such is all intelligence. It must, on the last analysis, be itself the umpire in respect to its voluntary states—be itself the sovereign, and have the control over them, and say what they shall be, and whether or not they shall be. Without this you do not get a personality into the intelligence, and abstracting this you destroy it as intelligence, and convert it into a mere effect, moved by causes from without, either material or immaterial. They shall say what it shall be and do, and not the intelligence itself; and theirs should be the responsibility of its course. It is no longer a "*causa causans*" but merely a "*causa causata*." But God deals with derived intelligence as if it were a "*causa causans*," and could put forth volitions without his influence therein, or with his influence therein, or against his influence therein. "Ye stiff necked and rebellious, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost." What mean those exhortations, and promises, and comminations, and eventual retributions, which are everywhere propounded in the Bible,

as related to this subject? What is the doctrine that underlies them, or what relevancy in them, if the sovereignity of our voluntary states is not in ourselves, but in God? Does one exhort another to that over which he has not the control and jurisdiction, but which after all, is with himself? We are aware of indicating here but what is well nigh common-place in philosophy, that all moral influence is inherently resistible, and that individual mind would be without self-respect, if it were without self-control. We prize as highly as any the work of the Spirit in the repentance and sanctification of men; but we would not thereby take from and absorb away the responsible personality of the soul. Much is resistible that will not be resisted. Men will repent when they could hold out in sin, as others will continue to hold out in sin when they could and should repent; and God knows all the results in both kingdoms of his empire, and has indicated them, so far as he has thought best, to us.

All accurate thinkers distinguish between a "*sine qua non*" and a cause. Intelligence acts in the way of intelligence. If there were nothing to choose, there would be no occasion for choosing. The mind determines itself in view of considerations present to it; but these are not the causes of its acts, nor the exponents of its power. The atmosphere is not the cause of breathing, though indispensable to it. The mind has laws of thought and principles of action. It dwells in a sea of motive influences, variant often and contradictory, and from all the sources of truth within its range; and it selects its course among them without

being commanded by any. It is itself the real and sole agent in the matter of volition, from the inherent "*nisus*" of its own interior sphere, with power to accept any or refuse any. It can act foolishly or wickedly, or wisely, in the same circumstances. All the motives in creation may surround and press upon it to do right, and yet it may do wrong. It holds a power within, and deeper than any external appliances can master. We present them, and leave them, and must leave them short of the result desired, and let that go to the sovereign arbitrament of the respondent mind, from its own interior sphere, in compliance or rejection, on an election and responsibility all its own. Motives do not secure choice, or necessitate it. They present its grounds, but give not its actuality, and are often doomed to bitter disappointment there. The voluntary activities of the will are inherently contingent, and so we reason in all the intercourse of life. We do in the in the pulpit, and in personal appeal. We are not sure of results till we get responses. Other principles of mind, and the facts of history and experience, help us to calculate results, but with much imperfection and many failures. The necessitated faculties and well known laws of mind show the ordinary range of its voluntary being, but do not necessitate its volition, in any given instance. It can will any thing, and that it does not, in its voluntary history, abide in the extravagant, and ludicrous, and unreasonable, and wrong, is to be attributed to other reasons than a limit of power.

The doctrine of necessity is, then, out of place in the sphere of the will, and the position that motives

necessitate choice, with no power to the contrary, is fairly open to the following objections, which, with these preliminary suggestions, may be now more formally stated.

1st. *It cannot be proved.* From the nature of the case it can be but an assumption, and ask the point in debate. How prove this coalescence of the "is" and the "can be," in respect to any given volition, and that it is the measure and limit of the powers of the mind, at the time, and that it cannot be arrested, or diverted, or changed and countermanded at any and every stage of it? We can only say that what is, is—only make a true note of history in the premises, without at all saying what might or might not be in its place. It takes for granted that we *must* will what we *do* will, and that we have no power against present consent of will, but only in its direction and fulfillment. And there is, there can be no psychological stand-point from which to maintain the position which can make it more than a "*petitio principii*," in behalf of some theological necessity supposed to demand it.

2nd. *Its definition of choice is logically incomplete and defective.* Its claim for choice is freedom in merely *one* direction, whereas the true import of it is freedom to *either*. It is liberty to accept or decline a given object. It implies a freedom, and of course a power, to either. The object can be received or rejected. The mind is sovereign over the issue, and is competent to a decision either way. It can act wisely or foolishly in the premises — choose life or death — act right or wrong — according to the light it has, or against it — obey or

disobey — love God or hate him — repent of sin or hold out in impenitence—follow Christ or the world. What would that choice be which presented no alternative—which involved the liability of but one issue, and made only that possible in the premises, and necessitated that? The element and the object of choice has now evaporated out of it, and it settles down into a fatality or a farce. The logical demands of the subject involve the principle and the power of contrary choice. "Choose ye this day whom ye will serve," says the Christian preacher; and does he not know that each one of his people, under every presentation of the subject, can at any time say, "Yes" or "No," to his plea? What would compliance be worth, but for this; or what vitality, or value, in character or destiny? And hence

3d. *It gives no real election in choice, and no true personality to the intelligence.* All personality claims discretion over the issues presented and as presented. It is not content with mere willingness of consent; it must have co-ordinately the power of refusal. That consent must not be, because it could not be withheld. It must be with liberty to the contrary, or there is no virtue in it, no dignity of manhood, no prerogative of one made in the image of God. Carry the opposite view to the marts of business, to the subject of religion or morality in the common walks of life, or even to the sports of childhood, and let the umpire be the common sense and sentiments of men, and the dogma would scarcely fail of ridicule and contempt.

The conviction of a practical and competent jurisdiction over influences brought to bear upon us, to say

what we will do and what the act shall be in view of them, is *everywhere*, and is everywhere essential to all acknowledged responsibility. With its abandonment would go all sentiment of personal accountableness, and all idea of the characteristic difference between a person and a thing.

4th. *It does not meet the demands of consciousness in volition or the sentiments of praise and blame which attend it.* Suppose the volition be a sin. Does it describe the conviction of him who committed it, to say that it was in any sense necessary and unavoidable? — that certain influences were imposed on me, and I complied, of course, without power to the contrary? Something approaching this was attempted in behalf of the primeval sin; but our first parents broke down with shame in giving it. They had courage only to say, "The serpent beguiled me, and I *did* eat;" "The woman which Thou gavest me, gave unto me and I *did* eat." Not that we could not help it, or avoid, and that it was "inevitable." The conviction in sinning, is, that it is needless as well as wrong; avoidable as well as blameworthy, and that unless it were the one, it would not be the other. I am assailed with temptation in the streets. Until I comply, I have the power not to, as by all admitted. When do I lose it? Does the consent to sin abolish it? Does the act of compliance abnegate the power of resistance, and necessitate my sin? This but confounds cause and effect, and gives an excuse beside. It makes the success of crime its apology. This would be a wonderful opiate to administer to those in sin—a wonderful relief to the pangs of remorse. A

child shall say, "I could not help it," and you will accept the excuse, while with perfect consistency society will inflict a severer punishment on the second or third or fiftieth offense, even up to a hardened iniquity, than on the first; showing indubitably that in the convictions of all men there is no relation between the indulgence of sin and its necessity. Consent, merely, does not, then, exhaust the conscious convictions of the soul, in respect to its volitions. It is consent when it might be withheld; compliance when it could have been resistance; wrong, perhaps, when it could and should have been right. Indeed, what is that voluntariness that cannot be withheld, that compliance which cannot be refused, that acceptance of a position or a boon which cannot be resisted? So that consent itself implies a power to the contrary; and hence,

5th. *Its theory of the intelligence is fundamentally incompetent and unsound.* It constitutes the mind a mere effect, in nature, moving as it is moved upon, by something else. It does not rise to the dignity of the supernatural, in its view of mind. The intelligence according to this scheme is not cause "*per se*,"—originating its own thoughts,—acting from the principles of its own constituent being, as inherently cause with self-control and jurisdiction over its voluntary movements to say what, and whether they shall be,—to comply or not comply with any motive influences that may be brought to bear upon us from any quarter, and to stand erect in the rectitude and dignity of our personal being, whatever the currents of adverse influence may be, that are sweeping by us; but only to comply with that which may be

deemed the strongest, and be alike at the mercy of any and every wave that comes. Mind has no power in itself. No element of simple cause inheres in it. It may arrest no movement, debate no question, counteract no issue, prevent no conclusion. It is only a "*causa causata.*" The real cause is elsewhere,—it is "*ab extra*" to the mind, which is mere effect, differing from the water-wheel in the feature of consciousness, but not in the relations of cause and effect. Just this is the demand of the scheme. It is an indispensable link in the chain, without which the whole would be valueless. If the sovereignty of volitions was of the personality, and one might at any time say yes or no to any amount of temptation that might be on him, who could predict its uniform success, according to any preconcerted programme that might be laid down, or know but that he did in thousands of instances deny its prerogative, and break in upon its line of things, and thus vitiate this method of moral government, whether human or divine? It must then deny all real cause to the finite, and with it all actual control over its voluntary history or jurisdiction and sovereignty in respect to what at any given point it shall be, and demand as the content of the mind's experience and its power, that it move contentedly and freely in the grooves marked by another's hand, in obedience to influences *ab extra* to itself. That this leaves little to the mind that is really intelligent in itself or of the nature of a *bona fide* personality, and that it is utterly aside from all the dictates of our conscious being, we need not here repeat, and pass therefore to the consideration, that,

6th. *It supplies no valid basis of* MORAL GOVERNMENT. Such a government always submits a question to the respondent under it, and gives him the jurisdiction over that question. It acknowledges a discretion on his part,—a power at all times to comply or not comply with the requisitions proposed. It furnishes a test —it presents an alternative, and presumes him competent to either course. It holds him responsible for the right, but capable of the wrong. This is the language of all law, of all character and destiny,—the doctrine of all promises and exhortations, all rewards and punishments, all probation and retribution. It defers to a personality, in the subject under it, that is always equal to the test given, and to the alternative proposed, to avoid the evil and choose the good,— a competency that is not compromitted by the actual facts of the case,—a competency that sits president among them and over them, and abides inherently in the personal being of the soul. It is a power to will or not will in any given case,—to will as he does or otherwise,—to will as he does or as he should, at any and all times, and that, too, whether he does so will or not. This element of power and sufficiency of soul for all right action, and all intelligent responsibilities of moral government lies inherent in the personality and back of all influences made to bear upon it. Without it, such a government is a mere pageant, and personal being a mere thing. Without this you could not have an intelligent accountability. You could never charge that an act was needless and could have been avoided. You could only say to the subject under it, "you could if you would." And

he must reply, "inasmuch as I *would* not, I *could* not," and the act is of *necessity*, a part of my integral life and history — and any government in heaven or on earth would break down on this issue and at this point. You must divorce the "is" from the "can be" under moral government, and account the one to be no necessary exponent of the other. A power to do right is a power to do wrong. Moral government has its legitimacy within that sphere. It furnishes the elements and grounds of an intelligent electivity, but does not constrain or necessitate it. From the nature of the case it could not, and it never will. Its methods are inherently resistible, and must be so. It cannot necessitate its moral issues. *There may be that under it which it does not design or want.* There may be that which is like rebellion to the strategy of a state, which is no part of that strategy or of its normal working, and which it cannot prevent, or dispose of, but in the way of a resultant retribution, which takes on the element of physical power. Thus there is that under Divine Government, which God in no respect sympathizes with or would have, and which all the prerogatives of the Infinite combine to prohibit and resist, and overcome and cure. Probation from its very nature may not see the will of God fully met, and there may be no other way of controlling the spirit of lost men, than that of confining their persons in "their own place." Their moral state is not such as God would have it, or such as it would have been, if he had control of it, and never will be, and their condition will be a *dernier* resort under moral government, from the inherent liabilities of it. Such a

government must be where God is, and creatures in his image, and it is the dignity and glory of creation. But this is necessarily of it too, and without which neither could virtue, or character, or moral excellency, or intelligent destiny, or heaven, be. All the wealth of character and destiny, of morality and religion, of likeness to God and companionship with angels, lies in this category of thought. Indeed what would that virtue and obedience be, which could not be withheld, but which was necessitated and "inevitable." Change the terms of the problem as you will, and that which takes from the intelligence the essential control of its voluntary states, and gives its volitions into the keeping of another, destroys it, and blots out all that distinguishes moral government in its methods and results from one of brute force. The resistibility of moral means is their excellency and glory, as well as of all moral action in view of them. If they were otherwise they would not be moral, nor would action be in view of them.

7th. *The position here controverted is not taken for its own sake.* We certainly intend no disrespect, and think we do no wrong in saying this. The historical relations of the question show this, and the effort of its friends now, as already intimated, is ulterior, and with a view to a *theological* position. They would find here the basis of a Divine government, and of the supremacy of God, and build on this pedestal the doctrine of decrees, and their fulfillment, and the security of the plans and purposes of God, and of his great end in creation. The line of argument is, that all is by a Divine decree and according to a Divine programme,

and tending to a Divine end,—that the transpiring of each is essential to the grand result which is God's great end in his works, and that this necessary fulfillment in the moral sphere and its relations to the physical, cannot be secured unless motive governs choice and necessitates it, and that as God has the supreme direction of motive influences, he can and does determine all volitions in accordance with the prescribed plan, and thus effectuates and secures his end. Now, without stopping to inquire whether it is quite authentic to solve a purely *psychological* problem by a *theological* formula, and taking up the question on its merits, and assuming that what is theologically true, is true every way, and everywhere, which we admit; are we sure that this is the only, or the best, or the true way at all, to constitute a Divine moral government? Would such a government be able to redeem itself from the simple pageantry of its movement as a Divine fatality, with really but one cause, one discretionary impulse and one effective personality, and all else reduced to mere effect? But how is this? Does not moral government imply a commerce of forces?—a commingling of different and variant and it may be antagonistic personalities and agencies? Must there not be the reciprocities of governor and governed? —the mutual concilience of distinct, individual personalities, each with its own agency and scheme of things, and will there not of necessity be as many plans of action as there are agents to enact them? Is it not so among men, as by all confessed, and how does the scale of the infinite change the terms of the problem? God "worketh all things according to the counsel of his own

will," but we are not quite so sure that sinners do. At least God says they do not. Besides, it is unphilosophical to say that one being purposes the purposes of another. This is not the way of securing from others our own ends. We present considerations and inducements, but we do not invade their agency and constitute their purposes. The plans of different agents may coalesce in the same result, but the plans are distinct and peculiar to each, and each is his own plan and not another's, and his decrees and purposes are but the mental condition of his own acts. We see this everywhere. It is of the individuality and responsibility of all personal intelligence. And we see no need of disturbing the law of these well known principles and facts, in our reference of the subject to its divine relations. Indeed, in the light of revealed truth we have them in their perfection there. God is in the infinite and in the right, and we are intelligent beings. The constituent being of man is a plea for the truth and righteousness, and course of God. Much that is resistible will not be resisted. The resources of the Infinite are with God, to bring light out of darkness and order out of confusion. "Better is the end of a thing than the beginning." Moral means, though inherently resistible, will have increasing success, and under the conduct of the Spirit of God will yet gain a glorious and permanent triumph over the tempter, death, and sin. Men will give heed to that Spirit, and all right agencies and influences, when they could hold out against them, and their repentance will be a *freedom* and not a *necessity*. Though none will repent without the Spirit, yet multi-

tudes will with. Nations will be born in a day, and earth become a type of heaven. "God sees the end from the beginning." He *sees* it. It is intuitional with him everywhere and always, and He has intimated results to us, for our encouragement, in the use of means. Probation will do much in behalf of "God's great end in all things," though it will witness much that He would not have, and fail of much that He would have. He would "have all to be saved," but they will not be. His own chosen methods will not be attended with universal success. Some, yea, many, alas! too many, will resist his will and his Spirit with its array of means and influences, and have to be turned over, to the dernier and less acceptable, but necessary retributions of moral government. "For he must reign until he hath put all his enemies under his feet." A supreme governor does not in the moral sphere always have all things subdued to him. There may be rebellion, and in it much that he does not will or wish, and it may bring disturbance into the physical relations of his subjects, and there may be a process of things, before the issue comes. But he will maintain himself against that rebellion, and succeed in putting it down, if not in one way, then in another. If mercy fails in anything, then retribution will take up the work, and the principles of his government will be vindicated,—"the righteous shine as the stars," and his great end be attained in all honor and justice and mercy and truth. Thus God's relations to wrong are right, and he is infinitely happy in himself and in the prosecution of his great end, though all are not saved and though "he has no pleasure

in the death of the wicked." And this style of moral government is legitimate, and appreciable, and satisfactory. It *is* moral government and free from the insuperable objections which must forever attend the view above referred to,—and to which we now present the still more serious and ultimate disclaimer, that,

8th. *It sanctifies sin.* It constitutes sin the Divine method of the universe,— as integral in the Divine economy,—as a Divine strategy and expedient, introduced therein with a view to the glory of God and his great end in creation. As such he decrees it, its time, and manner, and amount, and all the concomitants of it, so that there shall be just as much sin as God has decreed, without power to the contrary. All sin is a Divine method, and according to the Divine programme and as such inevitable, and without ability on our part of preventing it. We state the case sharply, but truly. However stated it comes to this. All this, and much more indeed, in the same direction, is the logical sequence of the position we controvert and its theological adjunct and reason. Any form of thought which takes sin into the Divine economy, obliges us to give a good reason for it. The doctrine of any strategic, propositional relation of God to the introduction of sin, commits us for the whole, and we must view all the wrong of earth and hell, as comprehensively according to the mind and will of God, and must hold him responsible for all there is of it, and then the doctrine of "no power to the contrary" is legitimate and necessary. And thus its friends understand it. Not to go further back, Dr. Hopkins of Newport wrote a volume to jus-

tify God as the proponent of moral evil, in which, with other language equally decisive, he says, "If God did will and choose that sin should exist, (which he maintains,) this necessarily implies, as has been before shown, all that energy, exertion and disposal of things that is necessary, previous to the existence of sin, in order that it may actually take place, and without which it could not have existed. For there is an infallible connection between the will of God that sin shall exist, and the actual existence of it, and this will of God is the cause or reason why it has taken place rather than not."*

Dr. Bellamy, in a more apologetic tone, writes a volume on the "wisdom of God in the permission of sin," while Dr. Emmons, with his sturdy unflinching logic, carries the subject up to its only legitimate conclusion, in his "Divine efficiency and scheme." For surely God ordains sin, and causes and controls sin in accordance therewith, "without power to the contrary," how on any other scheme does it take place? Current theology of the Princeton type, pressed in this matter flies to the extreme, that "God is above morality," and that "no rule reaches him," † while others, better posted, if not less unscrupulous, run the whole subject into mystery, and frankly acknowledge that the "rationale" of wrong, a matter in respect to which we have had and must have more practical experience and constant responsibility than on any other, is incapable of being understood. And so it is on the principle here objected to. The great Neander so esteemed it, and so it ever must

* System of Divinity — Decrees.
† See Review of Beecher — Princeton Review.

be esteemed, as an element in the Divine economy. The future will be further from appreciating it than the past. No man will ever write about it as did Hopkins, or with Emmons assume the logical sequences of the "efficiency scheme." The maturity of the study of *moral science* forbids it. *No one on that side will again encounter a discussion of the subject on its merits.*. With a standpoint in the Divine economy, the existence of sin is an insoluble mystery, and must ever remain so. The studies of eternity will not reconcile us to the doctrine that God is the proponent of sin in a scheme of things, and as such has decreed it and its accomplishment, and then, as an indispensable adjunct, necessitated it in the volitions of his creatures. It would be far wiser to take a lesson or two from conscience here, as this is essentially a moral question, and the solution of it practically in and of our convictions every time we sin. No one has ever introverted his attention at such a time, without the unequivocal conviction that, in this, he is outside of a Divine economy, and counter to all Divine will and purpose respecting him. He would himself be shocked to think that he was then fulfilling a Divine decree concerning him, and obeying a Divine arrangement for its execution, and, moreover, that this was all he *could* do in the premises. If there be a theology that cannot be preached, we apprehend that this is it. For ourselves we prefer one that can be preached, and to take counsel of that of "*the feelings*," if that of the "*intellect*" must be so lame and ungodlike. We scarcely know how to sympathize with those who find so much difficulty with the theology of sin. Perhaps we have

had more experience of sin than they have. We would hope so for their sake. For ourselves we view it as wholly a wrong seed—that it stands out in a plan of its own, and a plane of its own, and has about the relation to the economy of God, that rebellion has to the strategy of a state, and that while intelligence is and must be capable of it, and moral government inherently liable to it, as its abuse and perversion, it is no way of God, that it is in no sense according to the will of God, or has his consent or purpose in its behalf, or that it should be, or that we should commit it, but that, on the contrary, "His will is our sanctification," and that God sustains none but antagonistical relations to sin and wrong in every respect, and that he is taking the best methods of the Infinite to subdue and overcome it and instruct the universe out of it as a real dualism in finite cause. We have here the first truths of reason as well as the gist and spirit of Revelation and we get a theology that can be preached, that the conscience endorses, and that does not outrage its convictions of what must be the being, and perfections, and work, and way of God. Whatever else is true, we think this is, and that, based on the principles of truth, it will be found to justify itself in the light of all well balanced investigation that may be made respecting it in the future, while it is free from the insuperable objections of the scheme which makes God the proponent of wrong, and constitutes sin an integral element in the Divine economy of the universe.

Finally. *The view we oppose is virtually surrendered in the explanations of its friends concerning it.* Its "necessity"

is resolved into a mere "certainty," but how the one becomes a correlate or synonym of the other is not so well shown, and though this seems to be an advance in the right direction, yet its meaning is not fully obvious. It can not be intended to refer to an existent volition and reduce itself to the insignificant proposition that what is, is. It is prospective in its aim, and would make sure the future of our voluntary history and describe its law, and constitute that law, in the doctrine of motive influences on the will. And then to make that doctrine efficacious for its theological intent, that influence must be a Divine method, in the interest of and to insure a Divine government, and the carrying out of a Divine programme, in our voluntary history, and to give a Divine control in it as being that which God has ordained, and comprehensively, would have. This was the sense and the aim of the distinguished men already quoted, and it is necessary to the validity of the scheme. We regret to say that it was an integral element in the great work of "Edwards on the Will." But it forgets that the mind is a "*causa causans*,"—that it has in itself a real personality, and control of its voluntary states—that it is a power in itself and capable of resisting any force of motives thus imposed, and of course, of breaking up any scheme of things thus devised—that Propensity is no authorized law of choice, and that no constraint of wrong can apologize for it, or place us beyond the power and obligation of right action. Derived intelligence is made in the image of its author, capable of originating its voluntary states, on a plan of movement and progress which is its own

and not another's. Self-origination of plan and style and acts of voluntary movement is essential to all personality. God has his plan, and angels and devils theirs, and men theirs, but we shall be slow to conclude that the converse of this is true, and that the plan of each is that of all, and that the plans of all the apostate spirits of earth and hell are, also, that of God for them. "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, nor your ways my ways," saith the Lord. But if only a certain futurition of volition is intended by the necessity scheme, then what is to be understood by that? Of the future *we* know very little, and with all the power of forecast, that the experience of the ages or our own has given, we are often sadly disappointed in respect to the conduct and course of men. God knows all, always from the intuitions of his own infinite mind, and is competent from the resources and prerogatives of his own infinite being to bring out, in mercy and in judgment, a final result, glorious to himself and to the principles of all righteousness, in which his kingdom is founded.

But why not go a step further, and acknowledge that derived intelligence is a power in its sphere in the sense that its author is,— that it is self-acting from the resources of its own interior and essential being, in view of the elements and grounds of choice, within its reach, competent always for right action, and intelligently responsible for its course,— self-sustained and approved in all right action, and self-convicted and self-humiliated for all sin, as that which is needless and unnecessary as well as hurtful and wrong,— that the

method and government of God is a perfect righteousness, and his influence and will and purpose for a perfect rectitude, in those "created in his image," and his end, a holy, happy universe in his love and likeness—that all other and else than this in the moral sphere is not of him—that he is filling the universe with motives and incentives to love and obey him, and furnishing none to the contrary, and no excuse for sin, and that he is taking the best methods to reduce and bring all into subjection, in mercy and judgment and will, "until all his enemies be put under his feet,"—the "righteous shine as stars in firmament," and "God be all in all." Doing this, we should not feel much disposed, as we "*certainly*" should be under no "*necessity*" to complain. But our limits are up and here we close, commending this whole subject to the careful study of those who would seize on the true lineaments of the Divine government, and of the intelligent accountability of man.

CHAPTER XV.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO THE PREVENTION OF SIN.

[*a*] Where God is, and created intelligence, *there* is moral government.

[*b*] Moral government has its nature, and capabilities. It is a government of law—by motives—truth—reason and right—and by elective, resistible means. It implies a possible alternative in action. It may be resisted, maligned,—abused,—its intents be thwarted and its penalty incurred. It involves the liability of right or wrong action under it—obedience or disobedience,—conduct, character, destiny,—good or ill desert,—rewards and punishments.

Its results are a contingency, of which one factor is free-will. That may be which it [moral government] does not will or want, and which it would not have, and against which all its instructions, guards and methods, are set and its provisions made.

[*c*] This nature of moral government is its excellency and glory. In this lies the principle of all morality and

virtue, of all right and wrong in conduct and character —of all goodness, justice, righteousness,—praise and blame,—all appreciation of character and conduct,—all estimate of the perfections and worthiness of God, or of his creatures,—all spiritual advancement, sympathy and communion, and all the peculiar and transcendent excellencies and glories of a moral system.

[*d*] All intelligence has its behoofs and prerogatives, without which it would not be intelligence, and this as properly in derived, created beings, as in the underived and uncreated Jehovah. It is in the likeness and image of God in these respects. It has personality—free-will —a personal discretion and jurisdiction over its voluntary states and acts and control in them.

This is the logical and conscious doctrine of choice, and is essential to our intelligent responsibility. See chapter XIV.

[*e*] Sin, in wrong choice, is an inherent liability in a moral system. This could not but so be. It is possible from the very terms of the system. This is an elective system. A power to do right is a power to do wrong. That which can be, may actually be, and history shows that it actually has been, and is. It is not necessary but contingent, in a moral system. It may come through ignorance and inexperience, foreign temptation, heedlessness, forgetfulness, disregard of divine admonition. A "fac simile," we have in every day's transgression.

[*f*] Sin will first occur through the wrong or forbidden use of constitutionally right propensities, powers, or elements of intelligent being. It is an apostacy. It is an abnormal state of the soul, and implies a falling

away from the right and normal state of the soul. Sin can only thus be at first. Fact shows that it did thus occur.

[*g*] Sin when once broken out, will follow the law of habit and propensity, and strengthen by indulgence. It may perpetuate a sinful moral nature, and beget in a race a hereditary proclivity to wrong. This is what is sometimes termed "original sin," or sinful nature. It is a proclivity to wrong in the habits of the race, traceable to the first and test transgression. It is like an entailed propensity to drunkenness or any vice. It is not in itself sin, but a tendency to it,—an inclination —a bias—a perpetuated habit or propensity, whose indulgence is sin,—whose rebuke and discomfiture is praiseworthy. This is the law of all intellectual and voluntary existence.

[*h*] Moral government can not say that sin will not occur. Its very nature supposes the liability of sin. There is no way of stating the case that does not involve this, so that the question "why is not all sin prevented," is simply and purely irrelevant. Sin can be—law can be violated,—a discretion must lie with the subject, and be vested in him, whether to obey or disobey, in order to any responsible or praiseworthy issue, as well as from the inherent electivity of the subject matter. God may be wholly with his law, and place all the guards of moral government against transgression, and yet it may occur:—and that it can occur, is proved by the fact that it has occurred.

[*i*] The character of God is not implicated in the breaking out of sin. He does all for its prevention,

and for the legitimate ongoing of the moral universe in righteousness, that moral government implies and admits of. Sin is antitheistic in its inception, and altogether against the will, and without the permission of God. As it could be, so it is, the prerogatives and prohibition of God to the contrary notwithstanding. It is no way theistic in its origin, but the Divine relations are all antagonistic to it.

[*j*] The origin and existence of sin are fully accounted for in the doctrine of personal cause, existing in intelligent beings. Man can disobey God, and the resources of moral government may not always prevent it.

The provisions of moral government may be exhausted in behalf of the right, and yet wrong may occur. It is of the sovereignty of free-will and necessarily contingent in moral government.

Sin is not to be resolved into "the secret will of God." It comes through no want of faithfulness in Him to the cause of virtue and all righteousness. It is simply the transgression of his whole law, and disobedience to his whole mind and will. The Almighty has not an attribute that allows it.

[*k*] Moral government has more resources for the cure and discomfiture and putting down of sin, than for its utter prevention at first. "The way of transgressors is hard." Sin is a critic on itself. It grates against conscience and writes a bitter history. The moral history of the world accumulates reason against it, and adds force to all virtue and righteousness. Sin occurs at first through ignorance, misconception, inexperience,

mistaken views,— foreign temptation (in man) and appeal to the lower constitutional susceptibilities. It is out of harmony with the ideas and first truths of the reason, and has the endorsement of no intelligent element of mind. There is no good reason for it, and no being in the universe that really justifies it, and that is not ashamed of it. Truth and right accumulate in strength and in grounds of acceptance with the progress of ideas, and are in harmony with the sufficiency of God. An argument for the position that the Gospel will universally prevail, lies in the fact that it is *true*. Mind and truth are correlates. Sin shrinks from investigation—error has no reliable basis—all sciences favor the truth — this is seen in human history—all progress tends towards Christian civilization. The millennium of prophecy is the only reasonable end of the earth's history.

[*i*] Sin would not be likely to occur, except in the outset of a moral economy. Mature mind would be too wise and good for it. It is the offspring of mistake, inexperience, indiscretion, and heedlessness at first. See Gen. III : 6. Experience in virtue and goodness will give confirmation in all rectitude. As no good reason exists for sin, so intelligent beings will observe this, and get beyond actual liability to a first apostacy from right. So elect angels—so the Church triumphant in heaven. Confirmation in holiness to those that have not sinned, is as much a law of mind as an appointment of God. We may hope that the universe is largely peopled with intelligent beings who have passed beyond the actual liability of sin and apostacy from God.

[*m*] Sin is no co-ordinate of a Divine moral system It is a possible alternative, as rebellion is in the state, or disobedience in the family, but is no part of the system. That is perfect of itself in its legitimate ongoing, and sin is but the abuse of it,—its rupture and bane, and the forfeiture of its benefits. Sin is a malfeasance —an aberration of mind, guarded against, and sought to be prevented, by moral government.

[*n*] Sin is no matter of Divine arrangement or decree, and is not thus conditionated. God intentionally knows all things, and knows them in the relations in which they exist and as they exist. He purposes what he wants and would have, or rather what he does. Eph., 1:11. His purposes have respect to sin, as those of any good being may, and as may be needful to antagonism with it, and to bring good out of it. His purposes and acts are all in conflict with sin, and for its prevention, discouragement and overthrow. Sin is no strategy of the Deity. It could not be, for three reasons—it is logically impossible, as contrary to his *nature*,—to his *will*,—and would compromit his *character*. He could not deny himself—he would have no heart in it, and he must respect his own good name.

[*o*] God will bring good out of evil by showing where he is—by manifesting the contrasts of right and wrong, and bringing honor on all righteousness, and dishonor on all wrong—by making the wrath of man to praise him,—turning their wicked designs to fulfilling some good and wise purpose—taking advantage of their wrong to accomplish his good ends—as in the death of Christ.

[*p*] The conditions of this. Sin must not be a Divine method, and God must enter into no propositional relation to an economy of sin and wrong. Sin as a method must not have a theistic origin, or be in any sense a Divine expedient. It must in no sense compromise the unity, holiness, or goodness of God, by being of his arrangement or in any sense according to his will. There must be an out and out antagonism between God and a system of wrong. His relation to it must be wholly that of prevention, remedy or punishment.

[*q*] As sin is a liability, when it occurs it may be treated providentially and judicially for the good of the universe:—for instruction—warning—mercy—retribution. Its unwitting agency may effectuate a Divine purpose and God may interlock with it, in any way that any good being may and will in his sphere, for and in behalf of his own wise and benevolent purposes. He may yield his Son to its machinations, and make his death the life of the world. He may antagonize with sin as "bona fide" the method of another, and against his own will, in any and all ways within the sphere of goodness and righteousness, and he may serve himself out of it, at his own discretion, in any way possible, in furtherance of his own wise ends.

[*r*] Divine moral government will eventually succeed against sin, by the use of physical power. Retribution in the end enters into it, and becomes an integral part of it. Probation, its incipient stage, uses moral means mostly and subsides into retribution, which puts down all authority and power, but of God.

[*s*] Moral government in its actual sway and com-

mand, may never be complete and universal over all free-will. Retribution even, may not conquer the heart. Lost spirits in hell will not in temper be subdued to God. But retribution affects the condition,—it acts materially or physically, so to speak. It is a dernier resort, to put away, where they will do least harm and receive merited punishment, those that are not in spirit recovered under probation. Devils and damned spirits will forever resist and be opposed to God and unsubdued in will.

[*t*] It is to be hoped that the number of the lost will in the end be few comparatively to that of the saved.

[*u*] God is ever infinitely happy, notwithstanding the existence of sin, because his preventive, remedial, and punitive relations, and all his relations to it, are right and he does all the case admits of to remedy, and to bring good out of it.

CHAPTER XVI.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO PERSONAL RECOVERY FROM SIN.

[*a*] It recognizes the element and doctrine of free-will, and the electivity of mind. It in this relation abides in the supernatural. [*b*] It claims the basis of an intelligent, personal responsibility. [*c*] It supplies the requisites of right choice, and fills the universe with reasons for it, and motives to it.

[*d*] It makes its appeal to the reason, the conscience, and every susceptibility of the soul. [*e*] It operates by providence, probation, and retribution. [*f*] It claims in man the ability for right action, and that the impediments in the way of it are such as he is legitimately required and bound to overcome. [*g*] It makes impenitence appreciably sinful and intelligently remediable and preventable, and penitence for sin a reasonable command and duty. [*h*] By describing the harmony of reason and religion, it shows the impediments to piety to be in the lower, earthly, apostate nature,— the "law in the members,"—and therefore no way of God,

but the fruit of rebellion against him. [*i*] It presents the inherent oppositeness of the call to repentance. [*k*] It shows sin and sinning to be exceeding sinful.

[*l*] It leaves impenitence without excuse. If moral means are resistible, so much the more are they obligatory.

CHAPTER XVII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES.

I. DEPRAVITY AND NATURAL STATE.

[*a*] The apostacy of Adam took effect in two ways:—it diverted the race from the track of obedience, and it vacated the economy of legal obedience, as the way of eternal life under which man at first was placed. [*b*] It rendered acceptance and communion with God impossible, and salvation too, on grounds of law strictly and of personal obedience. (*c*) It induced a course and habit of disobedience in the race, degenerating into a propensity to sin in departing from God, and the setting up of self, attended with that discouragement in returning to God, which the entrance of sin occasioned. (*d*) The natural state of man, then, since the fall, is that of rupture and alienation and controversy with God; of broken covenant and obligation and of effort for self-justification, self-help, and self-reliance. It is self-love and self-respect carried over into selfishness,

and disrespect of God, of the claims of his law and authority, and of all righteousness and truth. It is selfism, instead of piety and devotion to God. It is depravity—a falling off from God to idols in form or spirit, and a yielding up ourselves to ways of disobedience to him. (*e*) Depravity has its primary seat in the will. It took its rise in a wrong voluntary state or act, and perpetuates itself in the habit of disobedience. It follows the law of habit—its indulgence begets propensity — wrong proclivities are formed, and hereditary degeneracy ensues. See this law of being in the rise and peculiarities of clans and nations,—in the influence of particular vices. (*f*) The constituent elements of our being abide in us nothwithstanding the fall. A man is a man yet, though apostate from God. He has reason, conscience, and free, responsible will. These faculties may be clouded and perverted by sin, but they yet exist, and give their testimony for God and the right. (*g*) A proclivity to sin or any given course of action, may be perpetuated, and inherited. It falls into the general law and doctrine of kindred and race. It obtains everywhere in nature, and in all being. We beget in our own likeness and after our kind. A proclivity to good would not be objected to, a proclivity to evil is the fruit of disobedience, and not a Divine responsibility.

[*h*] Responsibility, on strict analysis, is personal and untransferable. The indulgence of a sinful or wrong bias, or propensity, or proclivity to evil, whether hereditary or otherwise, is sinful and consciously so, and the obligation to confront and overcome it perfect and

acknowledge, and compliance with the obligations is praiseworthy, and an excellence in the sight of man and God.

[*i*] Proclivity to sin, as related to personal responsibility, is a temptation to sin; it is the indulgence of it that is sin, and the resistance of it that is commanded, and a duty, and an excellency and praiseworthiness. "If original sin" technically, be this proclivity, it has this reference and takes this solution, and does not impinge on the general law of personal responsibility.

[*j*] "Native depravity," as a state, is the being born in such a world as this, with such proclivities to wrong as are imposed on any given generation, by those preceding it, and especially by our first parent Adam, in the outbreak of sin.

[*k*] Depravity, as a life and a responsibility, is the personal indulgence of such proclivities, and a living in them, and apostate from God, and unrecovered from the reigning influence of sin and of these propensities which incite to it.

[*l*] "Total, or entire depravity," such as the Bible and history describe the native state of fallen man to be now, is the being wholly self-given up to the lead and sway of these proclivities, and to a life alienated from God, and to a state of impenitence in sin, a state destitute of holiness and love to God. All are not to the same degree depraved, but all are alike in this, that in their native, unregenerate state, they have not love to God, and do not from love to him obey his will.

[*m*] Moral government regards them as created with requisite powers, and sufficient means for all righteous-

ness, except through their own fault or the fault of the race but as wholly deficient in the life of piety and obedience, to which all true religion implies and demands.

II. REGENERATION.

[*a*] This may be regarded either as a state or as an act or work done, and moral government ascertains its nature and relations in both respects. In the first, it is regarded more in its issue and results; and in its act, more in its essence and cause. A state of regeneration is the state, habit, or mode of life into which the regenerating act introduces us. It is the new life, and the new state of pardon, reconciliation, and acceptance with God, and of submission, peace and love on our part. The regenerating act or work is that which is done in the soul in passing it out of the state of unreconciliation, and disobedience and condemnation, into that of reconciliation, forgiveness, and favor.

[*b*] This act or work has its divine, and its human side and relations. It is God working in us, or we acting under divine influence, suggestions, and efficiency. God works in us to will and to do, and we thus willing and doing, under those effectual divine influences repent of sin,—become penitent for the past, and turn believingly and lovingly to God,—yielding up the controversy and submitting to him on the terms of the Gospel. It is a combined movement of divine influence for our right action and of our compliance with it, in repenting, believing, loving, or whatever grace is first in the circumstances of the case, and the first in conversion, and we pass into a regenerated state. We are

not regenerated before we are penitent, but when and as soon as we are penitent. It is our thus becoming penitent that makes it true of us that we are new creatures in Christ. We do not repent because we are regenerated, but because of the effectual working of the spirit of God, through the truth, convincing us of sin, and inducing penitence for it, and which when wrought in and exercised by us, is the ceasing of the impenitent, unconverted state, and the passing into the renewed, or converted state.

[*c*] The philosophy of conversion or regeneration, is the same as that of any other change in the habituated, voluntary state of man. It is a change of action in view of good reasons for it, made effectual by the Divine spirit. It is a reasonable change in view of good reasons for it, apprehended, and in the view of the mind under the lead of the spirit. Other changes in the voluntary state of the soul occur without this superadded agency; but such is our proneness to sin, such the strength and constancy of our sinful habits and propensities, that we never should truly break away from them, and truly repent and turn to God, without special help from him, in sending the Spirit to work in us to this end. All is according to the laws of mind, and to the doctrine of any and all change in the state of the will, or the voluntary change of mind; but special means and help thereto are granted, in regeneration and recovery from sin.

[*d*] In regeneration no new power [or faculty] is communicated to the soul, but a new direction is given to those inherent in it. Its faculties are exercised in a

different way, under conviction of sin, we yield and repent, whereas before we resisted and held out in impenitence; and as we thus repent and submit, it becomes true of us that we are penitent, converted persons, renewed in the spirit of our minds.

[*e*] In regeneration we are conscious of no influence and no change but in view of the truth, and in accordance with it, and such as the truth is calculated and designed to work. It is right voluntary action, in view of the truth, through the Spirit.

[*f*] In regeneration, a new habit, inclination, or propensity, or proclivity to right action is commenced, which gradually strengthens in the progress of the soul in that direction, so that *that* action becomes more easy and habitual as we advance in the knowledge of the truth and in obedience to it, being helped of God.

[*g*] Regeneration is not a miracle. It is but giving "the law in the mind" the ascendancy over "the law in the members," and recovering a man to legitimate right action and life, through instrumentalities and by methods which accord with the laws of mind and the principles of all intelligence.

[*h*] It is better to regard this change from nature to grace as every way an intelligent one, and an accountable process of mind, than to clothe it in mystery, as a dark and unappreciable matter, bearing no relation to the laws of mind and truth, and concerning which no intelligent account can be given. John III. : 8–10. The Savior uttered these words, not to shroud the subject in mystery, but to explain it, and to rebuke Nicodemus for not understanding it better; and if it could be put

among "earthly things" then, which neophites should understand, what light ought the progress of the ages to have thrown upon it since.

[*i*] Moral government demands that this change, described as regeneration, be in the voluntary and responsible element of our being — a change of spirit, aim and action, and of relations to law and duty, under the guide of reason and conscience, and not in any constituent faculty of mind.

[*j*] It is a change fitly required of us, and the command "make you a new heart," is just and proper.

[*k*] The agency of God, in our conversion is to be regarded as a needful, and gracious help thereto, but not in abatement of our responsibility therein.

III. JUSTIFICATION.

[*a*] Moral government decides that sin can not be forgiven, or the sinner accepted, without an atonement.

[*b*] It decides that the sinner can not be justified on the ground of personal merit and righteousness. The doctrine of the Days-man is in the woof of moral government, if rescue for the sinner is attempted.

[*c*] It is also in the conscience. No man can ever be intelligently reconciled to himself for a single sin, on grounds of law. One wrong is forever fatal to the soul. Conscience proclaims any sin an eternal wrong, and forbids reconciliation to it.

[*d*] The subjective and the objective of moral government agree in this, and proclaim the doctrine of a vicarious atonement in order to the forgiveness of sin.

[*e*] A sense of demerit, and desert of punishment, is

inevitable on the commission of sin. It is universal. Thus law has its counterpart in our own bosoms ; a law is but the outward and overt expression of our own minds in the premises.

[*f*] The Christian doctrine of justification in its Divine relations, is that of God's forgiveness of sins ; and, on its human side, that of our being forgiven and and accepted with God. It is a gracious and sovereign act of God, in which he freely pardons our sins, accepts us into his favor, as his children, absolved from the legal penalties of our transgressions and delivered from condemnation, and restored to a state of reconciliation and peace with him. This act does not ignore the facts in the case, but forgives and accepts,—restores and adopts, and accounts us as children and heirs, notwithstanding those facts, and though in the full knowledge of them.

[*g*] The locality of justification among Christian doctrines, is next in order to repentance or acceptance of the terms of mercy. We could not be justified while impenitent, and it is promised as soon as its conditions are met, and is in order then. It is so in the order of nature and reason, as well as of the Bible. When one is penitent for his sins and acknowledges them, and submits to rightful authority, then is the place for the exercise of forgiveness and for his deliverance from condemnation. This is all the sinner can do, to get restored, and just that which the nature of the case requires of him, and just what he is constitutionally empowered to do.

[*h*] The meritorious ground of justification to the

sinner, is the mediation of the Son of God. His equal "status" with the Father enables him to undertake this work. As God the Son, he could humble himself without disparagement to first principles of law and right, and take upon him our nature, and die in our stead. The substituted sufferings of Christ unto death, are that in which the atonement primarily consists. The acknowledgement and vindication of the claims of righteous law, which are seen in his making his soul an offering for sin, and dying "the just for the unjust," that we might be made the righteousness of God in him. This self-surrender and self-sacrifice, for the sake of another, honors moral government, and exhibits God as just, though he justifies the ungodly on the terms of the Gospel. It is the doctrine of commerce—of common life—and of the human mind.

[*i*] Personal merit in the sinner as the ground of justification, is excluded from the fact and the demerit of sin, and all release from the penalties of law must be by the Days-man, and the method of expiation.

[*j*] Moral government decides that rescue and grace must be by substituted suffering and atonement. It can accept nothing less than an equivalent to the legal penalty of transgression.

[*k*] Atonement need not be in kind or duration the same with the penalty incurred by sin, but it stands in its place and before the universe a full moral equivalent, so that all right conclusions of mind therefrom will defer to the claims of law, and justify the method of grace.

[*l*] Atonement may be more than the bare equivalent

for the penalties of law. It may not only justify pardon, but honor it, and open the way to all the glory and blessedness of a kingdom of grace. And hence,

[*m*] Atonement opens the way for all that is peculiar, and excellent and enriching and desirable in an economy of grace. And hence,

[*m*] The songs of angels, and of the redeemed of earth, "to him who died for us and hath redeemed us to God." "To Him be glory," &c.

IV. SANCTIFICATION.

[*a*] This in its process is regeneration continued, and perfected in the full and complete subjection and obedience of the soul in spirituality and holiness and the love of God. The process on both the Divine and human side is identical, though its commencement is technically and fitly termed a regeneration or spiritual renewal and recovery to God, and its progress a sanctification of the whole man, gradually and eventually, by the word and Spirit of God, working together in us and with us, in bringing every thought into obedience and love.

[*b*] Sanctification is the transformation of the whole soul into the love and likeness of Christ. It is right action in the recovered sinner in the circumstances in which he is placed, under the influence of truth and of the Spirit, and making progress therein, onward to perfect manhood in Christ. It consists in progressively getting the victory over sin in all its forms, and in being at length brought into the perfect likeness of God.

[*c*] Sanctification is a process of activity in us and by

us, intelligently prosecuted under the lead of the truth and Spirit of God. We are conscious only of acting in the matter under the influence, and in view of the truth, but the Spirit of God gives it efficacy, and secures success to the work, without which it would fail and come short of accomplishment. This is a revealed doctrine,—a needed gracious economy, and in its working every way in accordance with the laws of mind. We have analogies of it on every hand. We ever act in the midst of influences from those about us — all intelligences act more less upon us,— all agencies from without are or may be associated with our voluntary being and conduct, and character and destiny.

[*d*] Sanctification is a self-confirming process. It obeys the law of habit, and the general laws of mind, by which accustomed action becomes easier. We gain habits of well doing and are fortified against temptation. We gain instruction, and see more and more the wrong and folly of sin.

[*e*] Sanctification is every way a rational and intelligent process. It is like the dawn and progress of the morning. Under the lead of the Spirit reasons for goodness of heart and life accumulate; the sphere of divine knowledge enlarges, as the approval of conscience and the blessedness of piety become sweet and attractive, and the ways of God more desirable.

The highest truth,— the largest thought, and the truest culture are found in the knowledge of God and the studies of religion.

V. PERSEVERANCE OF SAINTS.

[*a*] This doctrine asserts that all who truly repent and are born from above, will persevere unto life everlasting.

[*b*] This would seem to be the only reasonable result from the process of sanctification.

(*c*) It is opposed by the "law in the members," and all the impediments from this world—the lusts of the eye—of the flesh—and the pride of life.

(*d*) It is nevertheless graciously promised and guaranteed in the word of God.

(*e*) It is effected through the agency of the providence, word, and Spirit of God on our voluntary nature, and its correspondent action to this end.

(*f*) There is a momentum force gained at length that expedites this result. "How can ye that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?"

(*g*) There are arguments for it in all reason and truth, and all increasing knowledge of God, and of the grounds of obedience and love.

(*k*) Confirmation and perpetuity in a given course of action become the law of mind eventually. There is probation and retribution, or reward, in the very nature of mind. It is the subjective correlate of moral government. In the bad, conscience at first an advisory monitor, becomes, when long resisted, a scorpion sting of remorse. The Rubicon may be passed in moral character, and conviction, in the wrong-doer, be changed into despondent self-reproach, self-infliction, and self-surrender to ruin and woe. The converse of this is true

in the good. One passes over eventually by the laws of the intelligence from probation to its results. Apostacy, if it ever occurs in the history of an individual or a race, will occur early and in their unripe experience, Holy angels are past its actual liability. So are the redeemed of earth, in heaven. They know too much,—have had too much experience—and are too good, to act so unwisely and so wickedly as to sin against God.

(*i*) Multitudes of worlds may have attained already this experience and discipline in virtue and truth. Hence

(*j*) Confirmation in holiness and rectitude is a natural result under moral government and in a morol system, as well as the appointment of God. There is consent in the constitution of mind, and the overt dispensations and awards of this government, and as this system inherently has probation and retribution in it, so has the human mind.

(*k*) The confirmation, perpetuity and growing perfection and blessedness of the heavenly state, is the reasonable and innate result of moral government under God, no less than it is his gracious, positive appointment; and those who fail of it must be false to their own being, to the provisions of moral government, and to God.

VI. REPROBATION.

(*a*) Moral government essentially has probation and retribution—character voluntarily formed, and the results of it in destiny. A moral system implies and necessarily involves this. There must be personal con-

duct and rewards and punishmemts, according to character and desert.

(*b*) This too, as elsewhere stated, is subjectively the doctrine of conscience.

(*c*) It is also a law of mind that probation changes to, and issues in, retribution—opportunity claims its response and its award.

(*d*) Persistence in wrong eventually hedges up effectually the way of return, character becomes stereotyped, and self-reprobation ensues.

(*e*) Reprobation, as a divine act, is in conformity with these inherent and essential principles of moral government, and only the declarative and needful eventuation of them, in the authoritative superintendence and government of God.

(*f*) Moral government declares the condition of the lost to be ir-remediable and endless.

(*g*) It is with God an unwelcome an unavoidable issue and resort:—moral government has no other alternative.

(*h*) Good faith demands this of God.

VII. FINAL STATE OF THE LOST.

(*a*) It is that of rebellion, and disobedience and unreconciliation of heart.

[*b*] It is that of confirmed rebellion. The heart is not only hardened and the habits and propensities to sin confirmed, but the moral susceptibilities have passed over into that second stage, where conviction only maddens, and excites despondency and remorse—where light only reproves and reproaches, and all motives to

goodness bring up but a sense of loss and ruin, and the wretched experience, the "harvest is past, the summer is ended, and I am not saved."

[*c*] It is that of physical control over and confinement in the lost world. The physical condition in hell is assigned of God. It is as he is ruler and judge. So from the claims of law, and the demand of the well-being of the good and holy.

[*d*] It is a state of punishment for rebellion and persistence in it.

[*e*] It is a state of increasing depravity and moral degradation and departure from God.

[*f*] It is a state of increasing wretchedness in sin.

[*g*] The lost in hell must be regarded as the refuse of a moral universe. They are those on whom moral government has tried and served out its instrumentality without success. They are the few, it may be hoped, as compared with the saved and the happy of all worlds; but, few or many, moral government holds over and on them. They must endure its claims, and be put where they will do the least hurt. They must be a spectacle to the universe, and its instruction against sin.

[*h*] God in administering the behests of moral government on the finally impenitent, will be complete in righteousness, and be fully justified by the necessities of the case, and in the hearts of all right minded intelligences.

[*i*] The conscience of the lost will justify the ways of God.

VIII. FINAL STATE OF THE SAVED.

[*a*] It will be a state of freedom from sin.

[*b*] It will be a state of active holiness, ever increasing and expanding in the love and likeness of God.

[*c*] One of unalloyed, and perfect yet ever increasing blessedness.

[*d*] One of perfect Divine approbation and favor.

[*e*] One of uninterrupted and rapid intellectual culture and attainment.

[*f*] One of the highest culture and delight of the social affections, and emotional nature generally.

[*g*] One of greatest activity in the service of God.

[*h*] One of wide communion with the servants of God. All worlds and all space may be its theatre.

[*i*] As stated in the caption, it will be final, and eternal. It is so by divine appointment, and by laws of the intelligence.

CHAPTER XVIII.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO COMMON SENSE.

[*a*] Religion is and must be an intuition of mind; its statements must be intuitional, or reduced to those which are. All truth must be, in order to be appreciated.

[*b*] Religion is a first truth in reason. Moral government follows from the existence of God, and our existence. The obligations of religion are inherent in the relations of the Infinite and the finite, and must be palpable to each, and lie in the sphere of common sense.

[*c*] The subjective and the objective coalesce and harmonize in the teachings of religion and illustrate them to each other. They correspond with and respond to each other, in all the statements and requirements of religion. That can not be true which the mind can not appreciate as such. Ignorance and perversion may hinder the rightful operation of the intelligence, but truth in religion will sustain and justify its largest scope, and be sustained and justified by its largest attainments in knowledge and investigation.

[*d*] All truth is intuitionally apprehended by the divine mind; it is therefore capable of being so apprehended. We are made in the image of God, and therefore made to apprehend and appreciate truth in our measure as he does, though the process and helps of the finite are peculiar, and all progress in attainment advances us on in the intuitional apprehension of all truth—"seeing as we are seen, and knowing as we are known."

[*e*] Moral government endorses this statement, and demands this recognition in the ideas of the reason, and the conclusions of common sense.

[*f*] Much is gained in this harmony of reason and objective truth—this coincidence and consent of "the me" and "the not me." It is both guide and detector—it helps to show what can, and what can not be.

(*g*) It is a mistake in theology to have its statements belie the principles of common sense, or be such that the mind can not get a reliable and legitimate ground of conviction in their truth. Revelation is made to the principles of the intelligence, and will be consistent with them. It is both nugatory, and false to God, to propound for religious doctrine that which can not be appreciated.

[*h*] This would be a needless and grievous mistake. Truth is one, and God is one, and man is made in his image, to apprehend, appreciate, and honor and love him. Enigmas and contradictions of the first principles of morals and of belief do great harm. They palm on Revelation what does not belong to it, and tend to destroy confidence in it, and a sense of obligation for it.

[*i*] Mysteries in religion, or in the statement of religious doctrine, must not compromit first principles of truth or belief, but must be the suggestions of truth in accordance with them although from our immaturity we may not be able to comprehend them. Some things we fully know, now. The first truths of reason can not but be true. The conviction of them is irresistible in their own light. They are true, whatever else is, or is not,—that God is, and is infinitely perfect, and is to be worshiped, and has moral government, with all its legitimate principles and issues. Mysteries must not controvert these. They lie on in coincidence with them, in the range of truth and concrete reality farther than we can see, yet they are properly subjective, and not objective. They will not contradict what we do know, but be in aid by their announcement of our imperfect vision of what lies beyond.

[*k*] The future will enlarge the intuitional basis of our theology, and the strength of the popular conviction in the word of God.

[*l*] The gospel will yet have free course and be glorified. All science and truth and general cultivation will help it. It has now the greatest sway in the most intelligent portions of the earth, and in the most intelligent portions of given communities.

[*m*] The gospel will be found to be the hand-maid and the medium of a universal civilization.

CHAPTER XIX.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

[*a*] God is the only original source and depositary of authority. If he is not, there is no authority or objective foundation for it, or for morality or character any way. The atheist can have but conventional arrangements among men, and in the interest of expediency only, and even these without consistency or fixedness in moral principle and without moral obligation for their observation. Without a God there is no morality. As you could not administer an oath, so you could not obligate a man to keep his word, or speak the truth. Conscience would then be a half truth, to be triumphantly and consistently beaten down by the passions.

[*b*] Civil government is an ordinance of God, and gains its validity in that way. It is by delegation; the civil magistrate is God's minister to this end, and the state is God's appointment for highest good. It is without binding force on the conscience except for this.

Being divinely authorized, subjection to it is a religious duty.

[*c*] A specific form of civil society or government is not required as a universality. It will vary with the state and progress of general civilization in a community or in the world. With the growth of intelligence and virtue will be the prevalance of equal rights and the emanation of government from the people and for them.

[*d*] Civil government aims at real rectitude of character, and the prevention of all viciousness of heart in its sphere, and fails only in its means for the detection of sin. Its methods and evidences must be palpable, but its inquiry is after the state and crime of the heart, and asks for the "malice prepense." Its theory is that of real guilt and real righteousness, though obliged to study its doctrine in the light of overt acts.

(*e*) Civil government has subjective validity in the the moral nature of man.

(*f*) Civil pains and punishments or penalties, are legitimate, and should be administered as under authority derived from God.

(*g*) Punishment in the state should have strict regard to the question of deserts.

(*h*) As civil government is based on the divine government and assumes it, so should it accept its principles, and come into harmony and likeness with it.

(*i*) The maturity of the world will convince this harmony and coalescence.

(*k*) The Bible will yet be the statute book of nations, —not in form, but in principles, in spirit, and life.

(*l*) The nations will yet be one; not in form, per-

haps, but in administration, in laws, in aim, in spirit, and in mutually striving together for the peace, prosperity and welfare of each other.

(*m*) A millenium is as much a reasonable result and outgrowth of human society as it is the appointment of God.

(*n*) The subjective and the objective coalesce in the suggestions of prophecy respecting the latter day.

(*o*) Art, science, the Gospel, and the grace of God—the aspirations of humanity, and the composition and momentum of its forces in the interior and exterior spheres, under God, are conspiring together for it.

CHAPTER XX.

MORAL GOVERNMENT AS RELATED TO THE FAMILY CONSTITUTION.

(*a*) The family state, a primeval arrangement.

(*b*) It is a divine constitution for propagation of the earthly being and securing its experience and benefit.

(*c*) The elements of it — parents,— children born to them,— parental love and care — filial dependence and need — parental authority and guidance — filial submission and obedience.

(*d*) The wisdom of it. It provides support, oversight, instruction, culture, training. Knowledge is an experience and not a creation. Derived mind begins at zero, and must in some way [first] be taught what it knows [comes to know.]

(*e*) The family relation is a type of the divine—God is our Father—Christ our elder Brother.

(*f*) Husband and wife—relations—reciprocal duties.

(*g*) Rights and duties of parents.

(*h*) Rights and duties of children.

(*i*) Relations of brothers and sisters—corresponding duties.

(*j*) Obligations of children to aged parents—to parents when poor and infirm.

CONCLUSION.

(*a*) It has been the design of the foregoing chapters to present an intuitional scheme of thought,—to apprehend the unity of reason and religion, and to give the adaptations and coincidence of objective truth, in the inevitable verities and laws of the intelligence which God has given us. As God apprehends all truth intuitionally, so is it capable of being so apprehended. This is its only true appreciation, and all advance of thought in this direction, and all reconcilement of truth and satisfactory comprehension of it, in the light of the necessary laws of the intelligence is so much gained from the domain of the unknown and added to knowledge. Improvement here is the enlargement of mind —its rest and satisfaction. Our intuitional convictions preclude debate, doubt, and misgiving. Their language is, "this I know, I see it must be so." All the lines of truth converge upon it, and we abide in it as we do in the intelligence of the senses.

(*b*) A further object has been to unify and give universality to the principles of morals. These are essen-

tially the same in underived and derived intelligence,—in God and in those made in his image. To God pertain the rights and the prerogatives of an independent Creator, but on this account he may not do wrong and punish the innocent with the guilty. "Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" God owes it to himself and to his image in the finite, to do what is just and right—to be good and benevolent; and he would falsify himself and all unfallen intelligence to be otherwise.

Systems of theology have been equivocal and faulty at this point. Some writers have gone so far as to assert that "God is above morality, and that no rule reaches him." The difficulty has been of a dogmatic origin. It has arisen from a supposed theological necessity, and from giving a strict, metaphysical interpretation to the popular, oriental phraseology of the Bible. Thus the character of God has been compromitted in giving his relations to sin. We would avoid that, and find in the generic unity of truth a satisfactory and intuitional vindication of the first principles of morals, in their application both to the infinite and the finite. We think this is done in the scheme of thought here suggested, and the subject cleared of that mystery which has been wont to hang over it, to its immense disparagement and injury.

(*c*) We have endeavored to treat the subject of moral government as lying wholly in the *supernatural sphere.* This gives a proper personality to the will, and clothes it with legitimate freedom and responsibility. It absolves the Infinite from the responsibility of being sole

cause in the universe, and admits that there may be that in the moral sphere and descending thence to the physical, which God does not will or appoint, but which is averse to all his purposes, and which he circumvents and overcomes and brings good out of, by methods like himself, and eventually by retributive power. This preserves the unity of God,—vindicates the Divine morality, and gives meaning and vividness to the doctrine of right and wrong. This harmonizes with conscience, and impresses with vitality the doctrines of grace and all the features of a moral system.

(*d*) Our course of thought, also, indicates the harmony of the philosophical and of the positive in truth. Discrepancy here has been the great clog on the wheels of improvement and progress in knowledge. Men have stumbled on and been discouraged because of the disagreement of theories with facts and first principles. The consistent appreciation of the supernatural, and the necessary elements of a moral system solve the problem, vindicate virtue, and throw the legitimate responsibility where it belongs. This is the demand of conscience, and no system of ethics can be satisfactory, or lay claim to perfectness without it. To gain this, and harmonize the teachings of the *a priori* and of the *a posteriori* methods, is the great problem in moral truth.

(*e*) Our great aim has been for the unity of being—the grand harmonies of the moral sphere, in its design and conduct from the hand of God. God is one,—the universe must be. Principles must be universal,—so must be the first truths of reason,—the law of morals, and the doctrine of conscience, and the principles of

common sense. We would strike this chord, gain this interior element of truth, and by it adjust the relations of existence, and see that divine philosophy which, emanating from God, runs through his works, and is summarily propounded in that comprehensive passage of his word :—"For the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are *clearly* SEEN, being *understood* by the things that are made, even his *eternal* power and GODHEAD.—Rom. 1:20.

PART III.

THESES IN THEOLOGY.

III.

FOURTEEN THESES;

OR

OUTLINES OF THEOLOGY.

I. THE BEING OF GOD.

In this age of rapid movements, crude opinions and surface work, there are yet those that *think*, that inquire after the *philosophy* of religious belief — that would gain the first truths of reason, and reconcile therewith the statements of theology and the doctrines of the Church.

1st. Theology is *moral science* in the department of religion.

2d. It is embraced in the three categories,— the *Infinite*, the *finite*, and the *relation* between them.

I.— The Being of God.

1st. Something is.—(Proof)—(1) The senses; (2) consciousness; (3) universal conviction and consent.

2d. Something always was.— The derved implies the

underived; the created, the uncreated; the finite and dependent, the absolute and independent.

3d. Original of being, not matter.—Matter not inherently cause — has a reason for being, and being in one place rather than another — is dependent; a thing placed; is in itself without design or end.

4th. Original of being, spiritual, personal intelligence —the "I Am," of the Bible. Intelligence is cause *per se*; it *only* is cause; acts from design; has an end in what it does. This is true of derived intelligence — much more of the underived.

5th. Knowledge has a *chronological* method and a *logical* method. We are, therefore God is. The being of God is pre-supposed and known in the being of anything else. It must be that God is, if anything is.

6th. We may know that *that* is, which we can not comprehend — hence may know God, and that He is, though not able to comprehend the Infinite.

7th. It is not to be expected that *derived* intelligence will comprehend the *underived;* the law of knowledge is by analogy.

8th. If the finite, created, is only by the Infinite, uncreated, then is the Being of God the complement of all knowledge and thought, and God is all His works.

II. THE PERFECTIONS OF GOD.

Both physical and moral are Infinite.

1st. If not infinite, then is He finite, limited, created dependent, and then not God.

2d. Rectitude is the moral state and method of all intelligence.

3d. Infinite, personal intelligence, could not act legitimately or satisfactorily to itself except rightly, and according to truth.

4th. Moral wrong is only by defection from right—is by way of apostasy;—in God is no ground of change.

5th. Sin is a mistake as well as a mislead, and as such could not be predicable of the Infinite, or be of the nature of intelligent action in Him.

6th. Malevolence is never an end. Sin has the real sanction and subsidy of no mind, as that which is in itself desirable. It is never chosen for its own sake:—the vilest are ashamed of it, seen in its true light and under the testimony of conscience.

7th. Our constituent being "made in the image of God," repudiates wrong—"the law in the mind," as contrasted, with the "law in the members."

8th. The Jehovah of the Scriptures, with all perfection of knowledge, of power, of wisdom, goodness and truth, and every attribute of the uncreated, absolute, One, infinitely and immutably.

Inferences.—1st. The Divine economy is *pure* and *perfect* in all morality.

2d. All imperfection, and wrong and ill, is through the abuse of that which in its normal method and ongoing, is right and good.

3d. Sin is in the finite, and is resultant of the abnormal action and movements of finite cause.

4th. The Judge of all the earth will do right

5th. We ought to have unlimited confidence in the wisdom, rectitude, and faithfulness of God.

III. THE WORKS OF GOD.

1st. A quiescent Deity is a solecism. God is an intelligence — a cause — a power: He will have forthgoings and work.

2d. A work is of necessity in the finite. It is something done—a factum ; a reason for it, and a cause of it lie out of, and before it. It has time, and place, and all the accidents of the finite.

3d. The forthgoings and work of God will be the result of His perfections, and truly represent them — their cast, and design, and method, and scheme, and end, will be such as a Being of perfect rectitude can approve.

4th. The work of God, so far as known to us, or appreciative by us, will be in the physical and moral spheres—matter and mind—nature and spirit—things and persons—irresponsible existence and responsible, intelligent beings.

5th. The physical sphere will be in subordination to the moral or spiritual, and for its sake, and adapted to its developement and behests.

6th. A moral system or sphere, with intelligent beings in the likeness and after the image of God, is a perfect work. Nothing else could be better, or be in its place, for this is like God, and truly a result of His perfections, and its moral ongoing must manifest Him and be worthy of Him.

7th. Such a system, including God and all other intelligences, is inherently an end in itself, and the highest end.

8th. It is unreason to ask anything else in the place of such a system.

Inferences:—1st. The present not a choice of systems, as though embodying on the whole the fewest evils and the most good. Such a category would put God into the finite. His economy is a perfection and not a balancing of expedients. It is a rectitude, and any imperfection in it, would ruin it for Him and render it unworthy of Him.

2d. All evil originates in the infraction of the Divine economy, and moral evil is the parent of all other evil.

3d. No good reason can be given, or need be attempted, for the existence of wrong.

4th. The existence of moral evil is not to be resolved in a theistic argument, and no vindication of the character of God is called for in relation to it.

5th. Sin is in every respect antagonistical to God—to his purposes, and end in all things, and implies the righteousness and perfection of His being, economy and ways.

IV. MORAL PRINCIPLES THE CO-ORDINATE OF MORAL BEING.

1st. Moral principles inhere in moral relations.

2d. Like all mere qualities they must inhere in some ground, and that ground is moral beings; they imply and have personality.

3d. The relations of the Infinite and the finite involve and evoke them. Worship and obedience are not more an appointment of God than the demand of our being and a meet response from the relations subsisting be-

tween us and Himself. God appoints them, and instructs us in respect to them, because they are in themselves meet and due.

4th. A Divine revelation to us would be of the nature of a manifestation to the principles of being in us, and on the ground of the relations subsisting between us and God.

5th. The Bible has its doctrinal basis in the elements of all truth, growing out of the being and relations of the Infinite and the finite—the conscience attesting the obligation of Divine precepts.

6th. A revelation from God is information from the depths of the Infinite, on principles of truth recognized in our being and inherent relations to God.

7th. From the nature of the intelligence, sin wounds the conscience—it would if in the Infinite as well as in the finite. "That be far from thee to slay the righteous with the wicked. Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?"

8th. Natural ill is inherently consequent on moral wrong. It is not so much by overt appointment as inherent connection, from the nature and relations of the intelligence.

9th. God modifies and uses this relation of natural ill to moral wrong, for purposes of probation, and all ends in righteousness in a moral system.

10. Retribution is naturally and cumulatively consequent on sin and probation.

Hence,—1st. The Bible and reason are not in disagreement.

2d. Natural religion is a stepping-stone to that which is revealed.

3d. Revelation is exegetical of natural religion.

4th. Objective truth has its prototypes in the ideas of the reason.

5th. All Divine precepts are adapted to our moral being and inherently obligatory.

V. THE PURPOSES OF GOD.

I.—Purposes are a mental state or determination of mind, antecedent to, and conditional for an action of the agent purposing.

II.—The purposes of God are His mental determinations, concerning His own work, or of what he will do.

1st. This is the universal law of intelligence. One purposes his own conduct, and what influence to exert on others in behalf of objects desirable to him.

2d. A purpose, like a conception, is necessarily original, and personal in the mind that has it. Two individuals may have like purposes in relation to the same object, but then their purposes are distinct, and it is every way unphilosophical to hold them as identical, and to say that one purposes the purposes of the other.

3d. Free *original* thought, and design, and voluntary action are the characteristic and law of mind. It is so in the Infinite; it is so in those intelligences, "made in His image."

4th. God secures desired ends through a scheme and providence of His own, and "according to the counsel of his own will;" meeting, antagonizing with, or accepting the action, or plans, or purposes of others, as may

seem best to Him—his thoughts are not their thoughts, nor their ways His—by "bringing light out of darkness and order out of confusion," &c.

5th. In this way is the glory of God secured, as related to the machinations and work of wicked agents—not by planning their plans and purposing their purposes—but through a plan and purpose of His own, circumventing, overruling, defeating them, and bringing good out of evil.

6th. That philosophy is unsound and fallacious which prescribes a Divine programme, and ordination of all that *is*, in the responsible, moral sphere.

7th. We know that much is, in the responsible, moral sphere that God does not will, or devise, or want.

8th. We see no need of God's willing or ordaining moral wrong in order for it to be: it is essentially antitheistic.

9th. Physical ills, as the result of moral wrong, may be Divinely modified and used for good.

10th. The purposes of God are in accordance with all morality, and appreciably so.

11th. Resignation to evils, which are consequent on wrong received, springs not so properly from the fact that they take place, as from the overruling and recuperative agency and influence of God, in our behalf, respecting them.

12th. The purposes of God are equivalent to, and identical with an ever-*present* discretion in righteousness, in the sphere of the Infinite.

Hence,—1st. There is unity of being and of character in God.

2d. There is an appreciable morality in God.

3d. The pure and holy Jesus was a truthful manifestation of God.

4th. Our theology need not stumble, or be perplexed at the doctrine of the *purposes* of God.

5th. No good reason need be attempted for the inception of moral wrong.

6th. Sin is every way without excuse.

7th. The decrees of God are no bar to prayer. They are but the righteous decisions of One who abides ever in the present, to minister to the wants of His creatures, and answer those who cry unto Him.

VI. MIND INHERENTLY CAUSE AND SELF-CONTROLLED.

1st. This is true of the Divine mind, by universal concession.

2d. Finite intelligence is made in the Divine likeness.

3d. This is the doctrine of consciousness.

4th. This is essential to personality.

5th. This is essential to responsibility.

6th. This is the doctrine of law, of probation, and penalty, as applied to intelligent beings.

7th. This is admitted in the propositions of mercy.

8th. This is involved in all exhortation, all submission of truth for practical purposes, in all discipline, rewards, and punishments. Why exhort to that which cannot be withheld, or which is already in your own power?

9th. This is of the very element of *will*, as contradistinguished from the necessitated faculties of mind.

Hence,—1st. The sovereignty of our *voluntary state* is with ourselves.

2d. All influences from without, and means of moving mind, are submitted to its arbitrament, and discretion, and responsibility, as to the response we give.

3d. The finite can resist and disobey the Infinite, and often does.

4th. That may *be*, which God does not will, and as he is of one mind, which he has never willed or determined.

5th. It is irrelevant to inquire why God has not prevented all sin and wrong.

6th. A moral economy may, in probation, but imperfectly accomplish the will of God.

7th. Probation has a natural result in retribution.

8th. God may never regain in all hearts, and see his will done in all minds; he will never have the spiritual control of the finally impenitent and lost ones.

9th. The question of power, or almightiness in God, is out of place when applied to the coercion or absolute control of the will in his intelligent creatures.

10th. All gospel influences are resistible by the mind.

11th. These influences may nevertheless prevail, and yet increasingly, "in ages to come," and the world be converted to Christ.

12th. Men may repent, as they ought, when they *can* hold out in impenitence, as others do.

13th. Moral government has an eventual resort, in physical force, in respect to those who refuse compliance with its righteous dictates. God fixes the physical condition of the finally impenitent and lost, but their

wills will never be under his control, or be as he would have them to be.

VII. THE METHOD OF THE DEITY.

The method of the Deity, in all his works, is a pure righteousness, and every way consistent with the first principles of morality.

1st. He is an infinitely perfect, spiritual being.

2nd. His contrast, and great ultimate end, must be worthy of him, self-satisfactory to himself, and *morally like himself*.

3d. His object must be the greatest righteousness of his intelligent creatures, and their highest *moral likeness* to himself, and the greatest good as therein contained.

4th. Any dereliction from this on the part of his intelligent offspring, must incur his rebuke and displeasure as contrary to his will, and a disruption of his method and design in all his works.

5th. The manifestations of the Deity on the actual outbreak of wrong, on the part of angels and men, and his position in respect to sin ever since, evince this.

6th. A method or plan of things is for the sake of its execution, and is nugatory and worthless without it.

7th. A method or plan of things has the moral quality of its execution.

8th. God would institute no method or plan of things whose execution he could not approve. The outbreak of sin would complicate the divine relations to wrong, and the methods of God's antagonism to it, but an

original, Divine economy will be pure in all righteousness.

9th. Sin, as a device, is essentially antitheistic, and could be no part of a Divine plan, or economy of things.

10th. Any propositional relation to sin in the Divine scheme of the universe, would be suicidal in God, and could not meet the approval of intelligences made in his image.

11th. No such relation to wrong in a scheme of things, could be imitated by those made in the image of God, without incurring his displeasure and rebuke.

12th. Such a relation would involve the absurdity, that there can be a good reason for an intrinsic wrong.

13th. And also, that wrong, whenever and wherever it occurs, is better than right. Hence,

14th. That wrong as it exists is the best thing possible and therefore is not wrong.

15th. We are instructed to be the followers of God as dear children, but cannot without self-condemnation, imitate him, in a scheme of things, which devises and plans that which is morally wrong.

16th. Our constituent moral being, which is like that of God, repudiates a wrong method, as much as a wrong act.

17th. Sin cannot be a Divine expedient,—James i. 12 : 17,—God can not be tempted with evil.

18th. If God ordains moral evil, it must be for a good reason, which involves a palpable solecism.

19th. If God ordains wrong, then is wrong needful in a right system, and a right system is defective and imperfect without it, and a wrong is necessary to a perfect moral system, and a part of it, and is therefore not a wrong.

20th. If God ordains wrong, it is out of preference to its being, to anything else in its place, [or because he prefers it rather than anything else in its place;] and where wrong is, he prefers it to right, and chooses moral evil there to moral good, and if so, then is there no unity or determination of moral character in God. Hence,

Inferences:—1st. Sin does not ask God's leave to be

2d. Sin has not God's permission or consent to be.

VIII. A MORAL SYSTEM.

A moral system is a perfect work, and a divine necessity, though sin and wrong are an inherent liability under it.

I.—It is a perfect work.

1st. It is the work of an Infinite and perfect Being.

2d. It is in the end [to secure the end] of a universal and perfect righteousness, and [is] capable of it.

3d. Its crowning work and reason are intelligent beings, "in the image of God," and for this end, and adapted to it.

4th. It gives a true and proper personality, like that of God.

5th. It involves a legitimate and proper responsibility and destiny.

6th. It furnishes, subjectively and objectively, (within and without,) all requisite grounds for perfect excellence of character and state.

7th. Nothing else, or other than such a system, made in the likeness of God, and for such an end, could be, without being imperfect, and being unworthy of God. And hence,

II.—A moral system as above, is in some sense a Divine necessity. It has the perfect freedom and whole soul of the Deity in its behalf as nothing else or otherwise could have. Nothing different would be of the nature of intelligent action in God. Right intelligence for a right end is the sphere and true expression of the infinite, and of a Divine economy in the finite and created of being.

1st. Finite mind acts often on defective or imperfect promises, and may be mistaken ; God never.

2d. Finite mind may, through change and inconsistency, get at fault with truth, and right, and God, and come to hate and resist Him ; but God never.

3d. Infinite intelligence can see no reason against truth and right, or for sin and wrong, and must ever be of one spirit and one mind for the eternal rectitude of a moral system.

III.—Sin and wrong an inherent liability under moral government or in a moral system.

1st. A moral system has free cause in the finite.

2d. A power to do right is a power to do wrong, and in the finite the alternative may become an actuality.

3d. A moral system involves the legitimate and proper submission of the question of right and wrong, of char-

acter and destiny, and would be a worthless pageant without it.

4th. Its central idea is the discretion and responsibility of free intelligence and will.

5th. Its vitality, excellence and glory, lie in this, that its righteousness is not imposed and inevitable, but elective, and in the place of something else that might be, and which would be wrong.

6th. All personality involves this, and would be reduced to mere thing without it.

7th. All conscious reponsibility is based on this, and is impossible without it.

8th. We are conscious, only, of moral resistible influences, in relation to conduct and character, conformity or the want of it, to righteousness and law.

9th. It cannot be proved that any other influences in this regard exist, or are possible.

10th. The principle that underlies the whole subject of law, prohibition, exhortation, warning, penal infliction, &c., in this regard. Does one exhort to that which lies in his power?

11th. The question of fact. Sin could not be without the liability of it. Its existence shows the liability of it in a moral system.

Inferences.—1st. A moral system is not responsible for its abuse.

2d. A moral system cannot be altered, even though it may be abused.

3d. The question of sin belongs not in an argument concerning God. God is not its father; it is not of his economy for a universe, but outside of it, in one of its own, and is essentially antitheistic.

4th. The inquiry is irrevelant and absurd which asks why God does not prevent all sin. The element of electiveness is essentially in a moral system. Its means may all be expended, and yet its subjects go astray. It always submits the question of obedience to the mind's voluntary arbitrament.

5th. That may occur under a moral system, which is in no sense in accordance with the will of God; which may be like rebellion, to the will and strategy of the state.

9th. As sin is not a Divine method, God may exercise his discretion as to the time and way of manifesting his antagonism against it—may let the wicked fall into the pit which they have digged, and even let sin be the means of its own discomfiture, and of accomplishing his benevolent purposes against it, and for its overthrow.

7th. A probationary economy does not of course (may not) accomplish the whole will of God, or witness only that which is according to his will.

8th. Retribution has the element of physical power.

9th. The supremacy of God is through an independent economy of His own, circumventing sin, triumphing over it; either first by moral methods in probation, or eventually in retribution, to the honor of all righteousness and truth.

IX. SIN NOT AN EXPEDIENT IN THE DIVINE ECONOMY.

In these theses it is not claimed that each succeeding one is *wholly* an advance from the previous ones, but that in the use of them, it presents some additional

view of the subject in hand, and adds something to the stock of thought intended — and to-day as follows, viz. :—

Sin cannot be an expedient in the Divine economy of the universe.

I.—1st. 1 James xii, 17: "For God cannot be tempted with evil," &c.

2d. This would imply that there is a good reason for the existence of wrong, and that where it exists it is better and more desirable than right.

3d. Sin is never only a means to an end, and if it be the Divine resort in an economy of things, then is God, in this respect in the same catagory with all others who make it a resort in the plans and purposes they form.

4th. As sin is but an intrinsic wrong, an essential *un*-reason, it is impossible that God should see *reason* for it in the Divine economy of the universe.

5th. As sin is essentially antitheistic, it is logically impossible that it should be an ingredient in the divine economy or an expedient of it.

6th. If sin is a divine expedient, then must God see reason for the infraction of his own law, which thing is absurd, and this

7th. Would imply that God is not immutable, and, of course, that he exists in the finite.

8th. If sin be a divine expedient, then is it a divine necessity, and God is dependent on it, in his own economy, for the greatest good.

9th. If sin be a divine expedient, then is not the right and normal ongoing of a perfect moral system the

best method for it, and imperfection and wrong are better than perfection and right, and if so, then

10th. A perfect righteousness is not the highest good.

11th. Then, too, is not the law of God perfect in its requirements, and perfect obedience to it is not a duty, and it is better broken than kept.

12th. If sin be a divine expedient, then does God see infinitely good reasons for it, and that wherever it exists it could not be exchanged for anything else without detriment to a moral system.

13th. If so, then is it not contrary to the will of God, and then it is what God would have to take place, and then is it not wrong, and then, too, is it not sin, and sin is an impossibility; and then, too, is likeness to God and conformity to his will impossible without sin.

14th. The *heart* of God would revolt at, and repudiate, such an expedient as sin in his method of the universe.

15th. It would be to adopt the false and pernicious maxim, that "*the end sanctifies the means.*"

16th. It is impossible that sin should be a resort, as a method to an end, of any but a finite and wrong-minded being.

17th. Those made in the image of God and who are commanded to be like him, cannot follow such a lead in their methods of securing results without forfeiting perfection of character.

18th. The conscience which God has given us, as the transcript of his own, will not endorse such a resort in the plans we lay and the methods we employ.

19th. If sin be a divine resort in the scheme of the universe, then is it clothed with the dignity of a divine strategy, and entitled to the respect which belongs to the plans and purposes of God.

20th. Then, too, ought we to know this, and to feel that when we are sinning, we are subserving the highest interests of the universe, and then, likewise, ought we to sin in the spirit of obedience to the will of God. But

II.—1st. If sin be not an expedient and resort in the divine economy of the universe, so it need not be: it is essentially antitheistic, and is abundantly accounted for in finite cause contravening and counteracting the will, and purposes, and great end, which God has in view in all his works.

2d. If sin be not a divine expedient, &c., then "to its own master, it standeth or falleth."

3d. And then, too, is not conscience a mislead, and a perfect divine moral government is no mistake and no pageant.

4th. Then, too, is the divine prohibition of sin, at first, and always consistent, and appreciable, and exegetical of the unity and moral perfectness of all his relations to it.

5th. Then thus, also, is his providential rebuke of sin, and his final settlement of woe on all those who persist in it.

6th. Then, too, is not the gospel merely part of a divine strategy, in common with sin, but a real divine remedy against it, and its outbreak in the finite contrary to the will and prohibition of God.

7th. And hence the consistency of repentance of sin, in order to forgiveness *under* the gospel.

8th. If sin be not God's expedient in his divine method of the universe, and all his relations to it are consistent with perfect rectitude, then his peace of mind is not disturbed by it, any more than that of any other perfectly good being, in view of wrong.

9th. As sin is thus in no sense of God, he may exercise his sovereign discretion in his methods against it within the sphere of all rectitude and goodness — may let it be for its own rebuke and discomfiture, and even yield His Son to the power of his own enemies, "that through death he might conquer him who had the power of death," and be the life of the world, and thus bring order out of confusion, and light out of darkness.

10th. As God is in the right, in this controversy with sin and the powers of darkness, and has therewith all the moral and physical rescources of the Infinite, we may confidingly know that, according to his Word, he will reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet, and eternally vindicate the excellency and glory, and triumph of all righteousness, and goodness, and truth.

Finally.—The prayers and labors of all good men in behalf of the cause of Christ and against sin, and the common sense of all men on all subjects, are a united testimony for the validity and correctness of the view here taken.

P. S.—I propose but two more themes in this series

—the *method* of the *Divine Supremacy* and the *terms* of a completed moral science.

X. THE SUPREMACY OF GOD.

How does the Infinite comprehend the Finite? or, How is God Supreme?

1st. Not that he is the *only* cause.

2d. Not in absorbing from finite intelligence the *proper* element of personal cause.

3d. Not in possessing, in relation to finite intelligence, *direct* and *absolute* sovereignty of its voluntary states. This would destroy it. Sovereignty in this regard is of the essence of personality, and all legitimate responsibility.

4th. Not by the universal programme, and arrangement of all that is, so that the actual ongoing in the moral sphere is resultant of his supremacy, and an exponent of, or in accordance with, his plan and purpose and will; and so that nothing shall be, but what he in some sense wills.

5th. Not by the Divine permission of, or consent to, wrong.

6th. Not by being unmindful or regardless of the fearful wrong and remediless effects of sin in a moral system. But

7th. In making, at first, a perfect system and economy of persons and things with finite intelligence, "in his own image, and after his likeness," at its head, and for a perfect end, in the highest rectitude and excellence.

8th. In using all the appropriate influences and pre-

rogatives of the Infinite to keep it so, and universally to attain this end.

9th. In knowing, intuitively, what are the inherent liabilities of a perfect moral system, and the facts of it in actual history.

10th. In being physically omnipotent and independent in the full appropriate sphere of the Infinite, "Who doeth all things after the counsel of his own will."

11th. In aiding and sustaining, and influencing, in every way of wisdom and truth, all right action in finite cause, in accordance with his purpose and great end in all things.

12th. In antagonizing, in every way of wisdom, integrity and truth against all wrong there, "bringing light out of darknesss, and order out of confusion;" limiting the prevalence, and remedying the effects of sin, and instructing the universe in view of it.

13th. In the use of the prerogatives of the Infinite, bringing, however, a triumph at length on all righteousness, and discredit and discomfiture on all sin and wrong.

14th. In reigning to the eventual putting down of all sin and confining its adherents to their own place, and the exaltation of all righteousness.

15th. In securing glory to his name, and to all righteousness, in all these his relation to the finite.

16th. In doing all that, in the moral sphere, to this end, both in probation and retribution, which is appropriate to them on the part of the Infinite.

Inferences.—1st. Then is there legitimate cause and responsibility in the finite.

2d. Then is there unity of moral character and aim in the Infinite.

3d. Then is the Divine moral economy a reality and no mere pageant.

4th. Then may there be that, which is every way contrary to God, and in resistance of his will.

5th. Then may there be that of which God is in no sense the projector, and of which he may say, as in the Bible, "I neither spake it, neither came it into my mind."

6th. Then is sin an intrinsic evil, and no way a Divine strategy for good.

7th. There is good connected with sin, only in the way of remedy from it and its effects, through a counteracting Divine providence.

8th. Then is the condition of the finally lost, the only Divine alternative concerning them.

9th. Then is the supremacy of God, in respect to the moral system, more to be observed in its *results* than in its *probationary* ongoing. "For he must reign until he hath put all his enemies under his feet." "For now we see not all things put under him."

XI. THE TERMS OF A COMPLETED MORAL SCIENCE.

I.— Moral science is not complete while it fails to harmonize *religious doctrine* with the fundamental principals of all morality,—our creed with our conscience.

1st. Conscience is a God-send,— an element of our moral being as constituted in the image of God.

2d. As God is one, our subjective being, as Divinely constituted, must be in harmony with objective truth.

3d. The conscience is, necessarily, the *concrete* umpire in every question of right.

4th. The conscience *is* in harmony with all known truth; and hence

5th. That is anomalous, and out of place in religious doctrine, which belies, or is out of harmony with the dictates of conscience as above, and, at least, argues an incomplete analysis of the subject.

II.—Moral science is incomplete while it *ignores* the relations of God to wrong.

1st. Moral principles are co-ordinates of the Deity; we estimate his character by them, or how know that he is good?

2d. We were made in his "likeness," and if he is "above morality," so may we be.

3d. God is our example, and we are commanded to be perfect as he is.

4th. He is the objective scource of authority, which vests only in righteousness.

5th. If we do not know God's relations to wrong neither then do we know his relations to right, and are at sea, over the whole domain of morality and religion.

6th. Ignorance of the Divine relations to wrong begets a weakened sense of obligation in ourselves to do and be right.

III.—Moral science is incomplete while it fails to give the doctrine of full and proper *personal cause* in finite intelligence.

1st. This is the doctrine of consciousness. We have the personal "me," and it is legitimate cause, in its own behoof, as truly as in the Infinite, and we can not ignore it.

2d. It is essential to responsibility.

3d. It can only account for the existence of sin, and wrong, and thus the terms of a completed moral science are that it *defines* the relations of God to *wrong*, and harmonizes our religious creed with our conscience and the first principles of all morality.

IV.—The dogma that sin and wrong are a Divine strategy, and are introduced into the Divine economy as an expedient for good, does not thus harmonize religious belief with the first principles of all morality,—the creed with the conscience.

1st. It does not profess to do this, but acknowledges the incompatibility in question.

2d. It argues always, respecting it, to the point of *ad ignorantiam.*

3d. It asserts that the relations of God to wrong can not be resolved, and that he is "above morality" in this respect.

4th. It involves the solecism that a wrong method may not be wrong.

5th. It involves the immorality that "the end sanctifies the means."

6th. It makes the expedients of mercy to be of the

original law of the Divine economy, of which, from the nature of the case, they could not be.

7th. It is exposed to all the objections stated in this whole series of *Theses.*

V.— The doctrine that makes sin no part of the Divine economy, but simply an outbreak from it in finite cause, *does* harmonize with the first principles of belief in the conscience and with the doctrines of all morality.

1st. It holds that the relations of God to wrong are suggested as a first truth of reason and morality.

2d. It takes to the point of *ad intelligentiam*, what the other view takes, to that of *ad ignorantiam.*

3d. It meets the demands of consciousness, in the doctrine of cause, in our voluntary nature.

4th. It meets the terms of conscience in the question of morality.

5th. Intelligence in finite being constituted "in the image of God, and like him," possessing the attribute of inherent cause in its sphere, must, as properly as he does, originate its voluntary states, and plans, and purposes, and voluntary acts, on the responsibilities of a moral being.

6th. On no other principle is there any vitality in a moral system, and thus this view is demanded by the necessities of *moral science.*

P. S.—This completes the topics designed at present, and may I ask for the whole series a careful revision and study by those who would *justify* religious belief, and harmonize the *creed* with the *consience.*

XII. ORIGIN OF THE SOULS OF MEN.

Are the souls of men the immediate creation of God, and Divinely infused and implanted in them severally, as they gain each their personal being; or, are they resultant of the law of pro-creation and descent, as their bodies are in a continuous economy? Not the first but the last. For if the first, then—

1st. They would be morally pure and perfect like God, as were the angels and Adam at *their* creation.

2d. Then would there be no hereditary proclivity to wrong in the races.

3d. Then would not there be that progressive deterioration in clans and tribes of men often, which history shows?

4th. Then could there be no general lapse of the world into heathenism.

5th. Then would not the influence of a precedent generation, on an immediately succeeding one, be what it is?

6th. Then could there be no nature of things in the race, in the moral sphere.

7th. Then would the lesson of history be less instructive and responsible, and its experience less important and useful.

8th. Then would the doctrine of morality be less imposing and urgent.

9th. Then would not the scriptural doctrine of the nature and necessity of regeneration be true?

10th. Then would the perpetuated idiosyncracies of races and tribes and families of men be unaccountable.

11th. Then would the origin of the race be renewed in every generation.

But in evidence of the last:—

1st. A merely corporeal descent is not a descent of being, and would not constitute it true that Abraham begat Isaac, and Isaac Jacob, and Jacob the twelve patriarchs.

2d. The process of pro-creation is as properly mental as corporeal, and may as properly communicate mental as corporeal being.

3d. Children have as much the mental and moral peculiarities of their parents, ancestors and tribes, as their corporeal peculiarities.

4th. Resemblance of mind to parents often manifests itself in the looks and actions, &c., of children, through the mental constitution. The ideal similarity is often greater than the bodily.

5th. The mental and moral peculiarities and habits of children are but the reflex of those of their parents, often.

6th. The mental peculiarities of children are often but the blended combination of those of both parents.

7th. The children of intellectual parents (*cæteris paribus*,) are the more intellectual.

8th. The headship of Adam to the race, in the matter of accountability, must refer primarily and chiefly to his intellectual and spiritual being.

9th. The doctrine of an inherited proclivity to evil can be true only on this principle.

10th. The universal depravity of mankind is other-otherwise unaccountable.

11th. The scriptural doctrine of the necessity of regeneration is otherwise untrue.

12th. The felt tendencies in us to evil otherwise can not be accounted for.

13th. This only lays the legitimate and sufficient foundation for the domestic affections of parent and child. We name them, and why, if the relation is merely corporeal?

14th. We consciously have those traits of mind which our parents evince.

15th. This is a universal law of being and descent in nature and everywhere,—vegetable, animal, after its kind,—the whole being is propagated—alterations are by cross-breeds and intermixtures—the Infinite, the Son, has the moral nature and "status" of the Father.

Objections: I.—Does not this compromit the doctrine of personal accountability?

Answer. 1st. In all right and normal action of the race, this feature of the economy would be advantageous, and would not be complained of.

2d. That man sinned, and that the race is now off the track, and under the law to sin, is not a Divine responsibility.

3d. The law and lead of sin may be expected to be unhappy and unprofitable anywhere and any how.

4th. All sinful indulgence is personal and resistible, though a proclivity to it may be inherited. It is but the law of all habit and propensity, which one may resist or comply with on his individual responsibility. If the tendency is innate, so are reason and conscience,

with their plea and rightful sway for rectitude, duty and truth.

5th. There must be personal compliance with wrong suggestions and tendencies, in order to be reckoned a sinner.

XIII. THE FORMING AND ARRANGING OF TEMPTATION TO SIN.

Does God form and arrange temptations to sin and wrong?

Answer.—He makes and arranges all things for uprightness and goodness and truth. The drift and aim and design and intent and end of his universal providence, is a holy, happy, intelligent universe, like himself—made in his image for union in excellence and happiness with himself. The universe he has filled with motives to this, and any other use of them is a perversion, which he will punish or remedy.

Proof:—1st. A Divine activity in uprightness, and for it, in the direction of his own perfections, is the boundry sphere of the Infinite.

2d. Any other lead on his part would mar his perfections, and impugn the first principles of all morality.

3d. Any other lead he would have no heart to, as he "doeth all things after the counsel of his own will," and would never do.

4th. For God to sustain a propositional relation to wrong, would be to deny himself.

5th. The relation of sin, to God, must logically be that of rebellion to the state it plots against.

6th. God inhibits all wrong, and, therefore, could

in consistency take no measures in favor of its existence.

7th Sin being an intrinsic evil, could not be regarded by God as the means of good.

8th. His law is the exponent of his whole will in this regard.

9th. His providence and the conscience he has given us rebuke us when we do wrong.

10th. Sin is direct rebellion against the being and government sway of God.

11th. Sin must be rebutted and remedied, in order to have God's end in creation attained.

12th. Sin must be repented of and repudiated, as that which is every way counter to the will and sway of God.

Hence :—1st. Let no man say when he is tempted, "I am tempted of God."

2d. God's providence universally, is but an argument for uprightness and virtue.

3d. The will of man may in its perversity, turn to a wrong use and end a right and well intended providence.

4th. We may pervert to wrong and mischief what God means for good.

XIV. MAINTENANCE OF THE SUPREMACY OF GOD IN THE MORAL SPHERE.

How is the supremacy of God, in the moral sphere, maintained?

1st. Not by being the only cause.

2d. Not by invading or invalidating the appropriate sphere of finite cause.

3d. Not in that the ongoing in this sphere is always as he would have it, or as the transcript of his will.

4th. Not in that all events as related to their causes, or as in themselves, are the best possible.

5th. Not in having the direct and absolute control and sovereignty of the voluntary states and actions of finite intelligences.

But 1st. By the attribute of Omnipotence in its proper working in the physical sphere.

2d. By exerting this power as wisdom directs, and its nature admits of in the moral sphere.

3d. Approximately, through a universe of moral, resistible influences.

4th. Approximately through the appropriate methods of probation.

5th. Approximately through the appropriate methods of a resultant retribution.

6th. Through a sphere of independence, in his own proper agency, and for his own end, over and above all others, and as the case may be in opposition to them.

7th. By an eventually successful combat over wrong in finite cause.

8th. Through a recuperative agency against the mischiefs of wrong in finite cause.

9th. By, at length, putting down all wrong, and confining it to its own place.

10th. By, at length, and in the end, exacting all righteousness over wrong, and bestowing all honor upon it, to the discomfiture of all wrong.

11th. By reigning ever in righteousness himself, and bringing all willingly or unwilingly, in heart or condition, eventually under his sway.

THE END.

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